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Introduction 
American Indian tribes, unlike other sovereigns, have a uniquely limited 
ability to enforce their criminal laws. Criminal jurisdiction is one of the 
most important incidents of sovereignty.1 Criminal laws are a primary 
means through which a society protects people and goods, expresses norms 
and values, and holds wrongdoers accountable. A crime, although it usually 
involves a specific victim, is an offense against the laws of the sovereign; 
this is why the state, not the victim, is the complaining party in a criminal 
case.  
Sovereigns are generally understood to have jurisdiction over anyone 
who commits a crime within that sovereign’s territory,2 regardless of 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See, e.g., ALEJANDRO CHEHTMAN, THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
EXTRATERRITORIAL PUNISHMENT 56 (2010) (“The territorial scope of a state’s criminal law is 
commonly regarded as a manifestation of its sovereignty.”); Markus D. Dubber, Criminal 
Jurisdiction and Conceptions of Penality in Comparative Perspective, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 
247, 263 (2013) (“Criminal jurisdiction is just there, unquestioned, as the obvious 
manifestation of the state’s penal power, itself the obvious manifestation of the state’s 
stateless, its very sovereignty. . . . There is no theory of the so-called territoriality principle 
which determines jurisdiction based on the location of the crime within some sovereign’s 
territory (or within some sovereignty, for short). Territorial jurisdiction just is.”). 
 2. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“[T]he general 
and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be 
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”); David Wolitz, 
Criminal Jurisdiction and the Nation-State: Toward Bounded Pluralism, 91 OREGON L. REV. 
725, 730 (2012). The doctrine of territoriality—according to which criminal jurisdiction is 
determined by the territorial location of the crime—seems to answer most questions about 
which criminal justice system has jurisdiction over which crimes.”). In common law 
countries, the “territoriality principle” is so central that even extra-territorial extensions of 
criminal jurisdiction are often framed in terms of territory. Lindsay Farmer, Territorial 
Jurisdiction and Criminalization, 63 UNIV. OF TORONTO L.J. 225, 241-43 (2013) (describing 
territorial jurisdiction as “the central case and organizing idea” into which other cases were 
“either fitted . . . or treated as exceptions” and recounting fictions employed by courts to 
conclude that an act took place within a particular territory when in fact it did not); Dubber, 
supra note 1, at 265-66 (giving example of Canadian statute in which acts occurring in space 
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nationality, plus jurisdiction over the sovereign’s nationals and others 
whose actions affect its community for crimes committed outside its 
territory.3 When a person travels to another jurisdiction, nationality 
normally does not operate as a shield protecting him or her from 
prosecution, because jurisdiction in those cases is based on the local 
sovereign’s control over its territory.4 Citizenship status, consent, and 
                                                                                                                 
are legislatively “deemed” to have taken place in Canada for purposes of jurisdiction). 
Diplomatic immunity is an exception to the territoriality principle, but the exception is 
limited to those who represent the government and does not generally bar one sovereign 
from prosecuting the citizens of another. See Mitchell S. Ross, Rethinking Diplomatic 
Immunity: A Review of Remedial Approaches to Address the Abuses of Diplomatic 
Privileges and Immunities, 4 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 173, 177-78 (1989) (describing how 
diplomatic immunity is based on the idea that the diplomat represents the foreign sovereign, 
the fiction that the diplomat resides on territory that is under the jurisdiction of the home 
country, and the need to permit diplomats to carry out their work without interference). 
 3. Extraterritorial jurisdiction exists concurrently with, but does not replace, the 
territorial jurisdiction of the local sovereign. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is justified by the 
relationship between the sovereign and either the defendant or the victim of a crime, or on 
the impact of the crime on the sovereign’s integrity. Christopher L. Blakesley, 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURAL AND 
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 108, 116 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3d ed. 2008) In addition to 
the subjective territorial principle (jurisdiction because an element of the crime took place 
within the nation’s territory) and the nationality principle (jurisdiction over nationals who 
commit crimes abroad (“the second most important of the five theories [of criminal 
jurisdiction] worldwide”)), Blakesley describes four other principles that provide a basis for 
the assertion of criminal jurisdiction: objective territoriality (jurisdiction over crimes that 
impact the prosecuting nation), the protective principle (jurisdiction over an “offense [that] 
poses a danger of causing an adverse effect on a state’s security, integrity, sovereignty, or an 
important governmental function”), the passive personality theory (jurisdiction over crimes 
that harms the nationals of the prosecuting state), and universal jurisdiction (jurisdiction over 
universally condemned offenses, such as piracy and terrorism, that any nation claiming 
personal jurisdiction over the offender may prosecute). Id. at 104-15, 121-36. The 
relationship between sovereign and individual matters in this context is understood broadly. 
Extraterritorial jurisdiction extends to citizens as well as to nationals and foreigners who 
commit an offense that affects the sovereign or its people. Id. (describing various bases for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, including the nationality principle, protective principle, and the 
passive personality principle). 
 4. KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG: THE EVOLUTION OF 
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 8-20 (2009) (describing the link between territorial 
concepts of jurisdiction and the European concept of sovereign control over territory, 
enshrined in the Treaty of Westphalia). As Raustiala explains, territorial sovereignty was the 
basis for the era of European and American empire-building, in which Western powers 
extended their territorial reach over lands occupied by non-Western nations, which were not 
recognized as having territorial authority because they were not regarded as having “met the 
prevailing ‘standard of civilization.’” Id. at 14. 
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political participation rights generally have little bearing on the question of 
whether a sovereign can prosecute a particular offender. 
Unlike most sovereigns, however, American Indian tribes cannot 
exercise full territorial criminal jurisdiction. They lack jurisdiction over 
certain classes of people within their territory, but the precise contours of 
this jurisdiction have never been expressed as a coherent standard. Instead, 
the scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction is governed by a patchwork of rules. 
These rules do not issue from a single source, but from multiple federal 
statutes and Supreme Court decisions. 
Tribes generally lack jurisdiction over non-Indians,5 while they retain 
jurisdiction over “all Indians,”6 including their own citizens7 as well as 
“nonmember Indians,”8 but neither Congress nor the federal courts have 
carefully considered who is included in this category. Most recently, 
Congress restored tribal jurisdiction over some non-Indian domestic 
abusers, as long as the non-Indian has sufficient “ties to the Indian tribe.”9 
While these rules may initially seem clear, they become muddier the closer 
one looks. More importantly, they are not linked to a unifying principle that 
explains why tribes lack criminal jurisdiction in certain situations, which 
could guide tribes in determining the scope of their jurisdiction in future 
cases. Without such a considered analysis, tribal and federal courts risk 
relying on assumptions and misunderstandings when determining a tribe’s 
jurisdictional reach, and may interpret tribal jurisdiction too narrowly as a 
result. 
For example, some federal and tribal courts appear to assume that a 
tribe’s jurisdiction over nonmember Indians includes only citizens of other 
Indian tribes.10 Most of these cases have focused on the question of whether 
the federal law permitting tribal court jurisdiction over nonmember Indians 
violates equal protection because it distinguishes between Indians and non-
                                                                                                                 
 5. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978). 
 6. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012). 
 7. Courts have long agreed that Indian tribes retain inherent criminal jurisdiction over 
members of their tribes who commit crimes in their territory. See generally Talton v. Mayes, 
163 U.S. 376 (1896); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1978). While tribal 
jurisdiction has historically existed to the exclusion of state jurisdiction, see Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 540 (1832), the federal government has long exercised some 
concurrent criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying 
text. 
 8. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 198 (2004). 
 9. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B) (2012). 
 10. See infra Parts I.C.1-2. 
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Indians.11 Courts have answered that question by holding that Congress can 
legislate with respect to Indians without violating equal protection. Most 
defendants who have challenged tribal jurisdiction in federal court are 
citizens of some tribe (though not the tribe prosecuting them), so courts 
have relied on their citizenship to justify their inclusion in the Indian 
category, and thus their prosecution by a tribe other than their own. These 
courts are correct that Congress has the power to so legislate, but a focus on 
congressional power has obscured the more difficult theoretical question of 
why a defendant’s citizenship in one tribe should have any bearing on 
whether that defendant may be prosecuted by another tribe. Even though 
the statute affirming tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians12 defines 
the “Indian” category to include more than just enrolled tribal citizens, 
federal courts rarely have occasion consider its effect on the many members 
of Indian communities who are not citizens of any tribe.13 
Because of courts’ emphasis on tribal citizenship, the exercise of tribal 
jurisdiction over these noncitizen members may seem to present an even 
more difficult equal protection problem. If a person is not a citizen of any 
tribe, categorizing that person as an Indian may seem to some to be nothing 
more than a bald racial classification. Indeed, the first federal court to 
review tribal prosecution of an Indian who was not a citizen of any tribe 
suggested—citing no authority—that the extension of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over non-citizen members of the community “appears to 
present an equal protection problem” because it subjects the defendant to 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 
U.S. 952 (2006); Morris v. Tanner, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1134-35 (D. Mont. 2003), aff’d, 
160 Fed. Appx. 600 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 970 (2006); see also Lara, 541 
U.S. at 200, 209 (holding that Congress properly exercised its authority to restore inherent 
tribal jurisdiction in this area, but reserving due process and equal protection challenges). 
 12. Title 25 U.S.C. § 1301 affirms that tribes have inherent authority to prosecute “all 
Indians” and defines “Indian” by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1153, the law that authorizes 
federal prosecution of Indians. The scope of the Indian category under § 1153 has been 
interpreted by federal courts to include anyone who is descended from a tribal group 
indigenous to the United States and who is affiliated with an Indian tribe that is presently 
recognized by the federal government. See infra Part I.C.3 for a detailed discussion of these 
statutes and the case law interpreting each of them, including minor variations among 
circuits. 
 13. See Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as Racial 
Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 1025 (2011) (“Many . . . nonmember Indians are fully 
integrated into their communities, live on the reservation, and participate fully in tribal 
religious, cultural, and social life. The Supreme Court's equation of Indianness with tribal 
membership-narrowly understood to mean enrollment and voluntary political participation-
writes these people out of existence.”). 
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tribal jurisdiction “due purely to his blood quantum or particular lineage.”14 
Similar questions may eventually animate challenges to the most recent 
restoration of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian domestic violence 
offenders. That law subjects some non-Indians to tribal jurisdiction, based 
in part on their connection to the tribal community, but requires tribes to 
provide heightened due process protections to these non-Indian community 
members that are not required in prosecutions of similarly situated Indian 
community members.15 
The shadow of equal protection would be much less pronounced if the 
rules governing tribal jurisdiction were supported by a rationale rooted in a 
thorough understanding of tribal criminal power, but those rules are not 
usually so presented. After centuries of legislative and judicial silence on 
the matter of tribal criminal jurisdiction, the rules that currently govern its 
scope are instead the result of a back-and-forth between Congress and the 
Supreme Court, in which the Court has limited tribal jurisdiction over 
certain categories of people and Congress has responded by restoring it 
over some—but not all—of those categories. While anyone who has taken a 
course in federal Indian law can no doubt recite the rules, little attention has 
been paid to basic theoretical questions about the reasons for the scope of 
tribal criminal jurisdiction today. Because the federal government has long 
exercised criminal jurisdiction within Indian country, tribal jurisdiction is 
most often treated as only one part of the “jurisdictional maze” that governs 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians v. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1231 (D. Nev. 
2014) (“[Tribal prosecution of a disenrolled member] appears to present an equal protection 
problem. That is, under such a regime a person may, due purely to his blood quantum or 
particular lineage, be subject to criminal prosecution in Indian courts yet be ineligible for 
membership in the prosecuting tribe or any Indian tribe, the latter consideration being the 
only distinction traditionally held to insulate the blood/lineage nexus from equal protection 
infirmity.” (second emphasis added)). The Phebus court may have been referring to a 
Supreme Court case in which federal prosecution of an Indian person was upheld against an 
equal protection challenge. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 647 (1977). The 
defendant in Antelope was a tribal citizen, and the Court specifically cited his citizenship 
status as a reason for its holding. Id. at 646 (“[R]espondents were not subjected to federal 
criminal jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race but because they are enrolled 
members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe.”). The Antelope Court acknowledged, however, that 
federal law does not actually require that a defendant be an enrolled tribal citizen in order to 
be prosecuted as an Indian. See infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 15. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 
54 (codified in relevant part at 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(4) and (b)(4)(B)). See infra Part I.D for 
further discussion of the law. 
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criminal justice there.16 In this maze, tribal jurisdiction functions primarily 
as a gap-filler, with tribes exercising criminal jurisdiction only over the 
people and the offenses that no other sovereign can prosecute.17 
Despite a substantial body of scholarship on tribal civil jurisdiction,18 
questions about the purpose, guiding principles, and proper scope of tribal 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Robert Clinton coined the term “jurisdictional maze” in a seminal article. See Robert 
N. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional 
Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503 (1976) [hereinafter Clinton, Jurisdictional Maze]. Clinton 
described tribal jurisdiction at the time as limited in practice, but potentially much broader in 
scope, and highlighted several grey areas in which tribes sometimes asserted jurisdiction but 
federal law neither expressly affirmed nor prohibited. Id. at 557-60. Indian country criminal 
jurisdiction is now commonly described as a “maze.” See, e.g., INDIAN LAW & ORDER 
COMM’N, A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFER: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT & 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (2013) [hereinafter INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A 
ROADMAP], available at http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/A_Roadmap_For_ 
Making_Native_America_Safer-Full.pdf; Richard W. Garnett, Once More into the Maze: 
United States v. Lopez, Tribal Self-Determination, and Federal Conspiracy Jurisdiction in 
Indian Country, 72 N.D.L. REV. 433, 441-42 n.57-60 (citing articles that use the maze 
analogy or similar terms); see also AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO 
PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA (2007) [hereinafter 
AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE], available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/MazeOf 
Injustice.pdf. Several scholars have developed careful critiques of federal and state criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian country, see, e.g., Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and 
Tribal Self- Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 832-53 (2006) (describing problems with 
the application of federal criminal law in Indian country and suggesting ways to minimize or 
repeal federal laws); Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the 
Twenty-First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 707-29 (2006) (presenting 
data highlighting the shortcomings of state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country and 
proposing options for minimizing or repealing such jurisdiction), but these critiques simply 
identify the reasons that tribal jurisdiction would be better without engaging thorny 
questions about its scope. 
 17. Clinton, Jurisdictional Maze, supra note 16, at 560 (“[W]hile the present scope of 
tribal criminal jurisdiction is generally limited to relatively minor crimes committed by 
Indians on the reservation [over which no other court has jurisdiction], the potential reach of 
such jurisdiction may be substantially broader.”) 
 18. See generally, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil 
Jurisdiction, 46 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 779 (2015); Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: 
Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Civil Jurisdiction, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1449 (2013) [hereinafter 
Florey, Beyond Uniqueness]; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on Tribal 
Jurisdiction, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 973 (2010) [hereinafter Fletcher, Resisting Federal 
Courts]; Alex Tallchief Skibine, Tribal Sovereign Interests Beyond Reservation Borders, 12 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1003 (2008); Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osbourne, 
“Indian Country” and the Nature and Scope of Tribal Self-Government in Alaska, 22 
ALASKA L. REV. 1 (2005). 
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criminal power have remained unexplored.19 No considered analysis has 
investigated why tribes need criminal jurisdiction, why that jurisdiction has 
been limited at all, and what underlying principles might explain its current 
scope. For example, one popular idea is that tribes can exercise jurisdiction 
over people who consent to their jurisdiction.20 Consent is a significant part 
of the academic literature on civil jurisdiction, but it is rarely invoked to 
justify criminal jurisdiction outside the tribal context.21 
This article seeks to explain why current rules limit tribal criminal 
jurisdiction, and brings together ideas from criminal law, federal Indian 
law, and tribal law to suggest a single unifying standard to clarify who 
should (and should not) be subject to a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction: tribal 
criminal jurisdiction should extend to anyone who is recognized by the tribe 
as a member of the community. Though strong policy arguments support 
restoring to tribes full criminal jurisdiction over all people who commit 
crimes within their territory,22 this article begins by recognizing the current 
reality that Congress and the Court have both decided to limit modern tribal 
criminal jurisdiction. The two branches have been locked in a give-and-take 
over where to draw this line, but they seem to agree that it is potentially 
unfair to subject complete strangers to tribal jurisdiction. Part I describes 
the cases and statutes that govern this area of law and how they relate to 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Accord Florey, Beyond Uniqueness, supra note 18 (reconsidering the limits on tribal 
court civil jurisdiction according to settled doctrinal principles of personal jurisdiction, but 
noting that criminal jurisdiction presents different questions). 
 20. Compare Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 694 (1990) (premising tribal criminal 
jurisdiction on consent), with Paul Spruhan, Case Note, Means v. District Court of the 
Chinle Judicial District and, the Hadane Doctrine in Navajo Criminal Law, 1 TRIBAL L.J. at 
pt. IV (2000-2001), http://lawschool.unm.edu/tlj/tribal-law-journal/articles/volume_1/ 
spruhan/index.php [hereinafter Spruhan, Case Note] (noting differences between the Duro 
Court’s consent framework and the notion of consent articulated by Navajo courts); Matthew 
L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 45, 112-21 (2012) (noting differences 
between the understanding of consent expressed in Duro and that used in civil jurisdiction 
cases). 
 21. See infra Part II.D. 
 22. I share the view of most Indian law experts that tribes ought to have full territorial 
jurisdiction, see, e.g., INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 23 
(recommending that tribes be permitted to opt out of federal jurisdiction in favor of restoring 
jurisdiction over all people who commit crimes in the tribe’s territory), and principles of 
criminal jurisdiction generally support this view, see infra Part II.D. However, all three 
branches of the federal government have so far declined to endorse that view. The purpose 
of this article is to consider the existing limits on tribal criminal jurisdiction, which leave 
tribes with something short of full territorial jurisdiction. 
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each other, and highlights the resulting confusion and unanswered 
questions.  
Part II presents and describes the community recognition standard, and 
argues that this standard is the best way to implement the principles that 
underlie the current rules governing tribal criminal jurisdiction. It considers 
the interests served by criminal jurisdiction, the scope of that jurisdiction in 
other contexts, and the particular concerns expressed by federal actors 
about Indian tribal jurisdiction, and argues that the current rules seek to 
make tribal jurisdiction broad enough to provide for public safety, express 
cultural norms, and make individuals accountable to society, but narrow 
enough to prevent relative strangers from being prosecuted by tribes’ 
potentially different and unfamiliar legal systems. 
The community recognition standard is drawn from an examination of 
the two categories of people who are currently subject to tribal criminal 
jurisdiction, but whose status is somewhere between citizens and non-
Indians: nonmember Indians and non-Indians with sufficient ties to the 
tribe. For nonmember Indians, this model follows the jurisdictional laws of 
some tribal courts, which define “Indian” for criminal jurisdiction as a 
person who is recognized as such by the community. For non-Indians, this 
model follows the recent amendments to the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA), which confirms inherent tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian 
offenders who commit acts of domestic violence against an Indian victim, 
and who have sufficient “ties to the tribe”—meaning they live or work on 
the reservation, or are in an intimate relationship with an Indian who resides 
there.23 Part III contrasts the community recognition standard with a 
citizenship-based one and explores how this relates to the larger questions 
of how to define legal Indianness in the shadow of equal protection, what it 
means to be a member of a political community, and the appropriate reach 
of a sovereign’s criminal power. 
Community recognition is a flexible standard that can accommodate the 
many different ways an individual may be connected to a community, 
including but not limited to formal citizenship. It demonstrates that relying 
on formal citizenship is not the only way to measure the connection 
between an individual and a tribal community, and is therefore not the only 
way to ensure that Indian remains a political (as opposed to simply racial) 
designation. It empowers the tribal community to define who is included, 
but instead of focusing narrowly on consent and political participation, this 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, tit. IX, sec. 904, § 204(b), 
127 Stat. at 121-22 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304). 
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standard considers an individual’s responsibility to the community, and thus 
better reflects the functions of criminal law. While many tribes that employ 
a community recognition standard limit this category to people of Indian 
descent, as required by the federal law that prohibits tribes from enforcing 
criminal laws against non-Indians,24 this new standard that could 
theoretically permit jurisdiction over people not of Indian descent as long as 
they are members of the tribal community. In this way, this standard would 
harmonize tribes’ historical practices with the concerns expressed by the 
Supreme Court, Congress’ confirmation of jurisdiction over nonmember 
Indians, and the most recent reinstatement of tribal jurisdiction over non-
Indian domestic violence offenders. 
In addition, unlike the strong calls for congressional action to restore full 
territorial criminal jurisdiction,25 this community recognition standard has 
the advantage that it does not require a change in federal law, so courts may 
begin using it immediately. Under current law, tribal courts exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.26 Following this law, tribal 
legislatures and courts should develop their own definitions of “Indian” for 
purposes of criminal jurisdiction that emphasize recognition by, and 
obligation to, the tribal community—which is a broad and flexible standard 
that reflects the functions of criminal law. It is based on a defendant’s 
connection to the prosecuting community, rather than on citizenship in 
another tribal nation or status under federal law. In most cases, it will 
encompass more people than a rule that limits jurisdiction to citizens.27 
Federal courts reviewing tribal assertions of criminal jurisdiction should 
defer to tribal law standards for determining whether and how a person is 
affiliated with the community, and review cases only to determine whether 
the defendant satisfies the federal requirement that he or she be of Indian 
descent and be affiliated with a tribe. The community recognition standard 
could also permit tribal criminal jurisdiction over community members who 
are not of Indian descent, though this would require congressional 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978); see also United 
States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 (1846) (noting some degree of Indian descent 
required for Indianness under federal law); 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2012) (defining Indian in 
the tribal jurisdiction context by reference to the law governing federal criminal jurisdiction 
over Indians, in which context the Rogers rule applies, as described in Parts I.B.2 and I.C). 
 25. See, e.g., INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 23. 
 26. 25 U.S.C. 1301(2). 
 27. But see infra Part III.C (discussing one way that a community recognition standard 
could be narrower than a citizenship standard). 
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clarification or significant judicial reinterpretation of the “Indian” legal 
category. 
Tribal criminal courts today are much more than gap-fillers. Federal 
Indian policy recognizes the importance of local tribal self-governance, 
which Congress has affirmed forcefully in recent years by restoring and 
expanding tribal criminal jurisdiction.28 Many tribal criminal justice 
systems, once ignored or overridden because they relied on traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms that were not recognized by American 
courts as “real” legal systems, now have complex infrastructures that 
include police, courts, lawyers, judges, and jails, just like the criminal 
justice systems in other American jurisdictions.29 Because tribal justice 
systems can (and often do) incorporate culturally-specific legal norms and 
rely on non-adversarial processes, such as peacemaking, commentators 
have suggested expanding their jurisdiction and increasing the resources 
available to them in order to solve problems like high crime and over-
incarceration among Native people.30 Tribal courts have a critical, leading 
role to play in shaping criminal justice in Indian country, and federal 
                                                                                                                 
 28. In less than a decade, Congress has passed two major pieces of legislation that 
affirm expanded tribal criminal jurisdiction. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-211, tit. II, 124 Stat. 2261 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Violence 
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, 25, 42 U.S.C.). In general, all legislation affecting 
tribal criminal justice passed during the modern era has affirmed the primary importance of 
tribal justice systems in Indian country. See Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103-176, 
§ 2, 107 Stat. 2004, 2004 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631) (resources for tribal justice 
systems); Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-559, 114 Stat. 2778 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3682) (same); Federal Death Penalty 
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. VI, 108 Stat. 1959 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3591-
3599) (providing that the federal death penalty would not be imposed on Indian country 
defendants unless the local tribal government requests); Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, tit. VIII, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 
(1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)) (the Duro fix) (affirming inherent tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over “all Indians”). 
 29. See generally INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16 
(describing the complex institutional and financial infrastructure of modern tribal criminal 
justice systems). 
 30. See, e.g., INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 131 
(noting in chapter on alternatives to incarceration that “tribes are longtime advocates for 
alternative approaches”). See generally Ryan Seelau, The Kids Aren’t Alright: An Argument 
to Use the Nation Building Model in the Development of Native Juvenile Justice Systems to 
Combat the Effect of Failed Assimilative Policies, 17 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 97 (2012) 
(identifying over-incarceration as one aspect of the problem faced by Native youth in 
juvenile court and proposing tribal control as a solution). 
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policymakers are increasingly willing to follow their lead. Questions about 
the proper scope of their criminal deserve sustained and careful attention, 
which this article seeks to provide.  
I. A Patchwork of Rules 
Understanding the legal boundaries of modern tribal criminal 
jurisdiction31 requires interpreting Supreme Court cases and federal statutes 
together. Tribes today possess all sovereign powers, including criminal 
jurisdiction, unless those powers have been explicitly taken away by 
Congress or held by the Supreme Court to have been implicitly divested.32 
Congress has never expressly limited tribal criminal jurisdiction,33 but the 
Supreme Court has twice held that tribes lost their jurisdiction to prosecute 
specific categories of people.34 Congress subsequently passed legislation to 
“affirm” and “restore” tribes’ inherent power to prosecute some—but not 
all—of those categories of people.35 Taken together, statutory and common 
                                                                                                                 
 31. This article is concerned with crimes that occur within tribal territory. It considers 
the extent to which tribes’ territorial jurisdiction has been limited over certain categories of 
people. It does not answer the related but separate question of whether, with respect to the 
people over whom tribes still have jurisdiction, tribal territory marks the outer bounds of 
tribal power. See Kelsey v. Pope, No. 14-1537 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 2016) (upholding a tribe’s 
extraterritorial exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a citizen for a crime committed in the 
course of his duties as a tribal official); see also Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 240 (9th 
Cir. 1974) (affirming extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over citizens for offenses related to 
treaty rights occurring in treaty-defined territory). Many tribal codes assert extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction. E.g., NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 253(a)(1) (2010), available at 
http://www.navajonationcouncil.org/Navajo%20Nation%20Codes/V0020.pdf; id. tit. 17, § 
203 (extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over members); ABSENTEE SHAWNEE TRIBE CRIM. 
CODE § 2 (2010) (extraterritorial jurisdiction over members and residents who commit 
certain crimes), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/absentee-shawnee/criminal_ 
offenses.html; CHEYENNE & ARAPAHO TRIBES LAW & ORDER CODE tit. II, subpart D, § 2(a) 
(1988) (same), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/cheyaracode/ offenses.html. 
Whether the scope of that jurisdiction precisely matches the scope of intraterritorial 
jurisdiction described here is a matter for another article. 
 32. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). 
 33. It has, however, legislated to limit the manner in which tribal courts may conduct 
criminal proceedings and the length of sentence they may impose. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 
(2012). 
 34. See generally Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); Duro v. 
Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
 35. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, tit. 
VIII, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)) (jurisdiction 
over “all Indians”); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-
4, tit. IX, § 904, 127 Stat. 120 (jurisdiction over certain non-Indians). A later statute 
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law rules provide that tribes retain criminal jurisdiction as an aspect of their 
inherent sovereignty over “all Indians,”36 including tribal citizens and 
nonmember Indians. They lack jurisdiction over non-Indians in most 
cases,37 except certain non-Indian domestic violence offenders with 
sufficient ties to the tribe.38 
These rules, instead of adhering to a unifying rationale, have been 
created by judicial divestments and congressional restorations of tribal 
jurisdiction which appear to be hasty reactions to each other, with Congress 
partially undermining each of the Court’s limitations, but never fully 
rejecting them. The practical reasons are sometimes apparent,39 but the 
theoretical justifications are difficult to discern. The result is a patchwork of 
rules from different sources, no clear explanation as to why those rules 
exist, and unanswered questions about the precise reach of tribal 
jurisdiction in areas that have not been specifically addressed by Congress 
or the Court.  
This article’s focus is tribal jurisdiction, but to form a complete picture 
of criminal justice in Indian country, it is necessary to understand the 
related rules for federal and state jurisdiction as well. Within Indian 
country,40 the federal government exercises jurisdiction over crimes 
                                                                                                                 
amended the Duro fix to remove the year-long limit, making it permanent. See Act of Oct. 
28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646. 
 36. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012). 
 37. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210. This is at least true for non-Indians who are U.S. citizens. 
At least one tribal court has asserted criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who are not U.S. 
citizens, holding that the reasoning of Oliphant refers only to the rights of citizens. Eastern 
Band of Cherokee Indians v. Torres, 4 Cherokee Rep. 9, 2005 WL 6437828 (2005). 
 38. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B) (2012); see infra Part I.D (describing the scope of special 
domestic violence jurisdiction over non-Indians). 
 39. For example, Congress has twice restored tribal jurisdiction over a “jurisdictional 
gap.” See, e.g., Benjamin J. Cordiano, Note, Unspoken Assumptions: Examining Tribal 
Jurisdiction over Nonmembers Nearly Two Decades After Duro v. Reina, 41 CONN. L. REV. 
267, 268 (2008) (describing how restored tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians 
addressed a jurisdictional gap created by the Duro decision because neither federal nor state 
courts have jurisdiction to prosecute non-major crimes involving only Indians); M. Brent 
Leonhard, Closing a Gap in Indian Country Justice: Oliphant, Lara, and DOJ’s Proposed 
Fix, 28 HARVARD J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 117, 121-22 (2011) (describing how 
restoration of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian domestic violence offenders was necessary 
to close a similar enforcement gap, in which U.S. attorneys, despite having jurisdiction, 
frequently declined to prosecute non-Indian domestic violence offenders in Indian country). 
 40. “Indian country” is a legal term denoting the categories of land subject to federal 
criminal jurisdiction because of its status as Indian land. Most of this land is classified as a 
reservation or is held in trust by the federal government for the benefit of tribes or Indian 
people. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). Indian country includes “all land within the limits of any 
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between Indians and non-Indians41 and certain enumerated major crimes 
involving only Indians.42 In some areas, states exercise Indian country 
criminal jurisdiction in place of the federal government pursuant to Public 
Law 280 or a similar law.43 Absent such a specific law giving the state more 
expansive jurisdiction, state jurisdiction is limited to reservation crimes 
involving only non-Indians.44 Because the federal statutes and cases 
affecting tribal jurisdiction are structured around the default federal/tribal 
jurisdictional arrangement, this article likewise focuses on the interplay 
between tribal and federal jurisdiction.45 It is important to remember that 
                                                                                                                 
Indian reservation” and tribal and individual trust allotments. Id. § 1151(a). It also includes 
certain lands held in fee by tribes. Id. § 1151(b). Indian country also includes “dependent 
Indian communities.” See also United States v. Candelaria 271 U.S. 432, 443 (1926) 
(finding Pueblo fee land subject to the same restrictions as Indian trust land); United States 
v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913) (same). But see Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 
U.S. 520, 532 (1998) (finding fee land owned by Alaska Native corporations is not Indian 
country). In this article, I use the terms “tribal land,” and “tribal territory” interchangeably to 
describe land over which tribes have jurisdiction. Although largely coterminous, these 
categories may not always be identical. I therefore use “Indian country” only when referring 
to the federally-defined legal category. For ease of reference, I sometimes use the term 
“reservation” as shorthand when referring to tribal territory; it should be understood to 
include other types of tribal land as well. 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. By its terms, the statute does not extend to crimes committed by 
one Indian against another Indian, to Indian offenders who have already been punished by 
the tribe, or where a treaty has reserved exclusive jurisdiction to the tribe. Id. While federal 
jurisdiction over some Indian-on-Indian crimes was created by a later law, the federal 
government may not prosecute an Indian defendant under § 1152 if the tribe has already 
prosecuted and punished that defendant. 
 42. Id. § 1153.  
 43. Public Law 280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 25 U.S.C.), unilaterally transferred federal 
criminal jurisdiction to six states and authorized other states to assume the same. Although 
Public Law 280 transferred federal jurisdiction to the states, it did so by extending state 
criminal law into Indian country, so the reach of state jurisdiction is actually broader than 
federal jurisdiction would be. For example, states can prosecute Indian defendants for any 
crime against another Indian, not just a major crime defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1153. Other 
states were granted this jurisdiction by specific statutes, such as land claim settlements. 
 44. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881); Draper v. United States, 
164 U.S. 240, 247 (1896); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL tit. 9, 
§ 678 (2014). 
 45. State jurisdiction under Public Law 280 is concurrent with tribal jurisdiction, see 
infra note 48 (describing the modern scholarly consensus that tribes retain concurrent 
criminal jurisdiction under Public Law 280), so any general rule about the scope of tribal 
jurisdiction would also affect tribes subject to Public Law 280, and the practical effect may 
be different for those tribes. 
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the existence or non-existence of federal or state jurisdiction as a concurrent 
overlay has no direct bearing on the scope of tribal jurisdiction.46 Just 
because another government has concurrent jurisdiction does not mean that 
tribes lack it.Any question about the appropriate scope of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction must be answered first by looking to tribal law. Although 
federal law limits tribal jurisdiction in significant ways, federal courts have 
recognized that the question of a tribe’s jurisdiction should first be 
answered by the tribe itself.47 Tribal law defines the scope of tribal 
jurisdiction in the first instance, and the question of whether it complies 
with the limits imposed by federal law comes later. A major shortcoming in 
scholarly and judicial discussions of tribal criminal jurisdiction is the 
tendency to focus primarily on federal jurisdiction, treating tribal 
jurisdiction as a gap-filler: an approach that can lead tribes to unnecessarily 
limit their own jurisdiction.48 
                                                                                                                 
 46. The scope of federal and state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country certainly has 
practical implications that inform Congress’ policy choices or the Court’s view of history, 
which in turn may affect tribal jurisdiction. See infra Part II.A. A statute or case recognizing 
federal or state jurisdiction over a specific type of case, however, does not determine 
whether tribal jurisdiction exists. 
 47. See Nat’l Farmer’s Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1984) (finding 
scope of tribal civil jurisdiction should be answered first by the tribal court). 
 48. For example, the existence of federal jurisdiction over major crimes in Indian 
country, and the relative absence of tribal courts exercising jurisdiction over those same 
crimes, has led the Court to suggest that tribes may not have jurisdiction over major crimes. 
See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14 (1978) (assuming that tribal 
jurisdiction over major crimes was extinguished by federal law and citing pre-1978 circuit 
court authority to the same effect, but acknowledging some “confusion” over the question of 
exclusive jurisdiction and declining to decide the question directly). But see United States v. 
John, 437 U.S. 634, 651 n.21 (1978) (referring to the question as “disputed” and declining to 
resolve); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 325 n.22 (declining to resolve the 
question). Indeed, Congress seemed to assume that tribes lacked jurisdiction over major 
crimes during when it passed the Duro fix law. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 101-938, at 132 (1990) 
(Conf. Rep.) (report on first Duro fix bill) (referring to tribal jurisdiction as “criminal 
misdemeanor jurisdiction”). Today, courts and scholars agree that the authorization of 
federal jurisdiction did not divest tribes of their jurisdiction. Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 
825-26 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that tribes retain jurisdiction to over offenses covered by the 
Major Crimes Act, and noting that this was “the conclusion already reached by distinguished 
authorities on the subject”); accord COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 9.04, at 
758-60 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds, Lexis Nexis 2005) [hereinafter COHEN] (noting 
earlier judicial and regulatory opinions to the contrary but concluding that the Wetsit court’s 
conclusion is “the correct one”); PHILIP FRICKEY ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 326 (2d ed. 
2008); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 377-81 (5th ed. 2005); 
CAROLE GOLDBERG ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 528-37 (6th ed. 2010). Similarly, tribes subject to state jurisdiction under Public 
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Looking to tribal law is also important to avoid confusing questions of 
tribal jurisdiction with questions of federal jurisdiction. The courts’ 
tendency to conflate federal and tribal standards shows why it is so 
important for tribes to define the limits of their own jurisdiction under tribal 
law and to clarify whether they intend to adopt or diverge from federal 
standards. Federal court review of a tribe’s exercise of criminal jurisdiction 
should start with whether it comports with tribal law; only if it does should 
the court then consider whether it runs afoul of federal limitations placed on 
tribal court jurisdiction (which may be different from the limitations placed 
on federal courts’ jurisdiction). Tribes do not legislate in a vacuum, though; 
federal law imposes certain limits on tribes’ jurisdiction. This article begins 
with a careful review of federal limits, because a thorough understanding of 
these limits provides the context necessary to understand how and why 
tribes articulate the scope of their own jurisdiction. 
A. Jurisdiction Ends at the “Indian” 
Before 1978, it remained a legal possibility that tribes had retained their 
sovereign power to prosecute all people who committed crimes in tribal 
territory.49 But in that year the Supreme Court decided Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, a case involving a white man who lived on the 
                                                                                                                 
Law 280 sometimes have been treated as if they lack criminal jurisdiction. See B.J. Jones, 
Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-state and 
Tribal-federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 472 (1998). Today, it is clear that 
tribes retain concurrent jurisdiction even if subject to Public Law 280. Walker v. Rushing, 
898 F. 2d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1990); Booth v. State, 903 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1995); GOLDBERG ET AL., supra, at 535-38; Vanessa J. Jiménez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent 
Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1627, 1667-91 
(1998) (demonstrating that Public Law 280 did not divest tribes of criminal jurisdiction); 
CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND PUBLIC 
LAW 280, at 157-63 (1997); COHEN, supra, § 6.04[3][c] (describing the “nearly unanimous 
view” but noting that this “consensus . . . has developed relatively recently”) . 
 49. Congress and the Court agree that whatever the scope of tribes’ criminal 
jurisdiction, it exists because it is an aspect of inherent sovereignty that tribes have retained 
despite the imposition of federal plenary power. Federal law provides that tribes, which have 
been recognized by the United States government as separate sovereigns since before the 
country was formed, retain all aspects of sovereignty that have not been clearly taken away 
via treaty or statute or “withdrawn by . . . implication as necessary result of their dependent 
status.” Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. Congress and the federal courts agree that tribes retain 
some criminal jurisdiction, but not the full scope of territorial jurisdiction enjoyed by most 
sovereigns. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990) (“A basic attribute of full 
territorial sovereignty is the power to enforce laws against all who come within the 
sovereign’s territory, whether citizens or aliens. Oliphant recognized that the tribes can no 
longer be described as sovereigns in this sense.”). 
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Suquamish Reservation, and declared that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians.50 
Early treaties reflected the understanding that tribes were sovereign 
nations with “complete territorial sovereignty over their lands.”51 Such 
retained jurisdiction would have included the power to prosecute non-
Indian defendants.52 Before the 1900s, however, the geographical 
separation between Indian and non-Indian communities likely afforded few 
opportunities for tribes to exercise that power, or document it if they did. 
Moreover, when white settlers committed crimes in Indian country, the 
federal government often stepped in to prosecute them, relying on its power 
to manage relations between its citizens and the Indian tribes by keeping the 
peace, and on its obligation to protect tribes and their lands from incursions 
by settlers.53 In the late 1800s and early 1900s federal policies changed, 
which brought many more non-Indians within the boundaries of 
reservations54 and at the same time crippled tribal justice systems.55 Over 
                                                                                                                 
 50. 435 U.S. 191, 208. 
 51. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 113, 118-23 (2002) [hereinafter Clinton, No Supremacy Clause] (analyzing treaty 
provisions). 
 52. Id. at 123 (territorial sovereignty, as recognized by treaties, included “complete 
jurisdiction over any non-Indian intruders”); see also supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text 
(explaining that sovereigns are normally understood to have jurisdiction over all who 
commit crimes within their territory, plus extraterritorial jurisdiction over their nationals and 
others who commit certain crimes). 
 53. Beginning in 1790, federal laws known as Indian trade and intercourse acts provided 
for federal criminal jurisdiction over U.S. citizens (in other words, whites) who committed a 
crime or trespass on Indian land. See Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal 
Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 951, 958-59 
(1975) (describing these laws) [hereinafter Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction].  
 54. See General Allotment Act (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). The Act authorized a policy of allotting tribal 
lands, conveying parcels to individual Indians, and opening up the “surplus” land for white 
settlement. See generally Ann E. Tweedy, Unjustifiable Expectations: Laying to Rest the 
Ghosts of Allotment-Era Settlers, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 129, 144 (2012) (describing how 
the federal government’s allotment and sale of tribal lands encouraged and facilitated white 
settlement on reservations and disputing the common assumption that these white settlers 
expected tribes disappear and therefore did not expect to be subjected to tribal government 
jurisdiction). 
 55. The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012), undermined tribal criminal justice 
systems by extending for the first time federal jurisdiction to crimes committed by Indians 
against other Indians on reservations, an extension justified by the belief that tribal justice 
systems were not capable of addressing serious crimes. See SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW 
DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN 
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the next century, as non-Indian crime became more common on 
reservations, most tribes lacked the judicial and financial resources to 
prosecute these offenders. By the 1970s, however, tribes began to exercise 
this long dormant aspect of their sovereignty by prosecuting non-Indians 
who committed crimes in their territory, which finally prompted the Court 
to address the question of whether they still possessed such jurisdiction.56 
The Oliphant Court ended this practice by holding that tribes, while 
retaining criminal jurisdiction generally, were divested of the power to 
exercise it over non-Indians.57 
The Court’s primary rationale was historical. It first reviewed the 
historical record and noted that tribes rarely exercised criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians.58 Then it looked for congressional or executive 
confirmation of such jurisdiction and found none.59 In the absence of 
historical examples and external confirmation, the Court decided that the 
power of tribes to prosecute non-Indians who committed crimes in their 
territory no longer existed. As others have convincingly argued, the Court’s 
“use it or lose it” approach to history and doctrine here is inconsistent with 
its previous cases on tribal jurisdiction, in which it assumed tribes retained 
all sovereign powers unless a power had been explicitly divested by treaty 
or statute.60 The Court also created a circular trap for tribes. Previous 
                                                                                                                 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 136-39 (1994). The federal Code of Indian Offenses employed a 
criminal justice model to forcibly assimilate Indian people by criminalizing tribal cultural 
and religious activities. See generally GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 48. Congress further 
undermined tribal justice systems in 1953 by extending state criminal jurisdiction over many 
reservations. See supra note 43. 
 56. See Sarah Krakoff, Mark the Plumber v. Tribal Empire, or Non-Indian Anxiety v. 
Tribal Sovereignty?: The Story of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, in INDIAN LAW 
STORIES 261, 263 (Carole Goldberg, Kevin K. Washburn & Philip P. Frickey eds., 2010). 
 57. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978). 
 58. Id. at 197-98.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Oliphant has been the subject of devastating critique by Indian law experts because 
it reversed the logic of previous cases about tribal powers. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, A 
Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal 
Authority over Nonmember, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 34-36 (1999); Judith V. Royster, Oliphant and 
Its Discontents: An Essay Introducing the Case for Reargument before the American Indian 
Nations Supreme Court, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 60 (2003) (describing how the Court 
“[a]bandon[ed] the Indian law canons of construction”); Melanie Beth Oliviero & A.T. 
Skibine, The Supreme Court Decision That Jolted Tribal Jurisdiction, AM. INDIAN J., May 
1980, at 2, 6 (“[The Court did not explain] how [it] can find jurisdiction of nonmembers 
inconsistent with tribal status or in conflict with the sovereignty of the United States. The 
crucial mistake in Oliphant is that the denial of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians is a 
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federal policies had the intended effect of undermining tribal government 
institutions.61 Those policies were later rejected in favor of federal support 
for tribal sovereignty,62 but the Court used the resulting lack of strong tribal 
government infrastructure as a reason to hold that tribes no longer enjoyed 
the full scope of their governmental powers.63 Because of its reverse logic, 
the damaging impact of Oliphant eventually extended far beyond criminal 
                                                                                                                 
political question which the Court decided in violation of the United States Constitution.”) 
The general rule in prior case law was that tribes possess any power inherent in sovereignty 
unless that power has been limited by treaty, statute, or it was necessarily inconsistent with 
the tribe’s “domestic dependent” status. See Frickey, supra, at 8-13 (describing the 
foundational premise that “tribes possess all authority not lost as a result of original 
European contact, explicit treaty cessions, or unambiguous statutory language to the 
contrary”). Before Oliphant, the Court had only relied on the “necessarily inconsistent” 
reasoning twice to hold that tribes lost the “power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to 
whomsoever they pleased,” Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823), and 
that tribes lost the power of independent external relations with foreign nations, Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831). Besides those powers, the exercise of 
which could potentially threaten the existence of the United States as a nation, tribes were 
thought to possess any power that had not been affirmatively taken away. See Frickey, 
supra, at 13-14, 36 (describing the limited category of implicit divestiture prior to Oliphant 
and noting that the Court “reopened a category of diminished tribal authority that had been 
thought closed forever since the Marshall Court”). In Oliphant, the Court turned this 
approach inside out, asking instead whether the Congress had ever affirmed the existence of 
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and whether tribes had historically exercised 
such jurisdiction. Finding little evidence of historical exercise or congressional or executive 
confirmation of the power, the Court held that it had been “implicitly divested.” Id. at 197-
209. 
 61. See supra notes 48, 54-55. 
 62. Since the late 1960s, the federal government has followed a policy of supporting 
tribal self-determination and dealing with tribes on a government-to-government basis. This 
policy was first set forth in President Nixon‘s message to Congress on Indian affairs. Special 
Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, 1 PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970). President Nixon‘s 
statement rejected the policies pursued in the past where an “Indian community is almost 
entirely run by outsiders” and directed Congress to “create the conditions for a new era in 
which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian decisions.” Id. at 565-66. 
Every subsequent President has reaffirmed the policy. Memorandum No. 215, 74 Fed. Reg. 
57,881 (Nov. 5, 2009) (President Obama); Proclamation No. 7500, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,641 
(Nov. 12, 2001) (President G.W. Bush); Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 
9, 2000) (President Clinton); Memorandum No. 85, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994) 
(President Clinton); Exec. Order No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998) (President 
Clinton); Statement Reaffirming the Government-to-Government Relationship Between the 
Federal Government and Indian Tribal Governments, 1 PUB. PAPERS 662 (June 14, 1991) 
(President G.H.W. Bush); Statement on Indian Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 96 (Jan. 24, 1983) 
(President Reagan). 
 63. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196-205. 
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jurisdiction. For example, the Court has relied on this backward approach in 
subsequent cases to divest tribes of civil jurisdiction over nonmembers of 
the tribe in many situations.64 
The Oliphant Court’s historical analysis has also been criticized as 
inaccurate.65 For example, the Court cited treaty language that affirmed 
exclusive tribal criminal jurisdiction within tribal territory and also 
provided that the United States would punish its own citizens who 
committed offenses against the tribe or its members.66 Such language was 
probably not understood by the signatory tribes as a blanket prohibition 
against criminally punishing any non-Indians. There is evidence that non-
Indians who were married or adopted into tribes, or who otherwise settled 
in tribal territory, were treated as members of the community, and were 
subjected to tribal criminal jurisdiction.67 The treaties can be read instead as 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See, e.g., Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, Trapped in the Spring of 1978: The Continuing 
Impact of the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Oliphant, Wheeler, and Martinez, 55 FED. LAW., 
Mar./Apr. 2008, at 36, 38; Royster, supra note 60, at 60, 63-66 (describing how the novel 
logic of Oliphant has been used to divest tribes of civil jurisdiction). 
 65. See Royster, supra note 60, at 60 (“The [Court reasoned] that all three branches of 
the federal government shared a common historical understanding that tribes could not 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. This was arguably the most indecent piece 
of ‘reasoning’ that the Court has ever produced. It is a textbook model of how to obscure 
unfavorable law, relegate contrary facts and precedent to footnotes, and argue using only 
highly selective snippets that support the preferred position. As a lawyer's brief, this is 
probably ethical. As a decision by the nation's highest court, it is an embarrassment.”); Peter 
C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole Is Greater than the Sum of the Parts, 
19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391, 403-40 (1993) (reviewing precedent and historical sources relied 
upon by the Court and finding that “the history recounted by the Court certainly does not 
support” its conclusion). 
 66. Oliphant v. Squamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S 191, 197 n.8 (1978). 
 67. See, e.g., Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 53, at 953-54 
(describing how early treaties did not prohibit tribes from exercising jurisdiction over non-
Indians, but provided for mutual cooperation between a tribe and the U.S. in the case of 
crimes between tribal and U.S. citizens and recognized tribal authority to deal criminally 
with non-Indians who settled in tribal territory and committed crimes there); see also 
Clinton, No Supremacy Clause, supra note 51, at 122 (interpreting prosecution agreements 
in treaties as extradition agreements between sovereigns with complete territorial 
jurisdiction); Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 53, at 954-55 
(describing treaty language); see also United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 567-68 
(1846) (federal criminal case involving inter-married white man who was prosecuted by the 
tribe); see also Bethany R. Berger, "Power over This Unfortunate Race": Race, Politics and 
Indian Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957 (2004) [hereinafter 
Berger, Power] (describing other cases of whites prosecuted by tribal courts); Paul Spruhan, 
“Indians, in a Jurisdictional Sense”: Tribal Citizenship and Other Forms of Non-Indian 
Consent to Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 1 AM. INDIAN L.J. 79, 85-91 (2012); Oliphant, 435 
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intending to limit tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians who were relative 
strangers to the community, or as extradition agreements between 
sovereigns that did not limit either sovereign’s jurisdiction. 
Although most of Oliphant is dedicated to historical analysis, the Court 
acknowledged that historical practice alone was not enough to establish that 
tribes had been divested of criminal jurisdiction.68 The opinion’s final pages 
supplied the missing reasoning, explaining why the Court believed the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians to be inconsistent with 
tribes’ status as domestic dependent nations.69 First, the Court explained 
that any jurisdiction “beyond what is necessary to control internal relations” 
of tribes would be inconsistent with their semi-sovereign status.70 This 
distinction between internal and external matters appears in other cases 
decided at the same time as well,71 and it highlights the Court’s concern 
with tribal jurisdiction over outsiders, as opposed to insiders. 
Second, tribal prosecution of non-Indians, in the Court’s view, is 
incompatible with the United States’ interest in protecting the due process 
rights of its citizens: 
Protection of territory within its external political boundaries is, 
of course, as central to the sovereign interests of the United 
States as it is to any other sovereign nation. But from the 
formation of the Union and the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the 
United States has manifested an equally great solicitude that its 
citizens be protected by the United States from unwarranted 
intrusions on their personal liberty. The power of the United 
States to try and criminally punish is an important manifestation 
of the power to restrict personal liberty. By submitting to the 
overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes 
therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian 
citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to 
Congress.72 
                                                                                                                 
U.S. at 197 n.8 (acknowledging that the treaties also provided that whites who settled in 
Indian country could be punished by the tribe); Maxfield, supra note 65, at 415 (critiquing 
the Court’s interpretation of these treaty provisions). 
 68. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206. 
 69. Id. at 208-11. 
 70. Id. at 210. 
 71. E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978). 
 72. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209-10. 
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Although the Court emphasized the United States’ interest in protecting the 
due process rights of its citizens, a group that in 1978 included Indian 
people,73 it viewed this incompatibility as meaning that tribes lost 
jurisdiction over only “non-Indian” citizens.74 Oliphant thus carved out a 
category of “Indian” people who, although also United States citizens, 
could fairly be prosecuted in tribal courts.75 
However, the Court offered little support for its conclusion regarding the 
due process rights of citizens. U.S. citizens are regularly subject to 
prosecution by foreign governments for crimes committed abroad without 
significant concerns being raised about whether the substantive or 
procedural criminal law of the requesting country differs from American 
law.76 The Court did not explain in detail why Indian tribal prosecution 
presented more of a threat to the liberty of U.S. citizens than prosecution by 
a foreign court. It expressed concern about the fairness of subjecting non-
                                                                                                                 
 73. Indian Citizenship Act, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
1401). The Act collectively naturalized all American Indian people. Prior to the Act, Indians 
as a group were considered to be citizens of tribal nations, but not of the United States, 
although individual Indian people were sometimes naturalized. See generally Bethany R. 
Berger, Birthright Citizenship on Trial: Elk v. Wilkins and United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 
37 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
 74. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209-11. 
 75. This was consistent with an earlier case about federal criminal prosecution, United 
States v. Antelope, which held that it did not violate the constitutional rights of Indian people 
to be prosecuted federally when a non-Indian charged with the same crime could only be 
prosecuted in state court. 430 U.S. 641, 669-70 (1977) (subjecting Indians to prosecution 
under federal law, which carried stiffer penalties than prosecution under state law, for crimes 
committed in Indian country is not an illegal racial classification); see also Fisher v. Dist. 
Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976) (denying Indians access to state courts for adoptions arising 
on the reservation not a violation of equal protection). 
 76. When a U.S. citizen is subject to prosecution abroad, the decision whether to 
extradite provides the main opportunity for U.S. courts to intervene should concerns about 
the foreign system exist, but foreign courts are not subject to the same level of scrutiny as 
tribal courts. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. NO. 
98-958, EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES: OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND 
RECENT TREATIES 23 (2010), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-958.pdf 
(explaining that U.S. courts follow a “non-inquiry rule” based on the idea that “[w]hen an 
American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country, he cannot complain if required to 
submit to such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws of that country may 
prescribe for its own people”) (quoting In re Extradition of Cheung, 986 F. Supp. 791, 789-
99 (D. Conn. 1997) and collecting cases that demonstrate how rare it is for the U.S. to refuse 
to extradite because of procedural fairness concerns); accord id. at 8 (explaining that, while 
extradition usually applies only to offenses that are criminalized in both countries, “the 
United States favors the view that treaties should be construed to honor an extradition 
request if possible” and so this requirement is construed loosely). 
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Indians to tribal justice systems, which it characterized as culturally foreign, 
incompetent, and not sufficiently protective of the basic guarantees of due 
process protected by the Constitution.77 In reaching its conclusion, the 
Court looked for guidance to an 1883 decision about whether an Indian78 
could be tried in the federal system.79 Invalidating that prosecution, the 
Court had reasoned that the exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction over 
Indians absent express congressional authorization would amount to an 
unfair extension of law 
over aliens and strangers; over the members of a community 
separated by race [and] tradition, . . . from the authority and 
power which seeks to impose upon them the restraints of an 
external and unknown code . . . ; which judges them by a 
standard made by others and not for them . . . . It tries them, not 
by their peers, nor by the customs of their people, nor the law of 
their land, but by . . . a different race, according to the law of a 
social state of which they have an imperfect conception . . . .80 
The Oliphant Court reasoned that “[t]hese considerations, applied here to 
the non-Indian rather than Indian offender, speak equally strongly against 
the validity of respondents’ contention that Indian tribes, although fully 
subordinated to the sovereignty of the United States, retain the power to try 
non-Indians according to their own customs and procedure.”81 
Yet, the Court did not hold that tribes were divested of their criminal 
jurisdiction altogether.82 In fact, it affirmed that tribes retained jurisdiction 
over their own citizens that same year in a case called United States v. 
Wheeler, in which the Court held that the Navajo Nation retained its 
inherent power to prosecute an enrolled tribal citizen.83 In Wheeler and 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210 (“This principle [that tribes gave up the power to 
prosecute non-Indians] would have been obvious a century ago when most Indian tribes 
were characterized by a ‘want of fixed laws [and] of competent tribunals of justice.’ It 
should be no less obvious today, even though present-day Indian tribal courts embody 
dramatic advances over their historical antecedents.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 78. Indians were not United States citizens at the time. 
 79. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210 (citing Ex parte Kan-gi-Shun-ca (Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 
556 (1883)). 
 80. Id. at 210-11 (quoting Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571).  
 81. Id. at 211. 
 82. Id. at 210. 
 83. 435 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1978). Because the tribal prosecution was an exercise of 
inherent power, the subsequent federal prosecution of Wheeler for the same crime did not 
violate double jeopardy. See also Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (holding that 
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Oliphant, the Court thus drew a clear line between tribal citizens, over 
whom the exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction presented no conflict with 
U.S. sovereignty, and “non-Indians,” over whom the extension of “alien” 
jurisdiction was so unfair as to be incompatible with due process rights. In 
other words, the Court viewed tribal jurisdiction as fair in some cases and 
unfair in others—but limited its concerns about fairness to non-Indian 
people, to whom it believed the tribe’s justice system would be “alien.”84 
The Court in Oliphant did not explain why it chose to draw this line 
between “Indians” and “non-Indians,” nor did it explain whom it meant to 
include in each category, but instead left those difficult questions to be 
resolved in later cases. 
B. Jurisdiction Extends to “Nonmember Indians” 
Oliphant prohibited tribal courts from prosecuting non-Indians, while 
Wheeler confirmed those courts’ power to prosecute their own tribal 
citizens.85 In the gray area between those two categories remained a group 
usually described as “nonmember Indians”—people who might be 
considered Indians in the Court’s view (and are thus not outside tribal court 
jurisdiction under Oliphant), but who are not citizens of the prosecuting 
tribe.86 This category includes both people who are enrolled citizens of one 
tribe but commit crimes in the territory of another, and also people 
considered to be legally Indian by some measures, but who are not formally 
enrolled in any tribe. This begs the question of what it means to be legally 
Indian when one is not an enrolled tribal citizen. 
In 1990, the Supreme Court and Congress reached opposite conclusions 
regarding tribal criminal jurisdiction over this group. First, the Court 
extended its Oliphant ruling and held that tribes lacked jurisdiction over 
nonmember Indians as well.87 Then Congress immediately responded by 
                                                                                                                 
tribal criminal jurisdiction over a tribal citizen is an aspect of inherent tribal sovereignty not 
governed by the federal Bill of Rights). Wheeler is described in the Court’s opinion as “a 
member of the Navajo Tribe.” Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 314. The Court in Talton described the 
defendant and the victim as “both Cherokee Indians.” Talton, 163 U.S. at 379. Although 
neither Court specifically discussed the idea of formal citizenship, no questions were raised 
as to the status of either defendant as a member of the tribe. 
 84. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211. 
 85. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 328; Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 194. 
 86. Impact of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Duro v. Reina: Hearing on S. 962, S. 963 
Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 102d Cong. 137 (1991) [hereinafter Hearing 
on S. 962, S. 963] (statement of Wayne Ducheneaux, President, National Congress of 
American Indians). 
 87. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990). 
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passing legislation to confirm that tribes do retain criminal jurisdiction over 
nonmember Indians.88 Unfortunately, this legislation did little to clarify the 
scope of this category or Congress’ reasons for differentiating between 
nonmember Indians and non-Indians, over whom it did not restore tribal 
criminal jurisdiction. 
1. Duro v. Reina 
The Court, by failing to clarify its reasons for distinguishing between 
Indians and non-Indians in Oliphant, opened the door for its holding in 
1990 that tribes were also divested of their criminal jurisdiction over 
“nonmember Indians.”89 Duro involved an Indian defendant who was an 
enrolled citizen of the Torres-Martinez Band of Cahuilla Indians, but was 
living on the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Reservation,90 where he was 
accused of killing a fourteen year old Indian boy.91 Duro was initially 
charged with murder in federal court, but the indictment was dismissed in 
response to a motion by the Attorney General.92 The Salt River Tribe then 
charged Duro with the crime of illegally firing a weapon, and Duro 
challenged the tribal court’s jurisdiction.93 The facts presented an issue that 
was obscured in Oliphant: is tribal prosecution of a person who is “Indian” 
but not enrolled in the prosecuting tribe similarly inconsistent with U.S. 
sovereignty? 
The Duro Court reasoned that nonmember Indians are on the same 
footing as non-Indians in terms of the issues implicated by tribal criminal 
jurisdiction: they have not consented to be governed by the tribe,94 they 
                                                                                                                 
 88. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, tit. 
VIII, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)); H.R. REP. 
NO. 101-938 (1990) (Conf. Rep.); see infra Part I.B.2 (discussing this legislation).  
 89. Duro, 495 U.S. at 679. The Duro court categorized people into “members” and 
nonmembers” of a specific tribe. It did not explicitly define “membership,” but the opinion 
clearly equates the idea of membership with formal citizenship in the tribe. See id. at 694 
(“Tribal authority over members, who are also citizens, is not subject to these objections. 
Retained criminal jurisdiction over members is accepted by our precedents and justified by 
the voluntary character of tribal membership and the concomitant right of participation in 
tribal government, the authority of which rests on consent.”). For a discussion of others ways 
to conceive of “membership” in a tribal community, see Part II. 
 90. Id. at 679. 
 91. The victim was a citizen of a third tribe. The case thus involved two Indians, neither 
of whom was a citizen member of the prosecuting tribe, but both of whom lived and worked 
in that tribe’s community. 
 92. Duro, 495 U.S. at 680. 
 93. Id. at 681. 
 94. Id. at 693-94. 
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have no voice in the government,95 and the tribe’s legal system and culture 
might be unfamiliar to them.96 Like the Court in Oliphant, the Duro Court 
expressed concerns about subjecting outsiders to the cultural and procedural 
differentness of tribal courts: 
The special nature of the tribunals at issue makes a focus on 
consent and the protections of citizenship most appropriate. While 
modern tribal courts include many familiar features of the judicial 
process, they are influenced by the unique customs, languages, 
and usages of the tribes they serve. Tribal courts are often 
“subordinate to the political branches of tribal governments,” and 
their legal methods may depend on “unspoken practices and 
norms.” It is significant that the Bill of Rights does not apply to 
Indian tribal governments. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 
provides some statutory guarantees of fair procedure, but these 
guarantees are not equivalent to their constitutional counterparts. 
There is, for example, no right under the Act to appointed counsel 
for those unable to afford a lawyer.97 
The Court reasoned that criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians 
presented many of the same concerns that the Court had identified in 
Oliphant, but it framed the issue as one of lack of consent, a theme absent 
from Oliphant: 
The retained sovereignty of a tribe is but a recognition of certain 
additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent 
to be tribal members. . . . A tribe's additional authority comes 
from the consent of its members, and so in the criminal sphere 
membership marks the bounds of tribal authority.”98 
The Court noted that as a nonmember ineligible for citizenship in the Salt 
River Tribe, Duro was prohibited from voting, holding political office, or 
serving on a jury convened by the tribal court.99 The Court noted lack of 
consent and political participation rights as the determining factors, and 
found no reason to treat non-Indians and nonmember Indians differently for 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. at 679. Although concerns about lack of due process protections and cultural 
foreignness drove the Court’s decision in Oliphant regarding non-Indians, that opinion did 
not discuss its frame the Court’s concerns in terms of consent or civic participation.  
 96. Id. at 693-94. 
 97. Id. at 693 (citations omitted). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 679. 
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jurisdictional purposes.100 By using this consent/political participation 
rationale, the Court also relied less on the historical record, which it 
characterized as “somewhat less illuminating” than the record regarding 
jurisdiction over non-Indians.101 
The Duro decision left an immediate practical gap in Indian country law 
enforcement for tribes not subject to Public Law 280. Although the federal 
government has concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute many crimes 
committed by Indian people, no federal law authorizes prosecution of an 
Indian person who commits a minor crime against another Indian person,102 
and states only have jurisdiction over matters in which no Indian is 
involved.103 Minor crimes between Indians fall under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of tribal courts.104 Federal courts determining jurisdiction do 
not distinguish between Indians who are enrolled in the prosecuting tribe 
and those who are not, so a federal court would have jurisdiction over an 
Indian who committed a major crime, regardless of citizenship status. 
Likewise, that same court would lack jurisdiction over an Indian who 
committed a minor crime against another Indian, regardless of whether the 
defendant or the victim were enrolled citizens.  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at 684-88. 
 101. Id. at 688-92. But see H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, at 132-33 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (report 
accompanying the law passed to reverse the Duro holding) (finding tribes had been 
exercising jurisdiction over nonmember Indians for over two hundred years, and that the 
existence of such jurisdiction had never been questioned). 
 102. The term “major crime” is used in this article to denote crimes than are listed in the 
Major Crimes Act, which established federal jurisdiction only over certain enumerated 
crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012). The term “minor crime” is used to denote crimes not listed. 
The Act originally included only seven offenses, but now includes fourteen: murder, 
manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, felony sexual abuse, incest, felony assault (including 
assault with intent to commit a felony, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault by striking 
or beating, and assault resulting in substantial injury, and strangling or choking an intimate 
partner), assault on a child younger than sixteen, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, 
burglary, robbery, and theft of property valued over $1000. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). Use of the 
terms “major” and “minor” is not intended as a commentary on the seriousness of any 
particular offense. Some offenses listed in the Major Crimes Act could be considered non-
serious offenses (e.g., taking property valued at $1000 or more), while some crimes not 
listed (e.g., torture or treason) could be considered quite serious. 
 103. See supra note 44. 
 104. COHEN, supra note 48, § 9.04. 
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Table 1 – Jurisdiction After Duro – Which Courts May Prosecute? 
Defendant  Crime type Indian victim Non-Indian victim 
Tribal citizen 
Major  Tribal & Federal Tribal & Federal 
Minor  Tribal Tribal or Federal 
Nonmember Indian 
Major  Federal Federal 
Minor  X Federal 
Non-Indian All crimes Federal State 
After Duro, a person who qualified as Indian under federal law but was 
not enrolled in prosecuting tribe could not be prosecuted by any 
government. This even applied to Duro himself because, after the murder 
charge was dismissed, the federal court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him 
for the minor crime of illegally firing a weapon, while the tribal court 
lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him as nonmember Indian. 
2. The “Duro Fix” 
Congress responded swiftly to the Duro decision by passing legislation 
the same year that affirmed tribes’ inherent power to prosecute nonmember 
Indians, which closed the gap the Court created.105 It did so by amending 
the definitions section of the Indian Civil Rights Act to clarify that a tribe’s 
“powers of self-government” include “the inherent power of Indian tribes, 
hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all 
Indians.”106 The amendment also added a definition of the term “Indian” as 
“any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as 
an Indian . . . if that person were to commit an offense listed in that section 
in Indian country to which that section applies.”107 Although originally 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-511, tit. VIII, 
§ 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)). 
 106. Id. The statute was passed in response to the Duro decision holding that tribes also 
lack criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, so it is clear that it was intended to cover 
more than enrolled citizens of the prosecuting tribe. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. 
Reina and the Legislation That Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767, 767-70 (1993). 
 107. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2012). The law refers directly to a provision of federal law 
called the Major Crimes Act, which authorizes the federal jurisdiction over certain crimes 
between Indians. That statute does not define the term “Indian,” but the term has been 
judicially defined. See infra Part I.C.3. After circuit courts split on the question of whether 
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passed as a year-long temporary fix,108 Congress later amended the 
provision by removing the sunset date,109 permanently rejecting the Duro 
holding. 
Table 2 – Criminal Jurisdiction After the Duro Fix – Which Courts May Prosecute? 
Defendant  Crime type Indian victim Non-Indian victim 
Tribal citizen 
Major Tribal & Federal Tribal & Federal 
Minor Tribal  Tribal or Federal 
Nonmember Indian 
Major Tribal* & Federal Tribal* & Federal 
Minor Tribal* Tribal* or Federal 
Non-Indian All crimes Federal  State 
* Jurisdiction restored by the Duro fix. 
Why did Congress affirm jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, but not 
non-Indians? A primary rationale for the legislation was the law 
enforcement vacuum left by Duro. The congressional record reveals 
concern about Indians from other tribes,110 and advocates for the bill also 
cited this problem.111 Commentators observed the magnitude of the 
                                                                                                                 
the amendment affirmed tribes’ inherent authority to prosecute all Indians or delegated a 
federal power to tribes, the Supreme Court addressed the question, holding that the statute 
was an affirmation of inherent tribal power. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
Lara is discussed further in Part I.C.1. 
 108. The original law was temporary, Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 
1991, § 8077(d), 104 Stat. at 1892 (providing that the provisions restoring jurisdiction would 
be ineffective after September 30, 1991), and Congress expressed its intent to work with 
tribes, federal agencies, and states “to develop more comprehensive legislation within the 
coming year to clarify the intent of the Congress on the issue,” H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, at 
133 (1990) (Conf. Rep.), but the promised clarification never materialized. 
 109. Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646. 
 110. E.g., 102 CONG. REC. 10,712 (1991) (statement of Rep. George Miller) (“[V]irtually 
all tribes support it. That means tribes want the jurisdiction but also support letting other 
tribes have jurisdiction over their people.”). 
 111. E.g., The Duro Decision: Criminal Misdemeanor Jurisdiction in Indian Country: 
Hearing on H.R. 972 Before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 102d Cong. 33 
(1991) (Resolution of the International Association of Chiefs of Police on Expansion of 
Criminal Jurisdiction for Indian Tribes) (referring to visits and marriages “between members 
of different tribes”); id. at 23 (statement of Rep. Bill Richardson) (referring to the 
jurisdictional void over Indians from one tribe who “reside on, work at, or visit other tribal 
reservations” and to “member Indians [who] have spouses from a different tribe”). But see 
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problem, given the large number of nonmember Indians living and working 
on reservations112 and the even larger influx of nonmember Indians present 
at tribally hosted public cultural events, such as powwows and Pueblo feast 
days.113 Congress’ focus on patching a jurisdictional gap is underscored by 
references in the record to tribes’ loss of “misdemeanor jurisdiction” over 
nonmember Indians.114 The revised law fully restored jurisdiction over all 
Indian people to the same extent as it exists over tribal citizens, which 
includes jurisdiction over major crimes,115 but the legislators envisioned 
tribal jurisdiction only in terms of misdemeanors—the one category of 
crimes over which the federal courts lack jurisdiction in cases where both 
the defendant and victim are Indians.116 
                                                                                                                 
Hearing on S. 962, S. 963, supra note 86, at 137 (statement of Wayne Ducheneaux) 
(describing nonmember Indian category as including Indians enrolled in other tribes and 
Indians not enrolled anywhere); Hearing on H.R. 972, supra, at 153-58 (oral and written 
testimony of Professor Richard Collins) (explaining that formal enrollment does not 
necessarily reflect the traditional view about who is part of a tribal community); Hearing on 
S. 962, S. 963, supra note 86, at 218 (statement of Professor Nell Jessup Newton) 
(advocating elimination of language defining Indian in terms of member and referring to 
Indians who are not enrolled anywhere, a group she described as “much larger than many 
people realize”). 
 112. See Nell Jessup Newton, Permanent Legislation to Correct Duro v. Reina, 17 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 109, 109 n.7 (1992) (describing various factors that have led to the presence 
of significant numbers of nonmember Indians on most reservation, including the presence of 
Bureau of Indian Affairs and Indian Health Service employees, inter-marriage between 
tribes, and the presence of people who are ineligible for citizenship in their home 
communities, making them nonmembers if membership is defined in terms of citizenship); 
see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, at 133 (“Non-tribal member Indians own property on Indian 
reservations, their children attend tribal schools, their families receive health care from tribal 
hospitals and clinics.”) 
 113. See Hearing on S. 962, S. 963, supra note 86, at 146 (testimony of Donald Dupuis, 
Chief Judge of the Tribal Court of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes) (“thousands 
of non-member Indians gather on the Reservation each summer for annual pow-wows”); id. 
at 181 (“This number of non-member Indians and others increase tremendously on occasions 
of special events such as Shalako (the Zuni New Year’s celebration).”). 
 114. H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, at 132-33. 
 115. See supra note 48 (describing common assumption that tribes do not have 
jurisdiction over major crimes and recent case law holding to the contrary). 
 116. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, at 133 (referring to “the power of tribal courts to 
exercise misdemeanor jurisdiction”); Hearing on S. 962, S. 963, supra note 86, at 25 
(statement of Sen. Pete Domenici) (discussing jurisdiction “in misdemeanor cases—and 
remember, that’s all there is here”). The reference to misdemeanor jurisdiction probably also 
reflected an acknowledgement that tribes could not sentence offenders to more than one year 
in jail. See infra note 221 (describing sentence limits). 
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Beyond this practical problem, Congress did not elaborate on its reasons 
for restoring jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, but not non-Indians. The 
enforcement-gap explanation also does not explain why Congress chose to 
affirm only tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, rather than 
clarifying federal or state jurisdiction over these people. A second possible 
rationale is that tribes have a long history of embracing members of other 
tribes through intermarriage, education, removal, and relocation.117 
However, tribes have a long history of embracing non-Indians as well,118 so 
this rationale does not fully explain why Congress would distinguish 
between nonmember Indians and non-Indians.119 A third possible 
explanation is the idea that Indian tribes, whether as a matter of history or 
as a result of modern inter-tribal cooperation, share certain basic values that 
might render a tribal justice system in one tribe less unfamiliar to another 
Indian (even one from another tribe) than it would be to a non-Indian. This 
explanation, however, ignores the vast diversity among tribes.120 
A less satisfying but perhaps more likely explanation for restoring 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, but not non-Indians, is that it reflects 
a politically possible compromise between those who would limit tribal 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Accord Means v. Chinle Judicial Dist., 2 Am. Tribal Law 439, 444 (Navajo 1999) 
(“Given the United States Indian education policy of sending Indian children to boarding 
schools, Indians in the armed services, modern population mobility, and other factors, there 
are high rates of intertribal intermarriage among American Indians.”); id. at 447-51 
(discussing history of Indians from other tribes living in Navajo territory and of individuals 
integrating into Navajo society through its clan system). 
 118. See supra note 67 and infra notes 435-436. For the reasons described in notes 112 
and 117, the number of non-Indians incorporated into tribes is likely much smaller, and it is 
likely that tribes sometimes embraced Indian outsiders more readily and completely. 
 119. The frequency with which tribes exercised jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, 
and the degree to which federal officials recognized it, differs from their history with regard 
to non-Indians. H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, at 133 (“Throughout the history of this country, the 
Congress has never questioned the power of tribal courts to exercise misdemeanor 
jurisdiction over non-tribal member Indians in the same manner that such courts exercise 
misdemeanor jurisdiction over tribal members.”). This difference in historical practice 
accounts for greater emphasis on history in Oliphant. As described at supra text 
accompanying notes 68-84, though, historical practice does not fully answer the question, 
and each court therefore offered a fairness-related justification for its holding as well. 
 120. See, e.g., Greywater v. Joshua, 846 F.2d 486, 493 (1988) (pointing to “significant 
racial, cultural, and legal differences” between tribes, along with the lack of nonmember 
consent, to justify holding that tribes lack inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmember 
Indians); Duro v. Reina, 860 F.2d 1463, 1468-69 (1988) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from order 
denying rehearing en banc) (quoting Greywater and noting possibility of “hostility or 
mistrust” between tribes); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 678 (1990) (discussing diversity 
among tribes). 
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jurisdiction to enrolled citizens of that tribe and those who would extend it 
to anyone who commits a crime within the tribe’s territory. When Congress 
restored jurisdiction over non-Indian domestic violence offenders twenty 
years later, tribes sought restoration of full territorial jurisdiction: draft 
versions of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 would have completely 
overturned Oliphant, and advocates urged the same during hearings on the 
VAWA of 2013.121 
The possibility that tribal courts might obtain jurisdiction over white 
defendants has generated significant concern, especially in potential cases 
where those defendants do not live in the tribe’s territory or are viewed as 
living “involuntarily” in Indian country.122 This is one reason why the Duro 
fix may have encountered less resistance than an Oliphant fix would have 
encountered.123 Because its limited affirmation of tribal jurisdiction focused 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See Tribal Law and Order Act (Draft) (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http:// 
www.indian.senate.gov/sites/default/files/upload/files/DraftTribalLawandOrderActof2009.pdf; 
Native Women: Protecting, Shielding, and Safeguarding Our Sisters, Mothers, and Daughters: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. 75 (2011), available at 
http://www.indian.senate.gov/sites/default/files/upload/files/071411CHRG-112shrg71182.pdf 
(testimony of Sarah Deer) (urging restoration of criminal jurisdiction over all offenders for all 
crimes). 
 122. Many whites settled in Indian country as a result of the federal policy allotting 
reservations and encouraging whites to settle on those parcels on the assumption that Indian 
country would vanish. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 7-15 
(1995) (describing how allotment and surplus land policies resulted in nearly ninety million 
acres of formerly tribal lands passing to white settlers); Tweedy, supra note 54, at 133-34 
(same); Frickey, supra note 60, at 15 (describing allotment policy). When the United States 
later reversed this policy and reaffirmed tribal sovereignty, most of these white landowners 
remained on the land. Id. (allotment resulted in a “significant non-Indian population” on 
many reservations today); Royster, supra, at 60 (“In the allotment-based cases, the Court has 
consistently invoked the interests of non-Indian landowners in the Indian country.”); 
Tweedy, supra note 54, at 137-39 (discussing the Court’s concern with whether these 
settlers and their descendants would have expected to be subject to the jurisdiction of a tribal 
court and questioning its historical accuracy). 
 123. See, e.g., Stephen Fee, Transcript: Above the Law: Responding to Domestic 
Violence on Indian Reservations, PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 22, 2014, 12:20 PM EDT), http:// 
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law-uneven-justice-seen-reservations-victims-domestic-violence/ 
(quoting Senator Tom Coburn, who opposed passage of the Violence Against Women Act 
amendments restoring tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian domestic abusers on the grounds 
that they are not tribal citizens, with no mention of the twenty-year-old law providing for 
tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians) (“You cannot cast tribal sovereignty on me. I’m 
not a member of the tribe. . . . There’s no way you can assure and guarantee constitutional 
provisions under what passed. So it –this provision will eventually be thrown out, be 
challenged, and on appeal they’ll lose, because you cannot guarantee American citizens their 
constitutional rights if they’re non-tribal members in a tribal court.”). 
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on less of a politically charged issue than a reversal of Oliphant would 
have, it has also generated less focused inquiry into the reasons supporting 
such an extension of tribal jurisdiction, and has left important questions 
about the rationale for affirming tribal jurisdiction over only nonmember 
Indians unanswered. 
As a result, the law seems problematic to some critics: it treats Indians 
and non-Indians differently and rejects using tribal citizenship as the 
definitive way to determine who counts as an Indian. If a person’s Indian 
status does not in this context hinge on his or her formal citizenship in a 
tribe, some may wonder, what is left besides a purely descent-based 
classification? The next section discusses how various courts have 
answered the definitional questions raised by Duro.124 
C. Who Is an Indian? 
The Duro fix left open the question of who is included in the category 
“nonmember Indians.” Does the designation simply refer to enrolled 
citizens of tribes other than the ones seeking to prosecute them? In other 
words, did Congress intend to affirm inter-tribal jurisdiction, but not to 
disturb the Court’s emphasis on enrolled citizenship as a defining 
characteristic of Indianness? Or does the category also include the many 
people who live as members of tribal communities, but are not citizens? 
Most of the legislative history and case law concerning tribal jurisdiction 
has focused on citizens of other tribes,125 suggesting that Congress meant at 
least to include those people, but beyond that the congressional record is 
ambiguous. For example, the National Congress of American Indians 
submitted a statement in support of the legislation that defined the 
nonmember Indian category as including Indians enrolled in other tribes 
and “those Indians not enrolled in any tribe.”126 More importantly, the law 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See infra Part II (presenting a jurisdictional standard that relies on community 
membership, rather than citizenship or race). A fuller discussion of related equal protection 
issues appears infra Part III.A.2. 
 125. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, at 133 (1990) (Conf. Rep.) (describing the availability 
of federal services to Indians “without regard to whether their tribal membership is the same 
as their reservation residence”); S. 963, 102d Cong. § 2(10) (1991) (finding that law 
enforcement needs “require that inherent tribal jurisdiction over all Indians, including 
members of other tribes must be recognized and reaffirmed”). 
 126. Hearing on S. 962, S. 963, supra note 86, at 137 (statement of Wayne Ducheneaux); 
see also id. at 25 (statement of Sen. Pete Domenici) (“[D]ay by day, if you limit jurisdiction 
to membership and then put a little parenthesis next to it and say ‘(enrolled),’ which is what 
the Supreme Court seemed to say, you are leaving large numbers of Indians who are living 
right there day by day over whom no one has jurisdiction because there are scores of Indian 
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itself—which refers to the federal common law test for Indianness—
actually applies to non-citizen community members as well.127  
The law affirming tribal jurisdiction over all Indians defines “Indian” by 
referencing 18 U.S.C. § 1153.128 Known as the Major Crimes Act, § 1153 
grants federal courts criminal jurisdiction over major crimes between 
“Indians” occurring in Indian country.129 Neither § 1153 nor Supreme Court 
case law provide a comprehensive definition of Indian for federal 
jurisdiction purposes.130 Courts have not, however, interpreted the category 
                                                                                                                 
living on reservations who are not official members of the reservation and/or tribe or pueblo 
they live on for a myriad of reasons. Some think it is intermarriage. That isn’t half the 
reason. Some are just not enrolled. This enrollment process is a very technical kind of thing. 
In fact, it would be interesting . . . to find out how many Indians are not enrolled at all 
anywhere and are Indians living on Indian reservations. I believe there are literally 
thousands—perhaps hundreds of thousands.”). 
 127. See infra Part I.C.3 (discussing how the common law standard for federal criminal 
jurisdiction has developed and been applied by various circuits). The congressional record 
also refers to the federal common law test. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-938, at 132 (referring to 
a “jurisdictional void” over “those who identify themselves as Indian and are recognized 
under Federal law (18 U.S.C. 1153) as Indian”).  
 128. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2012). This definition was added to the Indian Civil Rights 
Act by the Duro fix legislation. H.R. 972, 102d Cong. (1991); see also supra Part I.B.2. 
 129. 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
 130. The network of statutes creating federal jurisdiction over crimes occurring in Indian 
country distinguishes between Indians and non-Indians, but does not define either term 
further. Federal Indian country jurisdiction is rooted in either the General Crimes Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1152 (2012), which extends federal enclave law to Indian country for prosecutions 
of interracial crimes (Indian on non-Indian, and vice versa), or the Major Crimes Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 1153 (2012), which authorizes federal prosecutions of certain intra-Indian crimes. 
Indianness is a jurisdictional prerequisite for prosecutions under the Major Crimes Act, 
which provides for federal jurisdiction over "[a]ny Indian" who commits certain enumerated 
crimes within Indian country. Id.; see United States v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585, 594 (9th 
Cir. 1977). The prosecution bears the burden of proving Indianness, United States v. 
Juvenile Male, 666 F.3d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 2012), but is not required to offer proof if the 
defendant stipulates that he is an Indian, Ward v. United States, No. 1:13cv01003, 2013 WL 
664087, at *2 (D.S.D. 2013) (finding no proof necessary where defendant stipulated Indian 
blood and tribal enrollment), appeal docketed, No. 13-01513 (8th Cir. Feb. 6, 2013). For the 
General Crimes Act to apply, either the defendant or the victim must be Indian (but not 
both). 18 U.S.C. § 1152. The Act establishes jurisdiction over crimes occurring within 
Indian country without regard to identity of the defendant by extending “the general laws of 
the United States as to the punishment of offenses” (federal enclave laws) to Indian country. 
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (defining “Indian country”). The second paragraph of the 
statute sets forth exceptions, specifying that federal jurisdiction “shall not extend” to crimes 
where both the defendant and the victim are Indian, or to an Indian defendant who has 
already been punished by the local law of the tribe. Id. § 1152. In a crime involving an 
Indian victim, a defendant may assert evidence of Indianness as an affirmative defense to 
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to apply only to enrolled tribal citizens. The test used by courts is drawn 
from a case that involved a different law, which provided for federal 
jurisdiction in Indian country but had an exception for crimes committed by 
one Indian against another.131 In a case involving whether a white man, 
married to a Cherokee citizen and naturalized under Cherokee law, could 
avoid prosecution under this exception, the Supreme Court held that legal 
Indianness requires both some degree of Indian descent and some sort of 
political recognition as Indian.132 Applying that test today in federal 
prosecutions under § 1153, which requires a showing of Indian status in 
order to permit prosecution, lower federal courts have held that tribal 
citizenship is sufficient to demonstrate political recognition, but it is not 
necessary.133 Instead, citizenship is one factor to be considered, along with 
other factors such as receipt of tribal or federal services, social recognition, 
community participation, and even self-presentation.134 While enrollment 
alone is enough to demonstrate political recognition,135 an unenrolled 
person may still be considered an Indian under federal law if one or more of 
the other factors are satisfied.136 
What, then, does political recognition look like for a nonmember Indian? 
Does this category include members of the resident tribal community who 
lack citizenship documents? Does it include those who are ineligible for 
citizenship under tribal law? For example, if a tribe requires that its 
members possess one-quarter Indian blood in order to enroll, what is the 
status of a descendant whose blood quantum is one-eighth? Does the 
category include all people of Indian descent? 
                                                                                                                 
prosecution under § 1152. See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 
2005) (holding that the government need not allege non-Indian status, but if defendant 
properly raises the issue and produces sufficient evidence, the burden shifts to the 
government to prove that the victim is not Indian). Indianness matters for different reasons 
under the two statutes, but courts use the same standard to determine it. See id. at 1229-30 
(explaining that Indianness is an element of the crime under § 1153 and may be a defense to 
prosecution under § 1152, but relying on cases arising under both statutes to determine the 
substantive standard in a § 1152 case). 
 131. Act of June 30, 1834, Pub. L. No. 23-161, § 25, 4 Stat. 729, 730. That law was the 
predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 1152.  
 132. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 567-68, 572-73 (1846). This case is 
discussed more fully infra Part I.C.3. 
 133. See, e.g., Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224; United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 
(9th Cir. 1979); Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1938); St. Cloud v. United States, 
702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D.S.D. 1988). 
 134. See infra notes 199-208 and accompanying text. 
 135. See infra note 209. 
 136. E.g., Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224; Pero, 99 F.2d at 31; St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461. 
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The circuit courts that have addressed the question of whether someone 
is politically recognized as Indian for purposes of federal prosecution all 
consider multiple factors, but different courts have selected different factors 
to consider and assigned different relative weights to them.137 All agree, 
however, that enrollment is not required.138 These cases are instructive, but 
do not directly answer the question of the appropriate boundary of tribal 
court jurisdiction; in fact, several cases suggest that Indianness might be 
governed by different standards for purposes of tribal and federal court 
jurisdiction.139 
1. Challenges to the Duro Fix 
One way that the question about the proper scope of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction has arisen is in cases that challenge the law restoring tribal 
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. The only such case to reach the 
Supreme Court was United States v. Lara.140 Lara, who was an enrolled 
citizen of the Turtle Mountain Chippewa Tribe but lived on the Spirit Lake 
reservation, was arrested after he assaulted an officer seeking to enforce an 
order excluding him from the reservation.141 He pled guilty to several 
counts of misconduct in tribal court and was also prosecuted in federal 
court for assault on a federal officer.142 Lara challenged his federal 
prosecution.143 He argued that tribes’ power to prosecute nonmember 
Indians was a delegation of federal power, so his subsequent federal 
prosecution violated the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against double 
jeopardy.144 The Court rejected this challenge, holding that Congress 
restored an inherent tribal power instead of delegating a new one.145 
However, it reserved other potential bases for challenge, including the 
                                                                                                                 
 137. See infra notes 199-206. 
 138. See infra note 207. 
 139. See infra notes 213-216 and accompanying text. 
 140. 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 141. Id. at 196. 
 142. Id.; see also United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 636-37 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 143. Lara, 541 U.S. at 197. 
 144. Id. at 197-98. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Lara that the Duro 
fix law amounted to a delegation of federal power. Lara, 324 F.3d at 640. 
 145. Id. at 198-99, 210. In so holding, the Court resolved a circuit conflict, agreeing with 
the Ninth Circuit’s pronouncement in United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 682 (9th Cir. 
2001) (reh’g en banc), that the Duro fix was a restoration of inherent power, not a delegation 
of federal power. Enas was an enrolled member of the San Carlos Apache Tribe who was 
prosecuted after he stabbed a member of the White Mountain Apache Tribe while on that 
tribe’s reservation. Id. at 665. 
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argument that a statute classifying by Indianness, but not tribal citizenship, 
was an illegal racial classification.146 
In Means v. Navajo Nation147 and Morris v. Tanner,148 nonmember 
Indian defendants directly challenged tribes’ assertions of criminal 
jurisdiction on equal protection grounds. Means, an enrolled citizen of the 
Oglala Sioux Tribe, lived on the Navajo reservation for a decade with his 
Navajo wife before later moving away.149 During a visit to the Navajo 
reservation, he threatened and battered his father-in-law (an Omaha tribal 
member) and another (Navajo) man.150 Morris involved a juvenile who was 
a citizen of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe and was arrested for speeding 
on the Flathead Reservation.151 Lower federal courts affirmed tribal 
jurisdiction in each case,152 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.153 
The closest cousin to these cases was a Supreme Court decision thirty 
years earlier which upheld federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians against 
an equal protection challenge. In that case, United States v. Antelope,154 
three citizens of the Coeur D’Alene Tribe were convicted of murder in a 
robbery that resulted in the death of a non-Indian woman who lived on the 
reservation. Two of the defendants were convicted of first-degree 
murder.155 Both defendants challenged their convictions, arguing that they 
were prosecuted under federal law, which included a felony murder 
provision, instead of under state law, which would have required proof of 
premeditation and deliberation, because of their race.156 Rejecting the 
challenge, the Court explained that federal laws relating to Indian tribes, 
“although relating to Indians as such,” are “not based upon impermissible 
classifications. Rather, such regulation is rooted in the unique status of 
Indians as ‘a separate people’ with their own political institutions. Federal 
regulation of Indian tribes, therefore, is governance of once-sovereign 
political communities.”157 This was enough to uphold the federal law, but 
                                                                                                                 
 146. Id. at 209. 
 147. 432 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 148. 288 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1134-35 (D. Mont. 2003). 
 149. Means, 432 F.3d at 927.  
 150. Id.; see also Means v. Chinle Judicial Dist., 2 Am. Tribal Law 439, 445 (Navajo 
1999).  
 151. Morris, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 1135. 
 152. Means, 432 F.3d at 935; Morris, 288 F. Supp. at 1143. 
 153. See supra note 11. 
 154. 430 U.S. 641, 642-43 (1977).  
 155. Id. at 643.  
 156. Id. at 644. 
 157. Id. at 645-46. 
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the Court continued, “[i]ndeed, respondents were not subjected to federal 
criminal jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race but because they 
are enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe.”158 The Court noted, 
however, that circuit courts did not require tribal citizenship in order for a 
defendants to face federal criminal prosecution, “at least where the Indian 
defendant lived on the reservation and ‘maintained tribal relations with the 
Indians thereon.’”159 Because the defendants were Coeur D’Alene citizens, 
the court did not reach the issue of whether federal criminal law extends to 
Indians who are not tribal citizens. 
Lara, Means, and Morris, like Antelope, were really cases about federal 
plenary power. In each case the court considered, in part, whether the 
federal government could carve out a category of “Indian” people and 
subject them to different laws, even where those laws might be viewed as 
placing Indian people at a disadvantage. As the Court has repeatedly made 
clear, Congress—in the exercise of its plenary power over Indian affairs—
may do so without running afoul of the Constitution.160 Congress also has 
the power to describe and change the boundaries of this Indian legal 
category, as long as the people within that category can fairly be described 
as related (by citizenship, descent, or otherwise) to the Indian tribes with 
which the federal government has a relationship.161 Whether Congress has 
the power to define and legislate with regard to citizens who are also 
Indians, however, is only tangentially related to the question of who a 
particular tribal government can prosecute and why. 
In Lara, Means, and Morris, the federal courts accepted that the 
defendants qualified as “Indians” and would be included in the Congress’ 
restoration of jurisdiction over “all Indians” as long as the law was valid. 
The invocation of defendants’ tribal citizenship provided an easy rejoinder 
to the question of whether Congress had illegally created a racially defined 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Id. at 646. 
 159. Id. at 647 n.7 (citing Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30 (7th Cir. 1938); United States v. 
Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 953 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
 160. Id.; see Fisher v. Dist. Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont., in & for Rosebud 
Cnty., 424 U.S. 382, 390-391 (1976) (exclusive tribal jurisdiction over family law issue 
arising between tribal members on reservation is not an unconstitutional denial of access to 
state courts); see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 545-55 (1974) (federal Indian 
preference laws not unconstitutional racial classification); see also Moe v. Confederated 
Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (tax immunity 
for Indians on reservation not unconstitutional racial classification). 
 161. See infra note 354 (describing various standards for determining the boundaries of 
the Indian legal category). 
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category of second class citizens.162 All three defendants were enrolled in 
other tribes, and easily met a citizenship-based definition of Indianness, so 
the courts did not analyze their Indian status further. As in Antelope, the 
courts were not forced to consider whether citizenship in a federally 
recognized tribe was an absolute requirement for Indianness, and none of 
them discussed why citizenship should be required for tribal court 
prosecution when it is not required for federal court prosecution.163 Even 
more importantly, none of these cases addressed the non-constitutional 
questions about the purpose of, need for, or proper limits on tribal criminal 
jurisdiction. 
Besides the fact of their citizenship in other tribes, the defendants in 
Lara and Means were also deeply connected to the communities in which 
they were prosecuted, forestalling questions about whether they were being 
unfairly prosecuted by an unfamiliar court system.164 Lara was married to a 
Spirit Lake tribal member and he lived with her and their children on the 
Spirit Lake reservation.165 Means was married to a Navajo woman, had 
lived on the Navajo reservation for ten years, and was actively involved in 
tribal political and social issues.166 Significantly, the tribal court in Means 
did not base its assertion of criminal jurisdiction on Means’ enrollment in 
the Oglala Sioux Tribe. Instead, the court based its jurisdiction on Means’ 
role in and kinship obligations to the Navajo community.167 
                                                                                                                 
 162. The Lara court described the Duro fix as restoring tribal jurisdiction over Indians 
from other tribes. 541 U.S. at 193, 198. The Means court also emphasized Means’ 
enrollment, although it acknowledged that federal law did not necessarily require enrollment 
to demonstrate political Indianness. 432 F.3d at 934-35 (“We therefore can and do leave for 
another day the challenging question Bruce invites: whether a person who was racially 
Indian, but who was not enrolled or eligible for enrollment in any tribe, would be subject to 
tribal court jurisdiction.”). In Morris, tribal law limited criminal jurisdiction to enrolled 
members of other tribes, and the court viewed the “voluntary” nature of enrollment, and the 
fact that it could be renounced in order to avoid future prosecution, as an important factor in 
its holding that the classification at issue was political, rather than racial. 288 F. Supp. at 
1133, 1141. 
 163. See infra Part I.C.3. 
 164. Morris did not live on the Flathead reservation, but the court pointed out that over 
2000 other nonmember Indians did, and that the tribe provided health, social and emergency 
services to those people. Morris, 288 F. Supp. at 1142. 
 165. Lara, 541 U.S. at 196. 
 166. Means v. Chinle Judicial Dist., 2 Am. Tribal Law 439, 445-46 (Navajo 1999). 
 167. Id. at 450; Spruhan, Case Note, supra note 20. 
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2. Federal Court Review of Tribal Jurisdiction over Unenrolled People 
Tribal communities include many people who are not formally enrolled 
citizens. This may be true for several reasons: some people are descended 
from tribal members but do not meet the minimum blood quantum 
requirements of their tribes;168 some tribes are matrilineal or patrilineal, so 
they only permit members of a certain gender to enroll their children in the 
tribe;169 some people who are eligible for citizenship simply have not 
followed the official procedures to enroll; and some people are not 
descended from that tribe at all, but are related through marriage or 
adoption. Some of these people are enrolled in other tribes (e.g., a child of 
parents from two different tribes may be enrolled in one parent’s tribe, but 
not in the other), but some are not enrolled anywhere.170 Many of these 
nonmember Indians are fully integrated into their communities, live their 
lives on the reservation, and participate fully in tribal religious, cultural and 
social life. 
Because almost every case in which a federal court was asked to review 
the legality of a tribe’s exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a nonmember 
Indian involved a defendant who was enrolled elsewhere, the issue of 
jurisdiction over unenrolled people has not been carefully considered. The 
first federal case to address this question was Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute 
                                                                                                                 
 168. See, e.g., JILL DOERFLER, IDENTITY, FAMILY, BLOOD, AND CITIZENSHIP AMONG THE 
WHITE EARTH ANISHINAABEG xxii, 61-90 (2015) (describing how White Earth constitutional 
revision was driven in large part by a desire to change the one-fourth blood quantum 
requirement for citizenship); MELISSA TATUM, MIRIAM JORGENSEN, MARY E. GUSS & SARAH 
DEER, STRUCTURING SOVEREIGNTY: CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIVE NATIONS 46 (2014) 
[hereinafter STRUCTURING SOVEREIGNTY]. 
 169. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 52 n.2 (1978) (citing 
ordinance enacted in 1939 by Santa Clara Pueblo Council disallowing membership in Santa 
Clara Pueblo to children born of female members and male non-members); Genealogy, 
SENECA NATION OF INDIANS, http://www.sni.org/Culture/Genealogy.aspx (last visited July 
22, 2015) (“[T]he mother must be an enrolled member in order for the children to be 
enrolled.”). 
 170. Some may be members of a tribe that is not formally recognized by the United 
States government. Members of those tribes may not qualify as Indians for most federal law 
purposes, and thus could be treated the same way as non-Indians if the standard used relied 
on enrollment in a recognized tribe. E.g., LaPier v. MacCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 
1993) (enrolled member of Little Shell Band of Ojibwe not an Indian for purposes of federal 
prosecution because tribe not recognized); United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th 
Cir. 2010), overruled in part by United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(same). As described in Part II, some tribes use a jurisdictional standard that specifically 
includes these people. See infra note 255. 
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Indians v. Phebus,171 which involved a tribal member who was 
involuntarily disenrolled as a result of an internal review of enrollment 
criteria.172 After his disenrollment he continued to live on the reservation as 
a member of the community while he contested his disenrollment through 
appeals to the tribal court and tribal council.173 During this time, he was 
convicted of a crime and sentenced to six months in jail by the tribal 
court.174 The tribe’s appellate court vacated his conviction, holding that the 
tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction.175 
While there may have been important tribal law arguments against the 
extension of criminal jurisdiction over a defendant in such a situation, the 
tribal appellate court did not engage them. Instead, it held that the tribe 
lacked jurisdiction because, as a result of the disenrollment, the defendant 
no longer qualified as an “Indian” under federal laws defining the limits of 
tribal jurisdiction, holding that “Indian” in this context includes only 
enrolled tribal citizens.176 This statement misreads federal common law, 
which clearly does not require enrolled citizenship to qualify as Indian.177 
When the tribe sought a declaratory judgment from a federal district court 
that jurisdiction was proper, the federal court granted it in part, holding that 
a tribal court may prosecute anyone who would qualify as an Indian under 
federal law, including people who are not enrolled.178 
However, the court expressed concern about the particular facts of 
Phebus, holding that a tribe that had disenrolled someone over his objection 
could not later premise a finding of Indianness on his affiliation with that 
same tribe.179 The case raised previously unexplored questions about how 
disenrollment, especially involuntary disenrollment, should affect 
                                                                                                                 
 171. 5 F. Supp. 3d 1221 (D. Nev. 2014). 
 172. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1225; see also Lynette Curtis, Cast Out of Paiute Tribe, 
Disenrolled Confront Struggles, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Apr. 22, 2012, http://www.review 
journal.com/news/las-vegas/cast-out-paiute-tribe-disenrolled-confront-struggles (discussing 
the background and aftermath of the decision that led to Phebus’ disenrollment). 
 173. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1225; Interview with Tribal Attorney Patrick Murch (Mar. 
28, 2014). 
 174. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1226. 
 175. Id. at 1226; see also Phebus v. Las Vegas Paiute Tribe, No. CA13-001 (Las Vegas 
Paiute Ct. App. June 10, 2013). 
 176. Phebus, No. CA13-001, at 3. 
 177. See infra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 178. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 1230-31. 
 179. Id. at 1237. 
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jurisdiction.180 Although federal law clearly protects tribes’ right to 
determine their own citizenship,181 and federal court review of tribal 
decisions to revoke citizenship is extremely limited,182 recent instances of 
tribal disenrollment have garnered a great deal of media attention.183 Even if 
these instances involve legitimate exercises of tribal sovereign power, they 
do not cast tribal governments in a particularly favorable light. A court 
considering the scope of tribal jurisdiction in a case involving a disenrolled 
person may have serious fairness concerns, as both the tribal and federal 
court did in Phebus. Whether these concerns should be addressed through a 
narrowing of tribal criminal jurisdiction is a different question, and one that 
neither court effectively addressed. 
Although the discussion about nonmember Indians surrounding the Duro 
fix legislation seemed to focus on the problem of jurisdiction over Indians 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Voluntary and involuntary disenrollment could impact jurisdiction differently. See 
infra note 290 and accompanying text (discussing how each category would fare under a 
community recognition standard). 
 181. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S 
218, 222 (1897) (holding Chickasaw Nation empowered to grant and revoke citizenship, 
including naturalization of non-Indian spouses). 
 182. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 69. But see Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 
F.3d 874, 888 (2d Cir. 1996) (claiming “that authority to determine membership questions is 
‘complete and absolute’—simply goes too far. While Congress has deferred with regularity 
to tribal membership determinations, there is little question that the power to define 
membership is subject to limitation by Congress.”) 
 183. See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 172 (Las Vegas Paiute disenrollment); Associated Press, 
Disenrollment Leaves Natives “Culturally Homeless” (Jan. 20, 2014), available at http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/news/disenrollment-leaves-natives-culturally-homeless (citing several 
examples of disenrollment battles and tracing increased visibility of disenrollment battles to 
the 1990s); K.C. Meadows, Former Pinoleville Tribal Members Want Their Own Tribe, 
UKIAH DAILY J., July 14, 2015, http://www.ukiahdailyjournal.com/general-news/20150714/ 
former-pinoleville-tribal-members-want-their-own-tribe (discussing a group of nineteen 
former members of the Pinoleville Pomo Nation who were disenrolled after a 2005 
constitutional amendment changed the tribe’s enrollment criteria); Randi Schaffer, Opinion 
Issued by Tribal Judge in Disenrollment Hearing, MORNING SUN, Mar. 23, 2015, 
http://www.themorningsun.com/general-news/20150321/opinion-issued-by-tribal-judge-on-
disenrollment-hearing (discussing Saginaw Chippewa disenrollment dispute); James Dao, In 
California, Indian Tribes with Casino Money Cast Off Members, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/us/california-indian-tribes-eject-thousands-of-member 
s.html?_r=0 (discussing disenrollment dispute involving the Picayne Rancheria of the 
Chukchansi Indians and other California tribes). Although the media attention has intensified 
in recent years, “[d]isenrollment is not a new issue” for tribes. Duane Champagne, The 
Debate Over Disenrollment, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (June 28, 2014), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/06/28/debate-over-disenrollment-155346. 
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enrolled in other tribes,184 the concerns expressed in Duro and raised by 
some legislators185 about the fairness of tribal court jurisdiction over people 
without political rights in that tribe extend to unenrolled people from that 
tribe as well. As the tribal and federal courts considering the Phebus case 
recognized, these peoples’ status vis-à-vis tribal and federal law may 
present more challenging questions than the most common assumptions 
about the Duro fix recognize.186 By erroneously assuming that federal law 
limits tribal court jurisdiction to citizens of tribal nations, the tribal 
appellate court in Phebus unnecessarily restricted its own jurisdiction and, 
more importantly, missed an opportunity to engage in a tribal law analysis 
of whether jurisdiction was proper under the circumstances. 
3. Federal Jurisdiction Cases 
To determine whether a person counts as an Indian for purposes of 
federal prosecution, courts apply a definition drawn from the 1845 case 
United States v. Rogers.187 Under the Rogers test, Indianness requires both 
Indian ancestry and political recognition as an Indian.188 The case involved 
a white man who had married a Cherokee woman, lived in Cherokee 
territory, and had become a naturalized citizen under Cherokee law.189 The 
victim in the case was another white man who was also a naturalized citizen 
                                                                                                                 
 184. See S. 963, 102d Cong. (1991) (draft bill introduced by Sen. Inouye to correct Duro, 
which states in the findings section that the tribes’ historical jurisdiction over all Indians 
“was seriously disrupted by the Supreme Court's . . . holding that Indian tribes have lost their 
inherent criminal jurisdiction over Indians who are members of other tribes”). 
 185. Newton, supra note 112, at 115 (“Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota expressed 
his belief that the Constitution's Bill of Rights should apply to all nonmember Indians, 
especially because nonmembers cannot vote in tribal elections or run for office.”). 
 186. See supra notes 172-179 and accompanying text (discussing Phebus). 
 187. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572-73 (1846). 
 188. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1118 (9th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Keys, 103 
F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996)) (finding test to consider “degree of Indian blood” and “tribal 
or government recognition as an Indian”); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th 
Cir. 1984); United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 786 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1280-1282 (10th Cir. 2001). For a comparison of the test across 
circuits, see generally Daniel Donovan & John Rhodes, To Be or Not To Be: Who Is an 
“Indian Person”?, 73 MONT. L. REV. 61 (2012); Bryan L. Lewis, Do You Know What You 
Are? You Are What You Is; You Is What You Am: Indian Status for the Purpose of Federal 
Criminal Jurisdiction and the Current Split in the Courts of Appeals, 26 HARV. J. RACE & 
ETHNIC JUSTICE 241 (2010). 
 189. Berger, Power, supra note 67, at 1960. 
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through inter-marriage.190 Despite significant evidence that the tribe 
recognized Rogers as a member, the Court held that he could not escape 
federal prosecution under an exception to then-existing federal law barring 
federal prosecution of crimes committed by one Indian against another 
Indian.191 Regardless of the tribe’s view as to membership, the Court held 
that a person must also possess some degree of Indian blood in order to be 
considered “Indian” under federal law.192 
Rogers involved a person who had been politically incorporated into a 
tribal community but was not descended from that community, or from any 
tribal community. The Court assumed that Rogers’ naturalized status met 
the political recognition prong and focused instead on the descent prong. In 
contrast, federal courts today are usually confronted with cases where the 
descent prong has been met and the litigation involves the political 
recognition prong of the test. One way to establish political recognition is 
tribal enrollment. Nearly every tribe today has adopted formal enrollment 
criteria and documents enrollment via certificates or lists of members. 
When a person has some Indian blood and is enrolled in any tribe, it is 
relatively easy for a federal prosecutor to establish jurisdiction.193 
Most of the federal court opinions on the question of Indianness 
consequently involve the gray area: people who are Indian by descent but 
who are not enrolled members of any tribe. One of the first circuit court 
cases to cite Rogers was Ex parte Pero, a case involving two defendants 
who argued that they were not Indian. One of the defendants, Moore, lived 
with his mother on the reservation of the St. Croix Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa, although neither he nor his mother was an enrolled citizen 
because of procedural issues and federal agency rules governing enrollment 
at the time.194 In an opinion that elucidated the political recognition 
requirement and laid the foundation for the modern tests, the court held that 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Id. 
 191. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572-73. 
 192. Id. at 573. Varying degrees of Indian blood have been found to be sufficient under 
federal law, and because some tribes require only descent from an enrolled member, but not 
a particular quantum of Indian blood, it would be problematic for federal courts to impose a 
blood quantum floor that would effectively exclude some enrolled members. 
 193. Federal jurisdiction does not require that they be enrolled in the tribe whose territory 
encompasses the location where the crime occurred. 
 194. Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30 (7th Cir. 1938). The other defendant, Pero, argued that 
his acceptance of an individual allotment made him no longer an Indian under federal 
supervision. Id. at 29-30. The court held that he was still an Indian for jurisdictional 
purposes. Id. at 35. 
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a child of an Indian mother and half-blood father, where both 
parents are recognized as Indians and maintain tribal relations, 
who himself lives on the reservation and maintains tribal 
relations and is recognized as an Indian, is to be considered an 
Indian within the protection of the federal guardian-ward 
relationship and within the meaning of "Indian" as used in the 
jurisdictional statute in question. The lack of enrollment in the 
case of Moore is not determinative of status.195 
Circuit courts today agree that enrollment is not required;196 this leaves 
the courts to determine alternative tests for political recognition in an era 
when formal citizenship has increasingly become the standard. The result is 
a varying and inexact set of factors, which courts apply differently in 
different circuits.197 Courts agree that “political recognition” in this context 
can come from either the federal government or a tribal government,198 so 
the factors consider both federal recognition and tribal recognition. 
In the Ninth Circuit (the circuit with the most published opinions on this 
question), courts have listed four factors that are relevant to proving 
Indianness: “1) tribal enrollment; 2) government recognition formally and 
informally through the receipt of assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) 
enjoyment of the benefits of tribal affiliation; and 4) social recognition as 
an Indian through residence on a reservation and participation in Indian 
social life.”199 These factors are listed in declining order of importance.200 
                                                                                                                 
 195. Pero, 99 F.2d at 31. 
 196. See infra note 207 (enrollment not required by circuit courts); supra text 
accompanying notes 157-159 (describing Antelope Court’s discussion of enrollment). 
 197. Although the term "Indian" is judicially defined in this context, courts have upheld 
the statute against challenges that it is unconstitutionally vague. E.g., United States v. 
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1264 (1979). 
 198. See, United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
federal recognition is not required and noting that the deference to tribal recognition “stems 
from the recognition that one of an Indian tribe’s most basic powers is the authority to 
determine questions of its own membership”); United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 786-87 
(8th Cir. 1976) (noting that courts consider “recognition by a tribe or society of Indians or by 
the federal government”). 
 199. Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1223 (quoting United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th 
Cir. 1995)) (listing factors relevant to determining Indianness as a defense to a prosecution 
under § 1152); see United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1114 (9th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. LaBuff, 658 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 
840, 846 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 200. Zepeda, 792 F.3d at 1114. 
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Courts in other circuits have identified similar factors, but vary as to 
precisely which factors are relevant and how important each one is. The 
Eighth Circuit, for example, considers five factors: 1) enrollment; 2) 
governmental recognition through receipt of assistance; 3) tribal recognition 
via tribal court prosecution; 4) enjoying the benefits of tribal affiliation; and 
5) social recognition as an Indian, including self-identification.201 Tribal 
enrollment alone is dispositive, but the other factors need not be considered 
in any particular order and are not exhaustive.202 This test places greater 
importance on informal forms of community membership because it does 
not require that social recognition be considered the least important factor, 
and it specifically considers self-identification.203 Similarly, the Seventh 
Circuit uses a totality of the circumstances approach.204 Factors that are 
relevant, but not dispositive, include tribal recognition, federal recognition, 
residence on a reservation, and “whether a person holds himself out as an 
Indian.”205 The Tenth Circuit also uses a “totality of the evidence” 
approach.”206 
Federal courts vary in their reliance on specific factors, but all agree that 
Indianness for purposes of federal prosecution requires descent and political 
recognition, and all agree that formal enrollment in a tribe is not the only 
way to demonstrate political recognition.207 All courts also rely to some 
extent on informal recognition by a tribal community. Courts have 
considered receipt of tribal services or benefits, prior exercise of 
jurisdiction by a tribal court, formal non-citizen status under tribal law, 
cultural and social participation, social recognition, residence on the 
                                                                                                                 
 201. United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 202. Lewis, supra note 188, at 242 (noting that Eighth Circuit’s factors are “illustrative” 
while Ninth Circuit’s factors are “exhaustive”). 
 203. See Dodge, 538 F.2d at 787 (relying in part on the fact that defendants held 
themselves out to be Indian). But see Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 764 (self-identification relevant 
but not sufficient alone). 
 204. See United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 205. Id. at 456 (approving jury instruction listing those factors but advocating a “totality 
of circumstance” approach). 
 206. United States v. Diaz, 679 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 207. LaBuff, 658 F.3d at 877; United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 
2005) (citing numerous cases holding that lack enrollment is not determinative and rejecting 
dissent’s proposal to adopt enrollment as the single determining factor); United States v. 
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1979) (enrollment not an absolute requirement 
for proving Indianness); Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d at 31; United States v. Drewry, 365 F.3d 
957, 961 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Pemberton, 405 F.3d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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reservation, and self-identification or self-presentation.208 While tribal 
community recognition is dispositive if it comes in the form of enrolled 
citizenship,209 federal courts have not been willing to rely on tribal 
community recognition alone if it comes in the form of social recognition or 
a formal tribal law designation short of enrolled citizenship. In other words, 
a person may be an Indian in the eyes of the tribal community and yet not 
qualify as an Indian under the factors set forth by a particular federal 
court.210 Conversely, a person may be an Indian under federal law even 
though they are not recognized as such by the tribe.211 
The Duro fix provides that Indianness for the purposes of tribal 
prosecution should be defined in the same manner as it is for federal 
jurisdiction.212 Yet, the cases applying the federal jurisdiction standard 
                                                                                                                 
 208. E.g., Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2009) (prior tribal prosecution, 
descendant status, reservation residence, and lack of participation in cultural activities), 
Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 764-65 (self-presentation, prior tribal court prosecution, social 
recognition), Dodge (self-presentation), United States v. Driver, 755 F. Supp. 885, 889 
(D.S.D.), aff’d 945 F.2d 1410 (8th Cir. 1991) (lack of social participation a factor in holding 
that defendant was not an Indian), Drewry, 365 F.3d at 961 (participation in tribal summer 
program and social life and prior tribal child welfare involvement sufficient to support a find 
that the victims were Indian in a prosecution of a non-Indian defendant under §1152); 
Pemberton, 405 F.3d at 660 (self-presentation, reservation residence). 
 209. E.g., United States v. Lossiah, 537 F.2d 1250, 1251 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984); St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 
1461 (D.S.D. 1988); Stymiest, 581 F.3d at 764; Drewry, 365 F.3d at 961; Zepeda, 792 F.3d 
at 1115. 
 210. E.g. United States v. Cruz, 554 F.at 846-48 (finding defendant not an Indian under 
federal law despite being formally recognized as a descendant under tribal law and having 
been criminally prosecuted in tribal court); United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (same). In each case, both involving unenrolled members prosecuted by the 
Blackfeet tribal court, the federal court did not investigate the circumstances of the prior 
prosecution or address whether tribal criminal jurisdiction over unenrolled descendant 
members was legal under tribal or federal law and, perhaps as a consequence, did not accord 
the tribal prosecutions much weight. Cruz, 554 F.3d at 846 n.7, 850; Maggi, 598 F.3d at 
1083. But see United States v. LaBuff, 658 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 2011) (basing a finding 
of Indian status in part on Blackfeet tribal court prosecution) (“As we observed in Bruce, the 
assumption and exercise of tribal jurisdiction over criminal charges, demonstrates tribal 
recognition [particularly where defendant] did not challenge the authority of tribal officers to 
arrest him or the exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction.”). 
 211. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 666 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(finding defendant is an Indian subject to federal prosecution in federal court where he is 
enrolled in a tribe and has used his membership to access services, despite not self-
identifying as an Indian and not being socially recognized as such by his community). 
 212. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 128-136 (examining the chain of 
references necessary to discern the Duro fix's definition of “Indian”). It is especially ironic 
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suggest that tribal recognition as a community member may be informal 
and, more importantly, may not always coincide with federal recognition as 
an Indian. In other words, federal common law indicates that a person may 
be eligible for criminal prosecution under tribal law, but not in federal court 
under federal law, and vice versa.213 Many of the federal cases involve 
defendants who were previously prosecuted in tribal court, suggesting that 
the tribe had determined that they were proper subjects for jurisdiction.214 
In some of these cases, the defendant, while not enrolled in the tribe, is 
officially recognized as a “descendant” or similar marker of tribal 
affiliation, a designation short of full citizenship that may render him or her 
eligible for tribal services and also may serve as the basis for tribal court 
prosecution.215 Courts treat previous tribal prosecution as evidence of tribal 
recognition as Indian, but it alone is not sufficient to establish any of the 
specifically enumerated factors.216 Although the federal cases do not 
directly address the question of whether jurisdiction was proper in the prior 
tribal prosecution, they seem to accept the premise that the standard for 
Indianness under tribal law may be different from the standard for 
Indianness under federal law. Enrolled citizens satisfy both tests, but each 
category includes more than just enrolled citizens, and the categories 
diverge. 
                                                                                                                 
that the Duro fix legislation that affirms tribal criminal jurisdiction over all Indians refers to 
the definition of Indianness employed by federal courts because that definition originates 
from the Rogers case in which the Court acknowledged that there is in fact a difference 
between tribal and federal standards. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 
(1846) (“[A person adopted by a tribe may] become entitled to certain privileges in the tribe, 
and make himself amenable to their laws and usages. Yet he is not an Indian [as defined by 
federal law].”). 
 213. Compare Juvenile Male, 666 F.3d 1212 (holding that juvenile male was an Indian 
for federal law purposes even though he was not an accepted member of the tribe), with 
Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (holding that Rogers was not an Indian for federal law 
purposes even though he was accepted as a member of the Cherokee community and had 
been criminally punished by the tribe).  
 214. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840; Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073; LaBuff, 658 F.3d 873. 
 215. See generally Adam P. Bailey, Threading the Needle: The Fort Peck Tribe’s 
Associate Membership: A Modern Model for Tribal Affiliation (April 2011) (unpublished 
draft on file with author) (analyzing one tribe’s two-tiered membership structure); see also 
discussion infra Part III.B.  
 216. Labuff, 658 F.3d at 878; Cruz, 554 F.3d at 846-48 (defendant prosecuted as 
“descendant member” under tribal law but ineligible for federal court prosecution). 
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To summarize, tribes clearly have jurisdiction over more than just 
enrolled citizens of that tribe. Several federal courts have upheld tribal 
jurisdiction over enrolled citizens of other tribes living and working in the 
community. However, while those courts point to the fact of tribal 
citizenship to justify jurisdiction, they do not discuss why citizenship in 
another tribe is a reason to subject the defendant to the prosecuting tribe’s 
jurisdiction, while a non-Indian would not be, or whether the defendant’s 
community connections were a significant factor.217 Federal courts 
considering the reach of federal jurisdiction, and the only federal court to 
review tribal jurisdiction over an unenrolled community member, have held 
that unenrolled people may qualify as “Indians” as long as there is some 
other indication of that person’s connection to a tribal community.218 
D. Jurisdiction Extends to Non-Indian Domestic Abusers with Ties to the 
Tribe 
In 2013, Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act again to restore 
concurrent tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in domestic 
violence cases.219 This law partially restored the jurisdiction that the 
Oliphant Court held had been divested, but only over a very limited class of 
                                                                                                                 
 217. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing Lara, Means, and Morris). 
 218. See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing federal jurisdiction cases); supra notes 172-179 and 
accompanying text (discussing Phebus). 
 219. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 
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non-Indians. First, the law applies only to offenders who commit certain 
specified offenses related to domestic and dating violence.220 Second, this 
“special domestic violence jurisdiction” is optional, and a tribe wishing to 
exercise it must provide additional procedural protections to defendants.221 
Third, not all domestic violence offenders are covered by it: the law 
specifies that a tribe may not exercise jurisdiction over any defendant who 
“lacks ties to the Indian tribe.”222 The statute further defines sufficient ties 
to include residence, employment, or being the spouse or intimate partner 
of a tribal citizen or an Indian who lives in the tribe’s territory.223 Three 
tribes participated in a pilot project through which the U.S. Attorney 
General certified that their criminal justice systems satisfied the law’s 
requirements, and those tribes began exercising special domestic violence 
                                                                                                                 
 220. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(c) (2012); see also id. § 1304(a)(1)-(2). As tribal advocates 
point out, the inclusion of a very limited class of offenses means that the law has been an 
imperfect tool for addressing family violence in tribal communities. Fee, supra note 123. 
The Tulalip Tribes’ lead attorney discussed the impact of the law’s provisions limiting tribal 
jurisdiction to only a few types of crimes, stating: “Unfortunately it’s not quite gone far 
enough. In just three recent cases, we had children involved, and we’re not able to charge on 
the crimes that were committed against those children including endangerment, criminal 
endangerment, possibly assault, [and] other attendant or collateral crimes.” Id. 
 221. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(4) (“The term ‘participating tribe’ means an Indian tribe that 
elects to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over the Indian country of 
that Indian tribe.”). If a prison term of any length may be imposed on a non-Indian, these 
additional protections include a right to law-trained defense counsel at the tribe’s expense; a 
guarantee of law-trained judges, publicly available criminal laws, and recorded criminal 
proceedings. Id. § 1302(c). Regardless of the possibility of imprisonment, the tribe must 
provide the defendant a trial by a jury that does not “systematically exclude . . . non-
Indians.” Id. § 1304(d)(3)(2). With the exception of the jury requirement, these procedural 
rights are also guaranteed to Indian (member or nonmember) defendants facing more than 
one year of imprisonment, as authorized by the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010. See 25 
U.S.C. § 1302 (2012) (amended by Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 
sec. 234, § 202, 124 Stat. 2261, 2280). Tribes that cannot or do not provide these protections 
remain limited to one-year sentences and may prosecute only Indians. Even where a tribe 
opts into both laws, however, significant differences remain between the federal law 
requirements for prosecuting Indian and non-Indian defendants facing a sentence of one year 
or less. A non-Indian defendant charged with a crime of domestic violence and facing one 
year or less in prison must be guaranteed all of the rights discussed above. An Indian 
defendant charged with the same crime and facing one year or less in prison is guaranteed 
none of these rights as a matter of federal law. Compare id. § 1304 (non-Indian rights), with 
id. § 1302 (Indian rights). The law thus continues to draw an important distinction between 
Indians and non-Indians. See id. §§ 1302, 1304. 
 222. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B). 
 223. Id. 
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jurisdiction over non-Indians in February 2014.224 As of the writing of this 
article, these tribes had prosecuted several non-Indians under the law, and 
none of the defendants had challenged their prosecution in federal court.225 
Table 4 – Jurisdiction After VAWA – Which Courts May Prosecute? 
Defendant  Crime type Indian victim Non-Indian victim 
Tribal citizen 
Major Tribal & Federal Tribal & Federal 
Minor Tribal Tribal or Federal 
Nonmember Indian 
Major Tribal & Federal Tribal & Federal 
Minor Tribal Tribal or Federal 
Qualifying non-Indian 
Domestic violence Tribal* & Federal State 
All other crimes Federal State 
Other non-Indian All crimes Federal State 
* Jurisdiction restored by VAWA. 
It is notable that Congress, in enacting this law, chose to limit tribal 
jurisdiction to domestic violence offenders who have a demonstrated 
relationship to the tribal community.226 Based on the reports and testimony 
provided in support of the legislation, Congress certainly could have chosen 
to restore tribal jurisdiction over any non-Indian committing a crime of 
domestic violence or sexual assault, regardless of community ties.227 This 
                                                                                                                 
 224. The three tribes are the Pasqua Yaqui Tribe, the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla 
Indian Reservation, and the Tulalip Tribes. 
 225. “[M]ore than two dozen non-Indians have been charged with domestic violence and 
dating violence crimes. They all have the right to go straight to federal court and ask to be 
released if their rights are being violated. And how many have done so? Zero.” Fee, supra 
note 123 (quoting Sam Hirsch, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Environment & 
Natural Resources Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
 226. Compare S. REP. NO. 112-153, at 9 (2012) (indicating extension of tribal criminal 
jurisdiction to only those offenders with sufficient ties to the prosecuting tribe), with Louise 
Erdrich, Op-Ed, Rape on the Reservation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb, 27, 2013, at A25, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/opinion/native-ameri cans-and-the-violence-against-
women-act.html?_r=0 (implying that the gap in the law has attracted random non-Indian 
habitual sexual predators to tribal areas and that VAWA would somehow empower tribal 
governments to arrest and prosecute these roving rapists who otherwise have no ties to the 
prosecuting tribal communities). 
 227. See Examining the Prevalence of and Solutions to Stopping Violence Against Indian 
Women: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 196 (2007), available 
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suggests a desire to balance the need to close an enforcement gap in Indian 
country against the need to maintain some kind of insider/outsider 
distinction in order to preserve fairness. With regard to domestic violence 
offenders today, the most significant distinction is not between Indians and 
non-Indians or members and nonmembers. Rather, it is between those 
people who have sufficient “ties to the tribe” and those who are strangers. 
Authorizing prosecution of offenders who are not of Indian decent is a 
significant change, yet there are thematic consistencies between VAWA 
and prior laws. It does not require that the victim be a citizen of the tribe. 
An offender can be prosecuted for committing a crime of domestic violence 
against any Indian victim, but the offender must have sufficient ties to the 
prosecuting tribe.228 Like the Duro fix and Oliphant, which focus on 
Indianness, VAWA acknowledges that a tribal community may include 
many Indian people who are not tribal citizens that tribes have an interest in 
protecting even these non-citizen community members through criminal 
jurisdiction. In contrast to the laws focusing on Indianness, however, 
VAWA’s test focuses specifically on a defendant’s connection to the 
prosecuting tribe; his or her ties to another tribe are irrelevant for purposes 
of this test. In this respect, the law echoes the Duro decision, which focused 
only on an offender’s relationship to the prosecuting tribe (as opposed to his 
status as an Indian under federal law) and acknowledged that substantive 
law, procedure, language, and cultural norms vary widely among tribes.229 
In enacting VAWA, however, Congress corrected the Duro Court’s 
unnecessarily narrow formulation of what it means to be sufficiently 
connected to a tribe to make tribal jurisdiction appropriate. 
It is clear that tribes have criminal jurisdiction over their members. It is 
equally clear that they lack criminal jurisdiction over most non-Indians, but 
retain jurisdiction to prosecute nonmember Indians. Congress rejected the 
Duro holding, but has remained largely silent on Oliphant, so the 
Indian/non-Indian distinction remains, and Indianness in this case is not 
                                                                                                                 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg39355/html/CHRG-110shrg39355.htm 
(referencing AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 16 (documenting the high rates 
of violent and sexual victimization by Native women at the hands of non-Native men, 
including both intimate violence and stranger violence)); see also NATIVE WOMEN’S ASS’N 
OF CAN., FACT SHEET: MISSING AND MURDERED ABORIGINAL WOMEN AND GIRLS 5 (2010), 
available at http://www.nwac.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Fact_Sheet_Missing_and_ 
Murdered_Aboriginal_Women_and_Girls.pdf (noting that aboriginal women in Canada are 
nearly “three times more likely to be killed by a stranger” than non-Native women in 
Canada). 
 228. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B) (2012). 
 229. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 678 (1990). 
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defined in terms of tribal citizenship. After the 2013 reauthorization of 
VAWA, tribes also have jurisdiction over a small subset of non-Indians: 
domestic violence offenders who have a sufficient tie to the tribal 
community. Although courts and commentators commonly assume that 
jurisdiction over people who are not citizens of the prosecuting tribe is 
justified by the defendant’s citizenship in another tribe, the VAWA law and 
Phebus (in which a federal court ruled that a tribe may, consistent with 
federal law requirements, prosecute an unenrolled person) reveal flaws in 
this assumption. 
The current doctrine seems to be the product of disagreement between 
Congress and the Court over the scope of modern tribal criminal power, but 
it also suggests the two branches may agree jurisdiction should be limited in 
some respect. The rationale behind each jurisdictional rule remains opaque, 
but taken together they reveal a recognition of the importance of criminal 
jurisdiction to tribal communities and a shared concern about the fairness of 
subjecting outsiders to prosecution in a tribal system that may be culturally 
foreign, procedurally different, or unknown. Reading the cases and statutes 
together, we can discern that federal law limiting tribal jurisdiction seeks to 
balance the interests served by tribal criminal laws against the fairness 
concerns expressed by the Court. We can also discern a desire to maximize 
tribal sovereign power within this framework: Congress has pushed back 
when the judiciary has imposed too narrow a limit. 
II. The Community Recognition Standard 
Two possible standards have occupied most of the judicial and scholarly 
discourse about criminal jurisdiction: a racial line (as the Court seemed to 
be drawing in Oliphant and as is enshrined through the incorporation of 
Rogers as the standard for tribal jurisdiction under the Duro fix) and a 
citizenship-based line (as the Court drew in Duro when it defined 
membership narrowly in terms of consent and political participation rights). 
An examination of how tribes define the limits of their own jurisdiction 
reveals another possibility: tribes may fairly exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over those people whom the community recognizes as members. This tribal 
law standard is remarkably similar to the standard Congress introduced in 
VAWA by drawing a distinction between non-Indians who have sufficient 
ties to the tribe and those who do not. In both cases, the primary inquiry is 
into the relationship between the defendant and the prosecuting tribe. 
By asking how the community views the defendant, rather than whether 
the defendant has chosen to enroll or to avail himself or herself of tribal 
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services, this standard emphasizes that community members have certain 
obligations to their communities, rather than characterizing membership as 
simply a matter of voluntary association. The emphasis on obligation 
instead of consent makes this standard much more reflective of the 
purposes and concerns governing questions of criminal jurisdiction. Instead 
of relying on a rigid line, the standard focuses on the relationship between 
the defendant and the sovereign seeking to exercise jurisdiction. It does not 
unduly cabin the idea of membership by focusing on citizenship as the only 
possible indicator. While enrolled citizenship does indicate community 
recognition, other factors may indicate it as well. Finally, as explored in 
Section II.D, it offers a way to understand Indianness that is separable from 
the question of descent. Although Indian descent is an important factor in 
many tribal jurisdictional laws,230 and even in the VAWA,231 community 
recognition potentially offers a way to determine whether someone is 
Indian based solely on their relationship to the tribe. If federal law were 
amended to permit it,232 the same standard could authorize jurisdiction over 
people who are not Indian by descent, but are nevertheless Indian in the 
sense that they are recognized as members by the tribal community.233 
                                                                                                                 
 230. The tribal codes reviewed here were written before the enactment of VAWA. In 
light of Rogers and Oliphant, it is not surprising that tribes would have developed the 
community recognition standard in defining the term “Indian” and that they would have 
done so under the assumption that Indianness required descent. While the descent 
requirement may be a product of tribal law standards, it is more likely a nod to federal 
restrictions. See discussion supra Parts I.A, I.C.3. Part II.E considers whether the community 
recognition standard could more fundamentally alter the Indian/non-Indian line in the 
criminal jurisdiction context by eliminating the descent requirement entirely. 
 231. See supra note 221. For offenders facing less than a year in prison, VAWA 
continues the Court’s practice of treating Indians and non-Indians differently because non-
Indians with sufficient ties to the tribe may be prosecuted only if they are accorded 
additional procedural protections to which Indian people facing a sentence of one year or 
less are not entitled. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(2). Any person, Indian or non-Indian, is entitled to 
most of these procedural rights (counsel, publicly available laws, law-trained and licensed 
judges) if facing more than a year in prison. Id. § 1302(c). For those people, the only specific 
additional requirement imposed by VAWA is the requirement of a jury pool that does not 
exclude non-Indians. Id. § 1304(d)(3). This requirement may have been driven by concerns 
about bias that are unique to non-Indian defendants. 
 232. This could be accomplished through congressional restoration of jurisdiction over a 
broader class of non-Indians (a version of VAWA that applies to all crimes), or judicial 
rejection of Rogers, which is the source of the descent requirement. See discussion supra 
Part I.C.3 (examining the centrality of Rogers in the federal common law standard) and infra 
Part II.E (considering the consequences of eliminating the descent requirement). 
 233. The idea that a person may be a member of a tribal community even though that 
person is not descended from the same community for purposes of asking whether the 
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A. Tribal Law Approaches to Jurisdiction 
A review of publicly available, pre-VAWA tribal codes provides some 
insight into how tribes envision and express the limits of their criminal 
jurisdiction.234 Tribal law approaches to criminal jurisdiction vary. Some 
are broadly worded, providing for jurisdiction over any person who 
                                                                                                                 
community can fairly subject that person to criminal prosecution should not be confused 
with the argument that descent is irrelevant to indigeneity in other contexts. See Rolnick, 
supra note 13, at 1003-06, 1023 (critiquing the Court’s facile equation of ancestry-based 
indigenous classifications with illegal racial classifications and acknowledging that Indian 
tribes and other indigenous communities are primary structured around kinship and descent). 
 234. This is not a full-fledged empirical research project. There are 565 federally 
recognized tribes. Notice of Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services 
from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 80 Fed. Reg. 1942 (Jan. 14, 2015). Of 
these, 229 are Alaska Native villages. Id. at 1946-48. I did not review the law of Alaska 
tribes because most tribes in Alaska do not presently occupy “Indian country” as that term is 
defined by federal law, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 523 (1998), so 
criminal jurisdiction in Alaska presents unique issues, INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A 
ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 45 (noting that the Alaska Attorney General “takes the position 
that its law enforcement authority is exclusive throughout the state, maintaining that Tribes 
do not have a land base on which to exercise any inherent criminal jurisdiction”). But see 
Ryan Fortson, Advancing Tribal Court Jurisdiction in Alaska, 32 ALASKA L. REV. 93, 132-
50 (2015) (advancing a theory of member-based criminal jurisdiction); Geoffrey D. 
Strommer, Stephen D. Osborne & Craig A. Jacobson, Placing Land Into Trust: Issues and 
Opportunties, 3 AM. INDIAN L.J. 508, 511-517, 520-523 (2015) (describing proposed 
regulations to permit Alaska Native villages to have land taken into trust and the 
consequences of this for “Indian country” status and territorial criminal jurisdiction). About 
half of the tribes in the lower forty-eight states operate formal tribal court systems. Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, Census of Tribal Justice Agencies in Indian Country, 2002, OFFICE OF 
JUSTICE PROGRAMS (Dec. 2005), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=543.  
I reviewed approximately 100 tribal codes, which likely covers most, but not all, of the 
tribes with active court systems. The codes reviewed represent most of the publicly available 
codes, as well as some unpublished codes obtained directly from the tribes. Where possible, 
I supplemented my review of codes with analysis of the few publicly available tribal court 
decisions applying those codes and occasional conversations with tribal judges and 
prosecutors. Publicly available version of tribal codes may not reflect recent amendments or 
include separately enacted ordinances. In particular, many tribes have updated their criminal 
codes in light of the Tribal Law and Order Act and the Violence Against Women Act, so 
even the provisions cited here may have changed since the information was collected. While 
a full empirical investigation would no doubt be useful in determining the most common 
legislative approaches and gaining more information into how those approaches are 
implemented, such a project would require significant field research and is far beyond the 
scope of this article. 
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commits a crime within that tribe’s territory,235 or to all people who commit 
crimes within the tribe’s territory to the extent that tribal criminal 
jurisdiction is allowed under federal law.236 Although federal law still limits 
those tribes’ jurisdiction, they have not incorporated those limits into tribal 
law.237 
                                                                                                                 
 235. See, e.g., BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY TRIBAL COURT CODE ch. 1, § 102 (2001), 
available at http://www.baymills.org/resources/chapter1_bay_mills_tribal_court.pdf; WHITE 
EARTH NATION JUDICIAL CODE tit. 1, ch. 2, § 1(d) (1997), available at http://www.white 
earth.com/data/upfiles/files/JudicialCode.pdf; FORT BELKNAP TRIBAL CODE tit. I, § II (1999), 
available at http://www.ftbelknap.org/documents/Fort%20Belknap%20Tribal%20Code.pdf; 
SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBAL COURT & JUDICIARY CODE § V (2008), available at 
http://www.srmt-nsn.gov/_uploads/site_files/TribalCourtAndJuduciaryCode.pdf (however, 
the tribe does not appear to have a criminal code); LUMMI NATION CODE OF LAW tit. 2, §§ 
1.02.010, 1.02.030 (2003), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/lummi/1Court.pdf; 3 
PASCUA YAQUI TRIBAL CODE tit. 3, ch. 1-1, § 20 (2015), available at http://www.pascua 
yaqui-nsn.gov/_static_pages/tribalcodes/index.php. 
 236. For example, the Skokomish Criminal Code contemplates jurisdiction over all 
persons “except that non-Indians must be apprehended and prosecuted in accordance with 
applicable federal law and consistent with the rule stated in Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 
435 U.S. 191 (1978), so long as such rule is good law.” SKOKOMISH CRIMINAL CODE § 
9.01.030 (n.d.) (emphasis added), available at http://www.skokomish.org/SkokConstitution 
&Codes/Codes/STC9-01.htm; see also FORT MCDERMITT PAIUTE-SHOSHONE TRIBE LAW & 
ORDER CODE ch. 3, § 1 (1998), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/fort_mcdermitt/ 
ch3.pdf (“[W]hen the State of Oregon effectively retrocedes criminal jurisdiction over the 
Oregon lands, and the Federal government approves same, the Tribal Court will assume 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction except that prohibited by federal law.”). 
 237. Many of these codes acknowledge federal law as a limitation, but they do not 
incorporate the limits or define them further. For example, the Kalispel Law and Order Code 
extends tribal court jurisdiction “over Indians and Non-Indians to the full extent allowed by 
Federal and Tribal Law.” LAW & ORDER CODE OF THE KALISPEL TRIBE OF INDIANS § 1-2.01 
(2015), available at http://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/kalispel/kalispel-tribe/pdf-uploads/ 
LAW-AND-ORDER-CODE_15.2.23.pdf; see also CHEYENNE ARAPAHO TRIBES OF 
OKLAHOMA LAW & ORDER CODE tit. II, § 5 (1988), available at http://www.narf.org/ 
nill/codes/cheyaracode/courts.html; COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES LAW & ORDER CODE 
art. 1, § 101 (n.d.), available at http://www.crit-nsn.gov/crit_contents/ordinances/Law_ 
and_Order_Code.pdf; LOWER SIOUX COMMUNITY MINNESOTA JUDICIAL CODE § 1.04(2) 
(2010), available at http://www.lowersioux.com/pdffiles/Judicial%20Code%20Courts%20 
and%20Jurisdiction.pdf; MAKAH INDIAN LAW & ORDER CODE §§ 1.3.01, 2.1.01 (1999), 
available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/makahcode/index.html; MATCH-E-BE-NASH-
SHE-WISH BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS OF MICHIGAN JUDICIAL ORDINANCE ch. II, § 1 
(2012), available at http://www.mbpi.org/PDF/TribalCourt/Judicial_Ordinance.pdf; TRIBAL 
GOVERNMENT OF MENOMINEE INDIAN TRIBE OF WI JUDICIARY & LAW & ORDER CODE art. 
VIII, § 120-33 (n.d.), available at http://ecode360.com/12174985; PAWNEE TRIBE OF 
OKLAHOMA LAW & ORDER CODE tit. I, § 5 (2005), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/ 
codes/pawneecode/courts.html; PRAIRIE ISLAND MDEWAKANTON DAKOTA COMMUNITY 
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Broader statutory language is more protective of tribal sovereignty, 
leaving courts free to determine whether a particular defendant is subject to 
tribal jurisdiction. The tribal courts may formulate a specific test, or they 
may use various tests, but the legislation itself does not constrain the court’s 
inquiry to particular factors. These tribal codes cast the widest possible 
jurisdictional net, placing the onus on the defendant to challenge 
jurisdiction and leaving the tribe free to adapt to changes in federal law that 
may expand tribal jurisdiction to certain non-Indians. A major change, such 
as VAWA’s restoration of jurisdiction over certain non-Indian domestic 
violence offenders, can be incorporated into tribal law without a revision to 
the jurisdictional scope of their criminal courts. However, these codes offer 
little clarity regarding the tribe’s vision of who is subject to its jurisdiction. 
They leave room for courts to adopt varying standards, opening the door to 
potential unfairness, and their lack of a clear definition could result in 
courts unduly limiting jurisdiction. 
Others limit criminal jurisdiction to “Indians” but provide no further 
definition of the term.238 These codes were no doubt written with an 
                                                                                                                 
JUDICIAL CODE tit. 1, ch. II, § 1 (n.d.), available at http://prairieisland.org/wp-content/ 
themes/tempera-child/docs/Judicial%20Code%20Title%201%20Courts.pdf; LAW & ORDER 
CODE OF THE SAUK-SUIATTLE INDIAN TRIBE ch. 2, § 2.020 (2006), available at 
http://www.sauk-suiattle.com/Documents/L&Ocode2006.pdf; SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBAL 
CODE ch. 71, subch. III, § 71.302 (2012), available at http://www.saulttribe.com/images/ 
stories/government/tribalcode/CHAPTR71.pdf; LAW & ORDER CODE OF THE UTE INDIAN 
TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY RESERVATION tit. I, ch. 2, § 1-2-3 (2013), available at 
http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/ute_uintah_ouray/t1.pdf; WASHOE TRIBAL CODE, tit. I, § 1-
20-030 (2012); WINNEBAGO TRIBE OF NEBRASKA TRIBAL CODE tit. I, art. I, §§ 1-103, -104 
(1994), available at http://www.winnebagotribe.com/images/tribal_court/tribal%20code% 
2009-21-11/2011%20 TRIBAL%20CODE.pdf. 
 238. Some of these codes refer to Indians generally. For example, the Chitimacha Code 
extends criminal jurisdiction “over all offenses committed by an Indian within the 
boundaries of the Chitimacha Indian Reservation.” CHITIMACHA COMPREHENSIVE CODES OF 
JUSTICE tit. 1, § 106 (2009), available at http://www.chitimacha.gov/sites/default/files/CCCJ 
%20Title%20I%20-%20Courts%20with%20amendments.pdf; see also ELY SHOSHONE 
TRIBAL CODE, tit. IV, ch. 1, § 1.300 (2008), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/ 
ely_shoshone/civil_1.pdf; TRIBAL COURT ORDINANCE, KLAMATH TRIBAL CODE tit. 2, ch. 11, 
§ 11.09(e) (2000), available at http://klamathtribalcourts.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ 
Title-2-Chapter-11-Tribal-Court-Ordinance-11-22-03.pdf; STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE 
CODE OF JUSTICE tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1-106 (2009), available at http://www.standingrock.org/data/ 
upfiles/files/Title%20(1)%20I%20-%20COURTS.pdf; YOMBA SHOSHONE TRIBE LAW & 
ORDER CODE tit. I, ch. A, § 3 (2001), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/ 
yombacode/yomba1trct.html#b. Others specifically mention nonmember Indians. The 
Northern Cheyenne Law and Order Code provides for criminal jurisdiction “over all 
offenses committed by Tribal members or other Indians on the Reservation.” NORTHERN 
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awareness that federal law from 1978 to 2013 prohibited tribes from 
prosecuting non-Indians. They ensure a closer match between tribal and 
federal standards, but they also incorporate the federal Indian-only 
limitation into their tribal law. As federal law regarding tribal jurisdictional 
limits changes, as it did in 2013 with passage of the VAWA amendments 
authorizing tribal jurisdiction over certain non-Indians, these tribes will 
need to amend their laws in order to extend jurisdiction to the fullest extent 
allowed by federal law.239 Like the territory-based codes, these laws provide 
                                                                                                                 
CHEYENNE LAW & ORDER CODE tit. IA, ch. 14, § 1A-14-2 (2008), available at http:// 
indianlaw.mt.gov/content/northerncheyenne/codes/2008_updated_law_and_order_code/title
_ia.pdf; see also ABSENTEE SHAWNEE CRIMINAL LAW CODE § 2 (2010), available at http:// 
www.narf.org/nill/codes/absentee-shawnee/criminal_offenses.html; COUSHATTA TRIBAL 
CODE tit. 1, § 1.2.04(c) (2004), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/coushatta/ 
coutitle1.html (“The Court shall have subject matter jurisdiction over all criminal actions in 
which an Indian is alleged to have violated the criminal provisions of this Code. . . [i]n civil 
expulsion actions, the Court shall have subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether or 
not the non-member defendant, whether Indian or non-Indian, has violated the criminal 
provisions of this Code, whenever, pursuant to tribal law, such violation would be grounds 
for expulsion.”); Persons Subject to Criminal Jurisdiction, MILLE LACS BAND STAT. ANN. tit. 
5, § 112 (2011), available at http://www.millelacsband.com/pdf/mltitle 05judbranch.pdf; 
Territorial Applicability, 17 NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 203 (2015), available at 
http://www.navajonationcouncil.org/Navajo%20Nation%20Codes/ V0030.pdf; SAC & FOX 
TRIBAL CRIMINAL CODE tit. 10, § 2 (n.d.), available at http://sacandfoxnation-
nsn.gov/sites/sfnation/uploads/documents/SF_CODES_Law/code_of_laws/10_Criminal_Off
enses_-_ch_0_intro_-_2014-12-11.pdf; SHOALWATER BAY INDIAN TRIBE CODE OF LAWS tit. 
2, § 2.00.03 (1995), available at http://www.shoalwaterbay-nsn. gov/assets/PDFs/Law--
Order-Codes/SHO-TITLE-2-LAW-and-ORDER.doc; SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CODE tit. 
4, ch. 1, § 4-01.050 (2003), available at http://www.swinomish.org/ media/3694/0401pre 
limprov.pdf. The Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians of Michigan and Indiana takes a 
similar approach, but does not use the term “Indian.” The tribal courts have jurisdiction over 
“violations of Pokagon criminal law by members of the Band or by other Native Americans 
on the Reservation.” POKAGON BAND TRIBAL COURT CODE NO. 10-21- 2002, § 3(A)(1)(b) 
(2002), available at http://www.pokagon.com/sites/default/files/assets/department/govern 
ment/form/2012/tribal-court-code-842-639.pdf; see also CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE 
COOS, LOWER UMPQUA & SIULSAW INDIANS TRIBAL CODE tit. I, ch. 1-1, § 1-1-23 (2014), 
available at http://ctclusi.org/sites/default/files/1-1.pdf (“The Tribal Court chooses not to 
exercise its right of criminal jurisdiction over any American Indian or Alaskan Native found 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribes . . . until such time as the Tribal Court establishes a 
criminal code of offenses.”) (emphasis added). 
 239. See, e.g., CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE UMATILLA RESERVATION CRIMINAL CODE 
ch. 1, § 1.02 (2014), available at http://ctuir.org/system/files/Criminal%20Code.pdf. Since 
the enactment of VAWA in 2013, several tribes have done so. E.g., FORT PECK TRIBES 
COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE tit. 2, § 106(b) (specifically providing for criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indian domestic violence offenders where criminal jurisdiction was 
formerly limited to Indians). 
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no further guidance as to the definition of Indian, leading to potential 
confusion about its definition and increasing the likelihood that tribal courts 
will rely on assumptions or incorporate a blanket adoption of federal court 
definitions. 
For purposes of understanding how tribes interpret the scope of their 
jurisdiction, codes that set forth a specific standard for determining who 
may be prosecuted are of greater interest. Although they cabin tribal courts 
more, these laws provide a clearer statement of the tribe’s jurisdictional 
vision. Three types of code incorporate a more specific definition of 
“Indian.” One type adopts a citizenship-based definition of Indian, 
extending tribal criminal jurisdiction to Indians enrolled in the prosecuting 
tribe or any other tribe.240 This definition of nonmember Indian as an Indian 
who is a citizen of another tribe is more narrow than the definition provided 
under federal criminal law.241 While it is possible that these tribes chose 
intentionally to limit tribal jurisdiction to enrolled citizens, it is more likely 
that this limitation reflects the common assumption that “Indian” is 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Some also include people who are eligible for enrollment under tribal law, but may 
not be enrolled. See TOHONO O’ODHAM CRIMINAL CODE tit. 7, § 1.4 (n.d.) (jurisdiction over 
any Indian), available at http://www.tolc-nsn.org/docs/Title7Ch1.pdf; id. § 1.16 (defining 
Indian); NEZ PERCE TRIBAL CODE tit. 1, § 1-1-12 (2014), available at http://www.nezperce. 
org/~code/index.htm (jurisdiction over any Indian); id. § 1-1 (defining Indian); PRAIRIE 
BAND OF POTAWATOMI NATION LAW & ORDER CODE tit. 15, § 15-1-1 (2014), available at 
http://www.codepublishing.com/KS/Potawatomi/#!/Potawatomi15/Potawatomi1501.html#1
5-1-1 (jurisdiction over all Indian persons); id. tit. 1, § 4-1 (defining Indian); NOTTAWASEPPI 
HURON BAND OF POTAWATOMI TRIBAL CODE tit. VIII, ch. 6, § 101 (2013), available at 
http://nhbpi.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Title-VIII-06-Law-and-Order-Code-Amend 
ed-8.21.20141.pdf (jurisdiction over offenses committed by any Indian); id. § 201 (defining 
Indian); CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE GOSHUTE RESERVATION 25 C.F.R. § 11.114 (2008), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title25-vol1/pdf/CFR-2012-title25-
vol1-sec11-114.pdf (criminal jurisdiction); id. § 11.106 (defining Indian); CHICKASAW 
NATION CODE tit. 17, § 201.9 (2012), available at https://www.chickasaw.net/Documents/ 
Long-Term/Chickasaw-Code/Title-17.aspx; COQUILLE INDIAN TRIBAL CODE § 610.200 
(2010), available at http://www.coquilletribe.org/docbin/610TribalCourt_002.pdf; OGLALA 
SIOUX TRIBAL CODE ch. 1, § 1 (2010), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/oglala_ 
sioux/chapter01-courtproc.html; YANKTON SIOUX TRIBAL CODE tit. I, § 1-4-3 (1995), 
available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/yanktoncode/yanktoncodet1provisions.html 
(jurisdiction over offenses committed by an Indian); id. § 8-8 (defining Indian); NISQUALLY 
TRIBAL CODE tit. 24, § 24.03 (n.d.), available at http://www.nisqually-nsn.gov/files/1213/ 
7356/7168/Title_24_-_Judiciary_and_Judicial_Procedure.pdf (jurisdiction over offenses 
committed by an Indian); id. tit. 10, § 10.02.06 (defining Indian); SQUAXIN ISLAND LAW & 
ORDER CODE tit. 9, ch. 9.12, § 9.12.020 (n.d.), available at http://squaxinisland.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/Law-and-Order.pdf. 
 241. See supra Part I.C.3. 
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synonymous with “enrolled tribal citizens” in all contexts, rather than a 
decision about how the term should be defined for criminal jurisdiction 
purposes.242 By tying jurisdiction to citizenship, these laws restrict tribal 
criminal jurisdiction to a narrower category of people than would be subject 
to federal criminal jurisdiction (the standard referenced in the Duro fix). 
Furthermore, if a tribe with a citizenship-based definition of Indian chose to 
exercise its jurisdiction under VAWA, tribal law would have to be amended 
to expand the jurisdictional reach of tribal criminal courts. 
Another type of code extends jurisdiction to anyone who would be 
considered Indian under the laws authorizing federal criminal 
jurisdiction.243 In these courts, a person may be prosecuted under tribal law 
if he or she would be eligible for prosecution under federal law. This 
requires that the person be of Indian descent and politically recognized as 
an Indian, but does not require citizenship in a tribe.244 Tribal courts in 
                                                                                                                 
 242. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 243. See SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS CODE ch. 71, subch. III, § 
71.302 (2012), available at http://www.saulttribe.com/images/stories/government/tribal 
code/CHAPTR71.pdf (criminal jurisdiction over “all Indians”); id. ch. 71, subch. II, § 
71.210 (defining Indian); MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS CODE tit. I, § 1-2-1 
(2013), available at http://www.choctaw.org/government/tribal_code/Title%201-
%20General%20Provisions.pdf (tribal policy of asserting criminal jurisdiction over all 
Indians); id. § 5-8 (defining Indian); SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA CODE ch. 
22, § 22-1101 (2009), available at http://www.meskwaki.org/Titles/Title%2022.%20 
Exclusion.pdf. An additional seventeen tribes employ the federal definition because tribal 
jurisdiction is exercised through federal administrative courts called Courts of Indian 
Offenses (C.F.R. courts). 25 C.F.R. § 11.114 (finding C.F.R. courts have jurisdiction over 
any Indian); 25 C.F.R. § 11.106 (2008) (defining “Indian” for purposes of CFR jurisdiction 
as “a person who is a member of an Indian tribe which is recognized by the Federal 
Government as eligible for services from the BIA, and any other individual who is an 
‘Indian’ for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153”). The following tribes rely on CFR 
courts: Ute Mountain Tribe, Te-Moak Band of Western Shoshone, Winemucca Indian Tribe, 
Apache Tribe of Oklahoma, Caddo Nation, Comanche Nation, Delaware Nation, Eastern 
Shawnee Tribe, Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma, Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, Modoc 
Tribe, Otoe-Missoura Tribe, Ottawa Tribe, Peoria Tribe, Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma, 
Wichita and Affiliated Tribes of Oklahoma, and Skull Valley Band of Goshutes. 25 U.S.C. § 
11.100; 78 Fed. Reg. 14,020 (Mar. 4, 2013). These administrative courts were established by 
the Department of the Interior prior to the 1930s as a way to exercise jurisdiction over minor 
offenses in Indian country in the absence of a Western-style tribal justice system. They were 
often staffed by non-Indian judges and served an assimilative function, punishing Indian 
people for engaging in traditional activities. B.J. Jones, Role of Indian Tribal Courts in the 
Justice System 3-4 (2000) (monograph). Today, CFR courts continue to operate only in 
tribes that have not established a separate tribal court system. 
 244. See supra Part I.C.3. 
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these jurisdictions would presumably apply the definitional factors 
identified by federal judges in their circuit.245 These codes move beyond 
citizenship, but they remain unnecessarily tied to a set of standards 
developed with very different concerns in mind.246 
Although the Duro fix references federal jurisdiction standards, tribal 
and federal courts are situated very differently vis-à-vis criminal 
defendants, and the concerns about the scope of jurisdiction for each are 
quite different in the criminal context. The federal government has limited 
criminal jurisdiction within Indian country.247 Its territory-based power 
functions as a backstop: it extends only to places like national parks and 
unincorporated territories, where there is no local government to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction.248 Federal jurisdiction within Indian country exists 
because Indian country is federal territory and because the federal 
government has unique powers over Indian affairs.249 This federal power 
generally excludes state jurisdiction, but it operates in tandem with tribal 
jurisdiction.250 In other words, the proper scope of federal criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian country is a matter of congressional plenary power.251  
Tribal criminal jurisdiction is more analogous to state criminal 
jurisdiction, except that it has been limited by Congress and by the Court. 
                                                                                                                 
 245. Because tribal courts are not federal courts, they may not be obligated to follow the 
test developed by any particular circuit, but the codes’ reference to federal criminal laws 
point judges in the direction of the circuit and district courts generally. For a related 
discussion of the relationship between tribal civil jurisdiction laws and federal court review, 
see Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts, supra note 18, at 1003-04. Accord Clinton, No 
Supremacy Clause, supra note 51, at 241-42 (arguing that tribal courts are not bound by the 
decisions of the lower federal courts or even the United States Supreme Court).  
 246. The difference between the tribal code provisions that refer to federal criminal law 
and the provisions that simply refer to federal law limitations on tribal jurisdiction is that the 
former direct courts to look directly at federal courts’ interpretations of Indianness, whereas 
the latter might permit a tribe to ignore federal court’s interpretation because it has never 
been expressed as an explicit limitation on tribal jurisdiction. 
 247. See Garnett, supra note 16, at 442-49. 
 248. 18 U.S.C. §§ 7, 1151-1153 (2012); see Ex parte Kan-gi-Shun-ca (Crow Dog), 109 
U.S. 556, 571 (1883) (referring to territorial courts as courts of “special and limited 
jurisdiction”). 
 249. Garnett, supra note 16, at 444. 
 250. See John J. Francis, Stacy L. Leeds, Aliza Organick & Jelani Jefferson Exum, 
Reassessing Concurrent Tribal-State-Federal Criminal Jurisdiction in Kansas, 59 U. KAN. 
L. REV. 949, 951-53 (2011) (describing the general rules governing criminal jurisdiction on 
Indian lands, in which recognition state or federal jurisdiction generally preempted the 
exercise of the other, but the existence of federal jurisdiction was concurrent with tribal). 
 251. See Skibine, supra note 106, at 768 n.6. 
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Whereas federal criminal jurisdiction extends only so far as Congress has 
determined it must, tribal criminal jurisdiction exists within the tribe’s 
territory except to the extent Congress or the Court has determined it must 
be limited.252 Moreover, while the federal government has a unique 
relationship with all those who fit into the legal category of “Indian” and 
has plenary power to define that category for purposes of federal 
jurisdiction, individual tribes may rely on different factors to determine 
whether a person is amendable to their jurisdiction. While tribes must 
accommodate the limits imposed by federal law, it is odd to assume that the 
limits on federal jurisdiction must match the limits on tribal jurisdiction, as 
the two systems have very different purposes and histories. 
Tribal laws that refer directly to federal standards incorporate a body of 
common law developed in cases that concern the proper scope of federal 
power, not tribal power. There is only one federal case (Phebus) addressing 
the scope of the Indian category for purposes of tribal jurisdiction.253 
Furthermore, circuits differ in the precise factors they have developed to 
implement the standard for Indianness under federal criminal jurisdiction 
set forth in Rogers (the only Supreme Court precedent), and a closer look at 
the federal cases suggests that they may not rely on the same factors if the 
question of tribal jurisdiction were presented.254 For these reasons, tribes 
that look directly to federal common law standards may be missing an 
important opportunity to develop their own factors for implementing the 
Rogers test. Because their scope of jurisdiction is tied to a finding of 
Indianness under federal law, these tribes will also be required to amend 
their codes if they wish to exercise jurisdiction under VAWA. 
B. Community Recognition in Tribal Statutory and Common Law 
Of greatest interest for purposes of this inquiry are the tribal codes that 
acknowledge the existence of federally imposed limits on tribal criminal 
jurisdiction but implement those limits through a tribally developed 
standard. Written before VAWA was enacted, these codes acknowledge 
federal limits in terms of Indianness. While they all define “Indian” to be 
broader than citizens of federal-recognized tribes, they do not refer 
                                                                                                                 
 252. See supra note 49 (citing Wheeler); supra note 60 (citing Frickey). 
 253. See supra text accompanying notes 172-179 (discussing Phebus). 
 254. See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing federal jurisdiction cases); supra note 212 (noting 
irony of using the Rogers standard to determine the limit of tribal jurisdiction given that 
Rogers, although not exempt from federal prosecution in the Court’s view, had been 
separately prosecuted in tribal court). 
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automatically to federal standards.255 Some of these codes simply specify 
that the definition of Indian includes people who are not enrolled citizens of 
federally recognized tribes,256 leaving it to the courts to determine which 
factors are relevant. Others provide a more specific definition of the 
requirements for Indian status under tribal law; those codes rely on factors 
that include descent from a tribal member,257 recognition by the federal 
government for any purpose,258 and recognition by the tribal community as 
an Indian.259 
The codes that expressly rely on community recognition outside of 
formal citizenship present the most interesting contrast with federal law. 
For example, the San Ildefonso Pueblo code defines “Indian” to include 
“[a]ny resident of the Pueblo who is considered Indian by the traditions, 
customs, culture, and mores of the Pueblo of San Ildefonso.”260 The Little 
Traverse Bay Band of Odawa Indians, the Little River Band of Ottawa 
                                                                                                                 
 255. For example, some tribes define Indian to include members of groups not typically 
recognized as Indian by the federal government, including Native Hawaiians, members of 
state-recognized tribes, members of unrecognized tribes, and Canadian Indians. See SALISH 
AND KOOTENAI TRIBAL CODE, tit. I, ch. 2, § 1-2-1-103 (jurisdiction over “any Tribal 
members, American or Canadian Indian, or Alaska Native”); SNOQUALMIE TRIBAL CODE tit. 
7, ch. 1, § 4.0 (defining “Indian” as a member of an Indian Tribe, but defining “Indian 
Tribe” to include any group recognized as such by the Snoqualmie Tribe); id. tit. 3, ch. 1, § 
5.0 (jurisdiction over American and Canadian Indians, Native Alaskans, and Native 
Hawaiians); TULALIP TRIBAL CODE tit. 2, § 2.1.2 (defining Indian to include members of 
federally recognized tribes and anyone “who is recognized as a Canadian Indian”). 
 256. E.g., SHOSHONE AND ARAPAHO TRIBES OF THE WIND RIVER RESERVATION LAW & 
ORDER CODE § 1-2-1. 
 257. E.g., COLVILLE LAW & ORDER CODE § 1-1-363; FORT MCDOWELL YAVAPAI LAW & 
ORDER CODE § 1-1 (direct descent from a member plus one quarter Indian blood). 
 258. The White Mountain Apache defines Indian as including “any other person 
recognized by federal law as an Indian for any purpose[.]” WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE 
JUDICIAL CODE § 1.1 (2012), available at http://www.wmat.nsn.us/Legal/Judicial%20Code 
%20-%2007.02.2012.pdf. The code also provides that the tribal court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over criminal actions involving “Indians.” Id. § 2.1. The Poarch Band of Creek 
Indians defines the term as including “[a]ll enrolled Tribal Members, or other federally 
recognized Indians[.]” POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS TRIBAL CODE tit. 4, § 4-1-2 (2014), 
available at https://www.municode.com/library/tribes_and_tribal_nations/poarch_band_ 
of_creek_indians/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=THTRCOPOBACRIN_TIT4JU. The 
tribe’s civil jurisdiction provisions, by contrast, refer to enrolled members and “members of 
other federally recognized tribes[.]” Id. § 4-1-1. 
 259. See infra notes 260-265 (collecting codes that rely on recognition by the tribal 
community). 
 260. PUEBLO OF SAN ILDEFONSO CODE tit. II, § 2.4 (1996), available at http://thorpe. 
ou.edu/codes/san-ildefonso/san-ildefonso.html. 
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Indians, and the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over “any person of Indian blood who is 
generally considered to be an American Indian by the [tribe].”261 The Leech 
Lake Band of Ojibwe tribal code definition includes “Indians who are 
recognized as such by an Indian community . . . for any purpose.”262 
Similarly, the Hopi Tribe exercises criminal jurisdiction over enrolled tribal 
members and those “who ha[ve] Indian blood and [are] regarded as an 
Indian by the society of Indians among whom he lives.”263 The 
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation code defines 
“Indian” to include “any other person on the Reservation who is recognized 
by the community as an Indian, including a Canadian Indian or an Alaska 
native.”264 The Pueblo of Santa Clara defines “Indian” to include enrolled 
tribal members, Indians enrolled in other tribes, and “[a]ny resident of the 
Pueblo who is considered Indian by the traditions, customs, culture and 
mores of the Pueblo of Santa Clara.”265 
These definitions depart from federal definitions most clearly by 
expressly permitting the tribal courts to determine whether the prosecuting 
community views the defendant as an Indian. They reject the federal 
government’s over-reliance on citizenship, political participation, or receipt 
of governmental services as the appropriate determinants of belonging, at 
least for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. Instead, they offer a vision of 
membership that is neither exclusively descent-based nor merely a matter of 
formal citizenship or consent.266 
These codes permit the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over people 
affiliated with the governing tribe who may not be eligible for enrollment 
                                                                                                                 
 261. LITTLE TRAVERSE BAY BANDS OF ODAWA INDIANS WAGANAKISING ODAWAK TRIBAL 
CODE OF LAW tit. IX, § 9.102 (2015), available at http://www.ltbbodawa-nsn.gov/ 
TribalCode.pdf. 
 262. LEECH LAKE BAND OF OJIBWE TRIBAL CODE tit. I, pt. 2, § 1(B)(1) (n.d.), available at 
http://www.llojibwe.org/court/tcCodes/tc_coTitle1-Judicial.pdf. 
 263. HOPI CODE tit. III, ch. 1, § 3.1.10 (2012), available at http://www.hopi-nsn.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/Hopi-Code.pdf. 
 264. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE WARM SPRINGS RESERVATION TRIBAL CODE ch. 200, 
§ 200.010(1) (2011), available at http://www.warmsprings.com/.docs/_sid/7d79c07acd 
34155ef1cf9ec524fb57ac/pg/400/rid/10286/f/200_courts.pdf 
 265. SANTA CLARA PUEBLO CODE tit. 1, ch. 1 § 1.1 (2006). A separate provision extends 
the court’s jurisdiction to “[a]ll [c]rimes enumerated in this Code and committed with-in the 
territorial jurisdiction of the Pueblo by Indians.” Id. tit. 1, ch. 2, § 2.3. 
 266. Most incorporate a requirement of Indian descent, which is consistent with both 
Rogers and Oliphant. Without such a limitation, the community recognition standard could 
apply to a person without Indian ancestry as well. See supra Part II.E. 
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because they do not meet blood quantum requirements, or because the tribe 
determines eligibility for enrollment based on descent from either the 
mother or the father and the defendant is descended from the other parent. 
They also permit prosecution of adopted or intermarried people even if 
those people are not eligible for citizenship or particular tribal rights. These 
codes acknowledge that a person may be connected to a tribal community 
in a variety of ways, from legal rights and benefits to residence, family ties, 
and cultural and social participation. 
The Navajo Supreme Court elaborated on this form of community 
membership. In Navajo Nation v. Hunter, the court construed the term 
“Indian” in the Navajo criminal code to refer to a person whose ancestors 
were indigenous to what is now the United States and who is considered 
Indian by his or her community.267 It added that if a non-Navajo “assumed 
tribal relations,” he or she would be considered Indian by the Navajo 
community.268 This type of community membership is not a matter of 
formal adoption, but a matter of Navajo common law.269 In Means v. Chinle 
Judicial District, the court described this form of membership under Navajo 
common law: 
While there is a formal process to obtain membership as a 
Navajo, that is not the only kind of “membership” under Navajo 
Nation law. An individual who marries or has an intimate 
relationship with a Navajo is a hadane (in-law). The Navajo 
People have adoone’e or clans, and many of them are based 
upon the intermarriage of original Navajo clan members with 
people of other nations. The primary clan relation is traced 
through the mother[.] A hadane or in-law assumes a clan relation 
to a Navajo when an intimate relationship forms, and when that 
relationship is conducted within the Navajo Nation, there are 
reciprocal obligations to and from family and clan members 
under Navajo common law.270 
The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians’ (EBCI) court uses a similar 
approach in their case law.271 The EBCI’s court has looked to federal 
                                                                                                                 
 267. 7 Navajo Rptr. 194, 196 (Navajo 1996). 
 268. Id.  
 269. Id. at 198. 
 270. 2 Am. Tribal Law 439, 450 (Navajo 1999) (internal citation omitted). 
 271. Legislatively, the Band’s rules about jurisdiction are a bit unclear. Although the 
EBCI Tribal Code provides that its criminal provisions apply to “all members of any 
federally recognized Indian tribe,” EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS CODE ch. 14, § 
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criminal law standards for guidance, but has applied the test in a manner 
that emphasizes a broad notion of community membership.272 Citing two 
federal circuit cases, the court considered “whether the Government has 
provided [the defendant] with assistance reserved only for Indians, whether 
the person enjoys the benefits of tribal affiliation, and whether [the 
defendant] is recognized as an Indian by virtue of her living on the 
reservation and participating in Indian social life.”273 It held that a person 
who qualified as a “First Lineal Descendant” under tribal law was an Indian 
for purposes of criminal prosecution,274 but a person who qualified as a 
“Second [Lineal] Descendant” was not.275 
Under EBCI law, a first descendant is a child of an enrolled member who 
does not possess the minimum blood quantum (1/16) required for 
enrollment. A first descendant may inherit trust property, access Indian 
health services, take advantage of Indian (but not tribal) preference in 
hiring, and access tribal education funds (but with a lower priority than 
enrolled members).276 According to the court, a first descendant is treated in 
the same manner as an Indian from another tribe when seeking assistance 
from the Council or tribal administrative bodies.277 A first descendant may 
not hold elective office, vote in tribal elections, purchase trust property, or 
                                                                                                                 
14.1.1 (2000), available at https://www.municode.com/library/nc/cherokee_indians_eastern 
_band/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICOOR_CH14CRLA_ARTIINGE_S14.1.1A
PPESUCRJUCHCO, the Code further provides that EBC law applies equally to all persons 
“regardless of race, age, or sex,” id. ch. 14, § 1.5(a), and that tribal police and courts may 
impose fines and penalties on “non members, as well as members,” id. ch. 14, § 1.5(c)-(d). 
Even if federal law prohibits the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over a particular defendant, 
the code provides that a person may still be subject to civil suits for damages, revocation of 
tribal licenses, and exclusion from tribal land for any criminal offense. Id. ch. 14, § 1.2. 
Thus, although the code defines nonmember Indians as enrolled members of other tribes, its 
other provisions leave room for broader exercise of jurisdiction over nonmembers and 
provide an alternative in the event a federal court disagrees with a tribe’s interpretation. In 
its case law, the Band cites the federal common law standard, in which enrollment is a 
sufficient, but not necessary, factor, but it applies the test in a manner that emphasizes 
community recognition over federal recognition. 
 272. In re Welch, No. SC 03-13, 2003 WL 25902440, at *4 (E. Cherokee Ct. Oct. 17, 
2003); E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. Lambert, No. CR 03-0313, 2003 WL 25902446, at *2 
(E. Cherokee Ct. May 29, 2003). 
 273. Lambert, 2003 WL 25902446, at *3. 
 274. Id. at *1, *3. 
 275. E. Band of Cherokee Indians v. Prater, No. CR 03-1616, 2004 WL 5807679, at *2 
(E. Cherokee Ct. Mar. 18, 2004). 
 276. Lambert, 2003 WL 25902446, at *1. 
 277. Id. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss2/1
No. 2] TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 403 
 
 
enroll in the tribe, but the court found that they “are participating members 
of this community and are treated as such.”278 
A second descendant is a grandchild of an enrolled member who does 
not possess the minimum blood quantum required for enrollment.279 Second 
descendants may also access Indian health services, but they do not have 
access to benefits reserved for members.280 With the possible exception of 
tribal educational benefits and inheritance of trust property, their rights 
under tribal law are likely similar to those of first descendants. In Prater, 
the defendant had a child who was enrolled in the tribe and had lived most 
of her life in tribal territory, but the court found that she was not treated as 
an Indian by members of the community.281 The court held that she was not 
an Indian for jurisdictional purposes under section 14-1.5 of the EBCI 
code.282 It did not, however, hold that no second descendant could qualify 
as Indian under ECBI law. 
C. Community Recognition as a Model Tribal Standard 
Tribes that employ a community recognition standard have created a 
novel, flexible standard for criminal jurisdiction.283 Tribal courts that rely 
on this standard are able to engage in a context-sensitive analysis into 
whether the defendant is an Indian in the eyes of the tribal community. This 
                                                                                                                 
 278. Id. at 3. 
 279. Prater, 2004 WL 5807679, at *1. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at *1, *2. 
 282. Id. at *2. The defendant in Prater did qualify for federal Indian health services. It is 
likely that she would have been be eligible for prosecution in federal court, where receipt of 
federal benefits would trump the lack of tribal community recognition. See supra text 
accompanying notes 199-206 (describing factors relevant to a determination of Indianness in 
federal cases). 
 283. It is notable that neither the Navajo Nation nor the EBCI include a community 
recognition standard in the primary jurisdictional provisions of their codes. NAVAJO NATION 
CODE tit. 17, § 203; id. tit. 7, § 253(A)(1) (criminal jurisdiction over “any person” who 
commits an offense in Navajo territory”); EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS CODE ch. 
14, §14.1.1 (criminal provisions applicable to “all members of any federally recognized 
Indian tribe”). This suggests that many more tribes may apply a community recognition 
standard than specify it in their codified laws. The Navajo Code, however, acknowledges a 
distinction between Indians and non-Indians in a provision authorizing civil prosecution of 
non-Indians. That provision was amended after the Means case to include a community 
recognition test: “Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction over any person who, by reason of assuming tribal relations with the Navajo 
people or being an “in law” or hadane or relative as defined by Navajo common law, or 
tradition, submits himself or herself to the criminal jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.” 
NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 17, § 204(C). 
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allows tribes to determine the nature and strength of the defendant’s 
connection, recognizing that it may take different forms. The standard 
emphasizes recognition by the tribal community, as opposed to recognition 
by the federal government (a key factor in federal criminal cases),284 which 
is a more appropriate way for tribal courts to determine if they have valid 
jurisdiction. 
Ideally, for tribal courts to implement this standard, they would elaborate 
the basis for a finding of jurisdiction, as the Navajo and EBCI courts did. 
Because many community members are also enrolled citizens, whether in 
their home community or elsewhere, a community recognition standard will 
often lead to the same result as an enrollment-based standard. The 
reasoning, however, would be different. Evidence of enrollment in the 
prosecuting tribes would likely be dispositive evidence of community 
recognition, but defendants enrolled elsewhere could only be prosecuted on 
the basis of their non-citizenship ties to the prosecuting tribe, which was the 
Navajo Supreme Court’s approach in Means. 
A community recognition standard could also sweep more broadly than 
an enrollment-based standard to encompass anyone who is recognized as a 
community member even if not enrolled in any tribe, as in Lambert. Factors 
that may indicate community recognition for unenrolled people include 
family relationships (e.g., descent, adoption, inter-marriage, or hadane), 
receipt of or eligibility for tribal services (e.g., health care, housing, general 
assistance), prior prosecution by tribal court, political participation, non-
citizen status under tribal law (e.g., as a descendant or resident), cultural 
participation, and religious or clan affiliation. 
For a defendant who is enrolled in another tribe, but is a stranger to the 
prosecuting tribe, the opposite result would obtain: jurisdiction would be 
permitted under an enrollment-based standard, but not under a community 
recognition standard.285 Visitors from other tribes who attend pow wows or 
feast days present an interesting example. Using a community recognition 
standard, a court could find it had no jurisdiction over visitors who are 
merely attending as tourists. On the other hand, the same court would likely 
                                                                                                                 
 284. See supra text accompanying notes 160-161 and 199-211 (explaining that the scope 
of federal plenary power is at the heart of federal cases considering the legality of tribal and 
federal prosecutions, and how federal criminal courts view federal government classification 
as an Indian as a factor distinct from tribal government recognition). 
 285. The defendant in Morris v. Tanner is an example: the facts of the case do not reveal 
that the defendant, although enrolled in Leech Lake, had any connection to the Flathead 
community. See supra note 164 (discussing Morris). This potential narrowing effect is 
discussed at length in Part III.C. 
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recognize jurisdiction over visitors who participate or visit relatives or 
friends who are member of the local tribe, or who are members of related 
tribal communities.286 
These factors are similar to those used by federal courts determining the 
scope of federal criminal jurisdiction. For defendants who are not enrolled 
anywhere, a community recognition standard would frequently lead to the 
same result as applying the federal common law standard. There are, 
however, important differences. For example, federal courts emphasize 
recognition by a government, so they consider receipt of tribal services and 
official non-citizen status under tribal law, but not the kind of family 
relationships that were central to the Navajo court’s decision in Means. A 
tribal court relying on a community recognition test could consider a 
variety of indications of community ties and would not be limited to those 
that indicated governmental recognition. Where the federal courts do 
consider such community engagement factors, they fall under the heading 
of “social recognition” which, at least in the Ninth Circuit, is the factor 
accorded the least weight. A community recognition test would permit 
prosecution of some defendants who might fail to meet the federal standard, 
as demonstrated by cases like Cruz, where the defendant was prosecuted by 
the tribe but was not considered Indian for purposes of federal 
prosecution.287 
On the other hand, several factors relevant to Indian status under federal 
law would not be relevant to a community recognition test. Self-
presentation by itself, which is a factor considered by some federal courts, 
would in most cases not be relevant to a test that considers whether the 
community claims the defendant, and thus whether the defendant owes 
some responsibility to the community. Recognition by the federal 
government as an Indian, including receipt of federal services, would also 
not matter. The community recognition standard focuses on a person’s 
status within the tribal community rather than his or her relationship to the 
federal government. In contrast, federal courts place more weight on 
                                                                                                                 
 286. There is evidence that Congress was specifically concerned about visitors from 
other tribes when it passed the Duro fix legislation. See supra notes 110-113 and 
accompanying text (discussing this concern). Absent tribal jurisdiction over these offenders, 
no government could prosecute them for minor offenses and this analysis is not meant to 
suggest that Congress had no power to restore jurisdiction over these offenders. However, 
because many people have connection to the prosecuting tribe and citizenship in another 
tribe, the population of strangers enrolled in other tribes may be relatively small. See supra 
Part III.C for a more detailed discussion of this issue. 
 287. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing Cruz). 
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evidence of federal recognition and receipt of federal benefits, which makes 
sense because they are concerned with the defendants’ eligibility for federal 
prosecution. A community recognition standard would likely not permit 
prosecution of those who qualify as Indians for some federal purposes but 
are not part of any tribal community, as the EBCI court determined in 
Prater, where the defendant qualified for Indian health services, but was 
not otherwise a treated as an Indian by the community.288 Finally, the fact 
of enrollment in another tribe, which is dispositive under the federal 
common law test (regardless of ties to the tribe in whose territory the 
offense occurred), would not be sufficient alone to establish Indian status 
under a community recognition test. 289 
An individual who voluntarily renounces his or her tribal citizenship 
could potentially break the community ties that form the basis for criminal 
jurisdiction, but the individual must do more than just formally disenroll. 
For example, a defendant who voluntarily disenrolls but remains living in 
or connected to the tribal community could still be prosecuted. A defendant 
who has been involuntarily disenrolled, like the defendant in Phebus, who 
was effectively demoted from citizen to descendant member by a change in 
enrollment rules, could also be prosecuted as long as he or she maintains a 
tie to the tribal community.290 
                                                                                                                 
 288. See supra notes 281-282 and accompanying text (discussing Prater). 
 289. Some of these codes are worded in a way that would permit prosecution of Indians 
from other tribes, regardless of enrollment status in that tribe and regardless of connection to 
the prosecuting tribe. E.g. LEECH LAKE BAND OF OJIBWE TRIBAL CODE tit. I, pt. 2, § 1(B)(1) 
(n.d.), available at http://www.llojibwe.org/court/tcCodes/tc_coTitle1-Judicial.pdf (jurisdiction 
over any Indian who is “recognized as such by an Indian community”); HOPI CODE tit. III, ch. 
1, § 3.1.10 (2012), available at http://www.hopi-nsn.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Hopi-
Code.pdf (definition of Indian includes anyone who is “regarded as Indian by the society of 
Indians among whom he lives”). The approach described in these codes seems to combine the 
idea that an Indian is anyone who is integrated into a tribal community with the idea embraced 
by the citizenship-based codes that nonmember Indians are Indians from other tribes. 
Employing this approach, a person without significant ties to the charging tribe could 
nevertheless be prosecuted on the basis of his ties to another tribe. My focus here is on the 
community recognition test for membership vis-à-vis the charging tribe. In Part III.C, I address 
the question of jurisdiction over Indians from other tribes who lack community ties to the 
charging tribe. 
 290. This is not to say that a tribal court may not find other flaws with a tribal process 
that permitted involuntary demotion from citizen to subject, especially for non-punitive 
reasons. However, these issues are more properly addressed in tribal court review of the 
disenrollment, or in the context of a specific case, than in a blanket ruling that tribes cannot 
prosecute disenrolled members. The issue presented by this class of people is discussed 
further at infra Part III.B. 
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The community recognition standard closely resembles the federal 
VAWA standard as both emphasize ties to the prosecuting tribal 
community. This makes sense, because the VAWA standard was written 
specifically to sketch the boundaries of tribal jurisdiction. The definition of 
community ties set forth in the VAWA, under which a non-Indian 
defendant must live or work in the tribal community and be in a 
relationship with an Indian person that gives rise to a domestic violence 
charge, provides another example of how a community recognition standard 
might be applied in practice. Because the law only applies to domestic 
violence crimes, a person who is employed by the tribe must also commit a 
covered offense against an intimate partner, deepening his ties to the tribe. 
The advantage of the VAWA formulation is its predictability: it sets 
forth clear factors for determining community ties and leaves little room for 
judicial interpretation, which helps protect against bias. A tribe could 
similarly enumerate a clear set of factors sufficient to show community 
recognition, alone or in combination, but such a test could vary among 
tribes to reflect the unique relational structure of each community. For 
example, residing on the reservation is a strong indicator of community 
membership in some communities, but it may have little relevance on 
reservations with a significant non-tribal population. Outside of the 
domestic violence context, residence or employment alone may not be 
sufficient to indicate community recognition. 
A community recognition approach analyzes the relationship between 
individual and community in a way that emphasizes existence and 
obligation, not simply political participation, consent, or voluntary 
association.291 By asking how the community views the person, rather than 
how the person identifies himself or herself or whether the person is 
formally enrolled, this standard focuses on obligation as opposed to 
consent. It offers a vision of community membership as a reciprocal 
arrangement in which the individual is granted certain rights, privileges, or 
status in the community and also assumes certain obligations with respect 
to that community. Community membership, according to this standard, is 
more than a fleeting, voluntary association. It cannot simply be discarded 
when inconvenient.292 This approach to the relationship between individual 
                                                                                                                 
 291. See infra Part III for additional discussion. 
 292. Community recognition is not a prison. A person could expatriate by voluntarily 
disenrolling, leaving the community, and severing all ties. In this case, a person would 
probably no longer be recognized as a member of a tribal community. By looking beyond 
formal citizenship, however, the standard would permit prosecution of a person who 
formally disenrolled, but remained living in (and committing crimes in) the community. 
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and community reflects the kinship model described by the Navajo court in 
Hunter and Means and treaty language that differentiates between outsiders 
who assume tribal relations and those who do not.293 
The community recognition standard is neither the broadest possible 
articulation of tribal jurisdiction, nor the clearest and easiest to implement. 
Tribes adopting it may find it necessary to articulate a factor test similar to 
the federal common law or VAWA standards. It does, however, allow tribes 
to work within existing federal law limitations while focusing on the 
purposes and appropriate scope of tribal power. The standard invites tribal 
courts to examine the relationship between the tribal government and the 
defendant, to rely on that relationship as a basis for the exertion of criminal 
power, and to more directly confront any potential concerns about whether 
it is fair for that tribe to prosecute that defendant. 
D. Community Recognition as a Federal Standard 
The community recognition standard is useful for tribal courts 
considering the limits of their own criminal jurisdiction because it 
recalibrates the focus to the reciprocal relationship between community and 
individual and gives courts the flexibility to acknowledge the multiple ways 
this relationship might manifest. This section asks whether it could also 
work as a unified federal law standard to demarcate the limits of tribal 
jurisdiction. 
Recall that federal law governing the scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction 
provides only the following: 1) a tribe may prosecute all Indians, 2) the 
term “Indian” includes anyone who could be prosecuted in federal court 
under § 1153, 3) federal jurisdiction under § 1153 extends, as a matter of 
federal common law, to anyone who is of Indian descent and is politically 
recognized as an Indian, 4) a tribe may not generally prosecute non-Indians, 
and 5) a tribe may elect to prosecute non-Indians who have sufficient ties to 
the prosecuting tribe and who commit crimes of domestic violence against 
Indian people.294 When a federal court reviews the legality of a tribe’s 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction, the federal court should defer to the tribal 
court’s findings and conclusions regarding the scope of that tribe’s 
jurisdiction, the definition of “Indian” used by that tribe, and the factors that 
tribe uses to determine jurisdiction, including any findings regarding 
                                                                                                                 
 293. See Means v. Chinle Judicial Dist., 2 Am. Tribal Law 439, 449-50 (Navajo 1999); 
see supra note 67 (discussing treaty provisions); supra notes 267-270 (discussing Navajo 
law). 
 294. See supra Part I (describing the source of these rules and highlighting unanswered 
questions about their precise scope). 
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community recognition. Federal court review of the jurisdictional standard 
is properly limited to testing whether the tribal court’s approach violates the 
overall federal law requirement that a person be Indian—that is, he or she 
has some Indian descent and some political affiliation with an Indian tribe, 
or some claim to Indian legal status under federal law—or be a non-Indian 
with sufficient ties to his victim and the tribal community such that VAWA 
authorizes prosecution. A tribe’s approach may be narrower than what is 
allowed under federal law, and the role of a federal court is to determine 
only whether that approach exceeds to outer bounds of what is permissible 
under federal law. A federal court should uphold the court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over an Indian as long as it is based on factors that indicate 
tribal community recognition.295 
But is community recognition the best substantive standard for 
determining the bounds of Indianness in the context of tribal court 
prosecutions? Federal Indian law doctrine includes a presumption that 
tribes retain all aspects of their inherent sovereignty that have not been 
expressly lost.296 This means that, whether or not tribes exercise a particular 
aspect of sovereign power frequently, they retain that power unless and 
until it is expressly limited by Congress or, as the Court found in Oliphant, 
implicitly divested because its exercise would be inconsistent with the 
United States’ sovereign interests.297 This rule suggests that federally 
imposed limits should be interpreted as narrowly as possible, foreclosing 
tribal criminal jurisdiction only where absolutely necessary to effectuate the 
Court’s concerns. To work as a unifying standard, community recognition 
should maximize tribal sovereignty, while exempting people over whom the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction would be unfair (in the view of the federal 
government) because of a lack of familiarity with a system that differs from 
                                                                                                                 
 295. Contrast a deferential approach with the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Cruz and 
Maggi, which accorded only minimal weight to a tribe’s determination that the defendants 
qualified as descendant members, referring to it as the least important of all the relevant 
factors, and ultimately held that the defendants were not Indians under federal law despite 
evidence of some community recognition. See United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 846-48 
(9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2010). Deference to a 
community’s determination of membership would also help avoid the potential problem of 
federal judges relying on stereotypical views of Indianness. See Carole Goldberg, Descent 
into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1373, 1380-88 (2002) [hereinafter Goldberg, Descent into 
Race] (describing cases in which the courts have limited the application of Indian laws to 
those individuals who appear in the Court’s view to be culturally Indian). 
 296. E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); see also Frickey, supra 
note 60, at 8-13.  
 297. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209-10 (1978). 
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other American systems in key ways. This article argues that relying on a 
flexible understanding of tribal community recognition is best way to 
accomplish this balance. 
Tribal sovereignty here is more than just a phrase. Understanding its 
meaning requires inquiring why sovereigns need the power to criminally 
punish and how to ensure that tribes can function largely as other 
governments do in this regard. In the criminal context, this does not simply 
mean prosecuting as many people as possible. Rather, it means examining 
the governmental interests served by criminal jurisdiction to ensure that 
tribal governments are able to protect those interests. Criminal laws 
perform public safety, expressive, and accountability functions. A careful 
examination of these interests, informed by criminal theory and the 
practical realities of modern tribal governments, reveals why a community 
recognition standard strikes the most appropriate balance between 
maximizing sovereignty and ensuring fairness. 
A primary function of criminal law is to ensure public safety. Criminal 
laws proscribe certain conduct, including conduct that harms other people. 
Criminal law is “a means of protecting individual rights and other valuable 
goods”298 through deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilitation of 
criminals.299 Whether a society responds to a violation with incarceration or 
through less coercive means, criminal laws play an important role in 
establishing and enforcing basic rules of conduct that keep people and 
goods safe. This practical focus of criminal law informs most non-
philosophical discussions of the importance of criminal jurisdiction, and 
reinforces the link between criminal law and territorial jurisdiction. 
Sovereigns cannot keep people safe if they lack criminal jurisdiction over a 
subset of people within their borders. 
Criminal laws and criminal procedure also reflect the cultural and moral 
consensus of a society.300 Criminal law is “critical to community identity” 
because it “codif[ies] the moral foundations of the community.”301 While 
                                                                                                                 
 298. CHEHTMAN, supra note 1, at 43. 
 299. See Morris K. Cohen, Moral Aspects of Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 1007-17 
(1940) (discussing justifications for criminal punishment) [hereinafter Morris Cohen, Moral 
Aspects]. 
 300. See Washburn, supra note 16, at 784-85, 840; Garnett, supra note 16, at 440 (“The 
criminal law purports to proclaim and vindicate the particular moral commitments of 
particular communities.”); Id. at 1077 (“It is one of the functions of the criminal law to give 
expression to the collective feeling of revulsion toward certain acts . . . .”). 
 301. Washburn, supra note 16, at 834. As Washburn points out, the dominant role of the 
federal government in prosecuting local crime in Indian country undermines this function for 
tribal governments. Id. at 784. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss2/1
No. 2] TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 411 
 
 
most societies criminalize violence and theft, the definition of some 
activities as criminal (e.g., incest, statutory rape, or polygamy) varies 
depending on the cultural beliefs of each society.302 Different societies may 
also choose to address crime differently. For example, one society may rely 
primarily on imprisonment as a means for addressing crime, and another 
may rely primarily on restitution. One society may guarantee particular 
rights to defendants in court that another system does not protect, or it may 
outlaw certain types of punishment that another jurisdiction permits. Even 
among societies with similar criminal laws, individuals in a given society 
share an interest in having in force a system of criminal laws specific to that 
society, which requires a belief that the government with power over that 
territory has the power to enforce those laws.303 
Another central purposes of criminal law is accountability.304 Criminal 
law “provides the institutional framework within which . . . perpetrators of 
public wrongs can be called to account (held responsible) for those 
wrongs.”305 This purpose underlies the focus on retribution as a justification 
for punishment.306 The law defines which moral wrongs will require such a 
public calling to account, provides procedures for public adjudication and 
condemnation, and sets forth consequences for wrongdoing.307 In so doing, 
it provides “an appropriate formal, public response” to criminal conduct.308 
Punishment is justified as a necessary response to the moral choice made by 
an actor who commits a crime. 
Public safety concerns are significant for Indian tribes. They, like other 
sovereigns, are responsible for prescribing and enforcing basic codes of 
conduct that keep people safe within their borders, and criminal jurisdiction 
is the primary means through which they accomplish this. Tribes, like other 
governments, need the power to arrest, prosecute, and punish (or not 
                                                                                                                 
 302. Within the United States, this expressive function may be one reason that criminal 
law is understood to be a matter for the states. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 
(1995) (noting that states are the primary sources of criminal power in the federal system). 
 303. See CHEHTMAN, supra note 1, at 40 (“[T]he fact that German courts claim the power 
to punish every act of arson perpetrated in Korea would hardly ground the belief in Korea’s 
criminal laws against arson being in force.”). 
 304. See Washburn, supra note 16, at 784-85, 840. 
 305. R.A. Duff, Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 125, 126 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011). 
 306. Id. at 127-28. 
 307. See id. at 126. 
 308. Id. This public condemnation and response is important for conduct that is viewed 
as an independent moral wrong and for conduct that is legally prohibited but may not be 
morally wrong. 
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punish) all people who commit crimes in their territory. Indeed, tribal 
sovereignty was historically understood to include the idea that tribes—
together with the federal government—were primarily responsible for 
maintaining and enforcing general criminal laws within their borders.309 
The public safety function of criminal law has been at the center of 
debates about tribal criminal jurisdiction.310 Many Indian reservations have 
high crime rates.311 Although no single factor can explain crime, one factor 
associated with high crime rates seems to be the perception that Indian 
reservations are “lawless” places where criminals can operate beyond the 
reach of criminal laws.312 This perception is driven largely by the fact that 
tribes cannot prosecute most non-Indian criminals, and the view that the 
federal government, which has jurisdiction over those offenders, will not 
bother to prosecute them.313 American Indians are also more likely than 
                                                                                                                 
 309. Worcester v. Georgia, a case that helped defined tribes’ status in the United States 
and lay the foundation for federal Indian law, involved Georgia’s efforts to arrest and 
prosecute a white man in Cherokee territory. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 537-38 (1832). The Court 
clearly held that Georgia’s criminal laws have no reach or effect in Cherokee territory and 
described tribes as “distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries within 
which their authority is exclusive.” Id. at 557, 561-62. 
 310. See, e.g., Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime and the Law, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 709, 713, 738-39 (2006) (arguing that the encroachment of federal jurisdiction and the 
role of federal prosecutors in Indian country undercut the ability of tribal governments to 
maintain public safety). 
 311. See, e.g., John Dougherty, Problems in Paradise, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (May 28, 
2007), http://www.hcn.org/issues/347/17026 (describing violent crime, including the murder 
of a tourist, on the Havasupai Reservation); Timothy Williams, Brutal Crimes Grip an 
Indian Reservation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/ 
us/wind-river-indian-reservation-where-brutality-is-banal.html (discussing crime, and efforts 
to fight it, on the Wind River Reservation); Timothy Williams, Higher Crime, Fewer 
Charges on Indian Land, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/02/21/us/on-indian-reservations-higher-crime-and-fewer-prosecutions.html (describing 
high crime rates on reservations). 
 312. See INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 17 (attributing 
high crime rate to a jurisdictional scheme that results in under-enforcement and “displaces 
tribal authority”); see also Michael Riley, Promises, Justice Broken, DENVER POST (Nov. 11, 
2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_7429560 (first article in a series on crime 
and jurisdiction in Indian country called “Lawless Lands”). 
 313. See, e.g., Sierra Crane-Murdoch, On Indian Land, Criminals Can Get Away with 
Almost Anything, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Feb. 22, 2013, 9:16 AM), http://www.theatlantic. 
com/national/archive/2013/02/on-indian-land-criminals-can-get-away-with-almost-anything/ 
273391/ (describing increased crime by non-Indians on the Fort Berthold Reservation in the 
wake of the Bakken oil boom and how jurisdictional rules make it difficult to investigate and 
prosecute); Riley, supra note 312; Troy A. Eid, New Mexico High Court Ruling May Make 
Indian Country Safer, LAW360 (May 27, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/659636/ 
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people of other races to be victims of violent crimes,314 and the perpetrators 
of this violence are very often non-Indians.315 Native women in particular 
have extremely high rates of violent victimization, and their abusers are 
most often non-Indian.316 Enforcing public safety in most cases requires 
that a sovereign exercise criminal jurisdiction over all people who commit 
crimes within the sovereign’s territory. Any crime threatens public safety, 
no matter who commits it, and public safety cannot be ensured if certain 
criminals are free to operate beyond the constraints of local law. 
                                                                                                                 
new-mexico-high-court-ruling-may-make-indian-country-safer (describing how the 
patchwork of jurisdictional rules makes Indian country less safe). Although the federal 
government has jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indian offenders, recent data shows that U.S. 
Attorneys declined to prosecute half of all Indian country cases. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-167R, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DECLINATIONS OF 
INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL MATTERS (2010), at 3, available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/ 
100/ 97229.pdf. But see Indian Country Investigations and Prosecutions 2011-2012, U.S. 
DOJ, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tribal/legacy/2013/05/31/tloa-report-cy-2011-
2012.pdf (showing fewer cases declined). 
 314. LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME 1-3 (NCJ 173386, Feb. 1999), available at http://bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/aic.pdf. Federal statistics, based on census categories, do not differentiate 
between Indians on and off the reservation. Id. at 35-37 (describing data sources and noting 
that most do not distinguish between reservation and non-reservation crime); see also 
Address by Sarah Deer, in Conference Transcript: Heeding Frickey’s Call: Doing Justice in 
Indian Country, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 347, 377-81 (2012-2013) (delivered to the Berkeley 
Law Thelton E. Henderson Center for Social Justice Symposium, Berkeley, Cal, Sept. 27-28, 
2012) (discussing difficulty presented by using national crime data to describe victimization 
of Native women). It is not clear, therefore, how rates of violent victimization among 
Indians on the reservation compare to the rates for other groups. 
 315. GREENFIELD & SMITH, supra note 314, at 7. 
 316. Id. at 4, 7; AMNESTY INT’L, MAZE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 16, at 4-5. National 
sexual assault statistics also fail to distinguish between Native women on and off the 
reservation. See Timothy Aqukkasuk Argetsinger, VAWA’s Loudest Advocates Further 
Silence Native Women, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Mar. 24, 2013), http:// 
indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/opinion/vawas-loudest-advocates-further-silence-
native-women-148312 (questioning the widespread use of Department of Justice statistics 
regarding inter-racial victimization rates of Native women because those statistics include all 
Native women, the majority of whom live in urban areas, and therefore obscure the reality 
faced by Native women living in Indian country); accord Address by Sarah Deer, supra note 
314, at 381 (“So we really can’t say for sure whether most Native women who experience 
crime on tribal lands are more likely victims of Native people or non-Native people.”). But 
see id. at 380-81 (acknowledging that the comparative rates of inter-racial victimization of 
Native women in Indian country is unclear, but calling the debate “a bit of a distraction” and 
arguing that “studies showing that most perpetrators of violence against Native women are 
non-Native are certainly compelling reasons to fix Oliphant”).  
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Theoretically, federal jurisdiction might be enough to ensure public 
safety for tribes, even where tribes lack jurisdiction to criminally prosecute 
non-Indians. In practice however, the experience of those who rely on 
federal prosecution suggests that federal jurisdiction alone has failed to 
ensure public safety on reservations, and may even undermine it.317 Instead, 
federal jurisdiction has resulted in under-policing, ineffective 
investigations, and declined prosecutions, feeding the perception of 
reservations as places without criminal laws.318 The public safety purpose 
of criminal law, then, is best served by full territorial jurisdiction. 
The expressive function of criminal law also suggests that it is important 
for tribes to have criminal jurisdiction over all lawbreakers in their territory. 
In general, for criminal laws to effectively function as expressive 
instruments, a sovereign must have jurisdiction over all people who violate 
those laws within its borders, including foreigners.319 Potential lawbreakers 
must believe that the sovereign with primary authority over that territory 
can and will enforce its own criminal laws. This refutes the argument that 
tribes do not need jurisdiction over everyone as long as some government 
has the authority to prosecute; the expressive function of criminal law is 
one reason that federal jurisdiction is not enough. 
However, the expressive function also reveals why exercising criminal 
jurisdiction over people who are complete strangers to that culture and its 
values might be viewed as unfair. Tribes have the right, like other 
sovereigns, to determine how crimes are defined and addressed. Like states, 
tribes may vary in their definitions of crimes and their procedural approach 
to justice, and they have the right to enact criminal laws that reflect this.320 
On one hand, tribes need the power to punish everyone who commits 
crimes within their borders, because having people the tribe cannot punish 
undermine the tribe’s rule of law. On the other hand, if the criminal law is 
                                                                                                                 
 317. See supra note 310 (citing Washburn); supra note 313 (citing articles on under-
prosecution). 
 318. See INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 17. 
 319. See CHEHTMAN, supra note 1, at 57-58 (explaining that crimes committed by or 
against foreigners undermine public confidence in the existence and effectiveness of the 
system of laws just as much as do crimes by or against citizens). 
 320. Some of this potential variation is smoothed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1304 (2012). The Indian Civil Rights Act extends many of the 
protections found in the Bill of Rights to tribal governments, ensuring that due process rights 
in criminal cases will roughly parallel those in state and federal courts, limits the length of 
sentence that a tribal court may impose, and authorizes federal habeas corpus review of 
tribal criminal court prosecutions, offering additional protection against unfair decisions. See 
generally id. § 1302(a)-(c), § 1302. 
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an expression of each society’s unique value system, it is potentially unfair 
to impose that system on someone who is unfamiliar with or opposes that 
value system. Of course, one might similarly argue that it is unfair for any 
state to prosecute a citizen of another state because the criminal laws in 
each state reflect different values. Whether fairness concerns related to the 
expressive function of criminal law should outweigh the public safety 
interest in territorial jurisdiction ultimately turns on how different the 
foreign court is. Similarity trumps difference for interstate jurisdiction, but 
currently law suggests that it does not for tribal courts, which the Supreme 
Court has described as extra-constitutional321 and which may be based on 
very different cultural value systems.322 
Finally, the accountability function of criminal law requires citizens to be 
accountable to their community. Only members of a community can 
effectively be called to account before the rest of the community, and the 
community’s response will be most significant its for members. Unlike the 
public safety and expressive purposes of criminal law, a sovereign’s 
criminal laws need not reach everyone within its territory in order to make 
its citizens accountable. A focus on accountability thus recalibrates the 
focus of criminal jurisdiction from territory to community. 
The Court sharply curtailed tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians in 
Oliphant, driven in large part by the idea that tribal court systems are 
different.323 An important part of this difference was the possibility that 
                                                                                                                 
 321. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337 
(2008) (quoting United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004)) (“Tribal sovereignty, it 
should be remembered, is ‘a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the Constitution.’”) 
 322. See generally FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 
AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE (1997); Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems 
and Tribal Society, in JUSTICE AS HEALING: INDIGENOUS WAYS 108 (Wanda D. McCaslin 
ed., 2005); Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes from It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 
175 (1994); JUSTIN B. RICHLAND, ARGUING WITH TRADITION: THE LANGUAGE OF LAW IN 
HOPI TRIBAL COURT (2008); Carey N. Vicenti, The Reemergence of Tribal Society and 
Traditional Justice Systems, 79 JUDICATURE 134 (1995); Christine Zuni Cruz, Tribal Law as 
Indigenous Social Reality and Separate Consciousness: [Re]Incorporating Customs and 
Traditions Into Tribal Law, 1 TRIBAL L.J. (2000-2001), http://lawschool.unm.edu/tlj/tribal-
law-journal/articles/volume_1/zuni_cruz/index.php; Gloria Valencia Weber, Tribal Courts: 
Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225 (1994). 
 323. Although the Court used the neutral language of difference, the implication of its 
reasoning and the cases it chose to rely on clearly implied a judgment that tribal courts are 
inferior to Western courts. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE 
REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 97-115 
(2005). Instead of relying on the case law from the previous two decades that affirmed the 
competence of tribal courts and recognized their importance to tribal governance, the Court 
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non-Indians would not be guaranteed the same procedural protections that 
they would have under federal constitutional law.324 This concern reflects 
the expressive and accountability functions of criminal law by suggesting 
that it would be unfair to subject certain people to tribal criminal 
jurisdiction because it would subject them to an unknown system of legal 
values, and because it would require them to answer for their wrongs 
according to a standard set by a foreign community.325 
The Court understood that lack of criminal jurisdiction would potentially 
leave a serious crime problem on reservations, but, reversing the approach 
of prior case law, it held that Congress must weigh this “consideration” and, 
if it chose to, act affirmatively to recognize or restore tribal criminal 
jurisdiction.326 Congress then chose to restore inherent criminal jurisdiction 
over a limited subset of non-Indians to address reservation public safety 
needs relating to domestic violence and sexual assault.327 That restored 
jurisdiction depends on tribes restructuring their criminal justice systems to 
ensure that defendants receive the same procedural protections applicable in 
non-tribal systems. 
                                                                                                                 
relied on the explicitly racist reasoning of assimilation-era cases that denigrated tribes as 
savage and refused to acknowledge the existence tribal sovereignty. Id. at 76-79. This was an 
odd choice because those two ideas about Indian policy had been clearly rejected by 
Congress and the Executive at least twice since cases like Crow Dog were decided. See 
Rolnick, supra note 13, at 981-83 (describing Indian Reorganization Act era); id. at 986-89 
(describing self-determination era). 
 324. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211-12 (1978) (“As 
previously noted, Congress extended the jurisdiction of federal courts, in the Trade and 
Intercourse Act of 1790, to offenses committed by non-Indians against Indians within Indian 
Country. In doing so, Congress was careful to extend to the non-Indian offender the basic 
criminal rights that would attach in non-Indian related cases. Under respondents' theory, 
however, Indian tribes would have been free to try the same non-Indians without these 
careful proceedings unless Congress affirmatively legislated to the contrary.”) The Court 
only briefly acknowledged that many tribes at the time of the case had Western-style court 
systems, and that Congress extended certain procedural guarantees to tribal courts through 
enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act. Id. 
 325. The Court reasoned that, in light of their extra-constitutional status, tribal criminal 
jurisdiction infringes upon the overriding sovereignty of the United States because it could 
potentially subject U.S. citizens to criminal prosecution without constitutionally guaranteed 
protection. Id. at 210. The reference to citizenship, however, sheds little light on the line 
drawn by the Court between insiders and outsiders. Id. at 211. While members of a tribal 
community were considered citizens of foreign nations in the past, all Indians (tribal 
members and nonmembers) were recognized as federal and state citizens more than a 
century ago. See supra note 73 (describing Indian Citizenship Act). 
 326. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212.  
 327. See supra Part I.D. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol39/iss2/1
No. 2] TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 417 
 
 
This interplay suggests that, despite Congress’ and the Court’s 
disagreement about the proper scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction, they 
seem to share a concern about the potential unfairness of extending tribal 
jurisdiction to people located within a tribe’s territory who are otherwise 
strangers to the tribe and its criminal justice system. This limitation seems 
rooted in the idea that the expressive and community accountability 
functions of criminal law can be achieved if jurisdiction is limited to people 
who are part of the tribal community, and assumes that the potential 
differentness of tribal justice systems makes extending jurisdiction beyond 
that community a subject of concern. At the same time, both branches 
acknowledge the public safety needs of tribes and are at least nominally 
committed to a jurisdictional regime that facilitates that purpose.  
But the Court’s concern about unfamiliarity is overblown. Today, the 
similarities between tribal and non-tribal courts usually outweigh the 
differences.328 While tribes are not governed by the Constitution’s 
requirements related to criminal procedure, nearly all of these requirements 
do apply to tribal courts because they are included in the Indian Civil 
Rights Act,329 a fact that the Oliphant court brushed aside,330 but which 
undermines the Court’s reliance on historical notions of differentness. In 
fact, a recent federal commission recommended restoring full territorial 
jurisdiction, emphasizing the degree to which Western approaches to 
criminal justice have influenced tribal systems.331 Like Congress did in 
enacting the VAWA, the commission conditioned its recommendation on 
closing the remaining procedural gaps between tribal and Western courts.332 
The idea that tribal courts are still so different as to justify exceptional 
                                                                                                                 
 328. See INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 117 (contrasting 
tribal justice systems of the late 1800s, when the extension of federal jurisdiction to Indian 
country crime was premised on the notion that they were insufficiently punitive, with 
modern tribal justice systems, in which incarceration often plays a central role). 
 329. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012). 
 330. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211-12. 
 331. INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 17-22 (describing 
procedural safeguards guaranteed by the ICRA and noting that several tribal courts provide 
additional protections, most notably the guarantee of counsel for indigent defendants, not 
required by the ICRA). 
 332. Id. at 17-27; accord Samuel E. Ennis & Caroline P. Mayhew, Federal Indian Law 
and Tribal Criminal Justice in the Self-Determination Era, 38 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 433-
55 (2013-2014) (arguing that the federal government, through legislation restoring tribal 
criminal jurisdiction, allocation of tribal justice funding, and application of comity principles 
to tribal court decisions, has pushed tribal criminal courts in a more Western direction). 
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limitations on criminal jurisdiction is fundamentally unsound, but it 
nevertheless reflects current law, and therefore must be taken into account. 
Moreover, while many modern tribal courts are similar to Western 
courts, the power to be different is important. The right to sustain and 
nurture cultural differentness through separate governance is an important 
aspect of the sovereignty tribes retain.333 Tribal governments can govern 
illiberally334 and they can craft court systems that are procedurally quite 
different from the standard U.S. adversarial model.335 Given this, the 
Court’s concern about exposing outsiders to unfamiliar systems and 
cultures echoes concerns about subjecting certain foreign travelers and 
diplomats to the jurisdiction of foreign nations with culturally different 
criminal justice systems.336 
Criminal jurisdiction is a core aspect of sovereignty, but it has a dark 
side as well: sovereigns can and do wield criminal power as a tool of 
conflict, domination and subordination.337 Critical theorists argue that the 
primary function of criminal laws is to preserve a system of social 
stratification.338 Particularly when applied to those groups with little or no 
                                                                                                                 
 333. See generally POMMERSHEIM, supra note 322, at 99-135. 
 334. See Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799, 
816 (2007). 
 335. See generally Robert Yazzie & James W. Zion, Navajo Restorative Justice: The 
Law of Equality and Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 157-74 
(Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1996) (describing fundamental differences in values and 
procedure between Navajo and Western court systems). 
 336. See Elizabeth Helen Franey, Immunity, Individuals and International Law 63 (June 
2009) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics), available at http:// 
etheses.lse.ac.uk/309/1/Franey_Immunity,%20individuals%20and%20international%20law.
pdf (noting that immunity is sometimes necessary for diplomatic and state officials to 
function “in a foreign state with a different culture, and different laws” and to guard against 
the risk that they “may inadvertently infringe the criminal law through ignorance of cultural 
differences”). 
 337. See, e.g., Joachim J. Savelsberg, Knowledge, Domination, and Criminal 
Punishment, 99 AM. J. SOC. 911, 922 (1994). 
 338. Some of these are arguments about poverty and class domination, see, e.g., Malcolm 
M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Note on the Emerging Strategy of 
Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 467-70 (1992), while others focus 
on the criminal law’s role in maintaining racial hierarchies, see, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, 
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 16 (1st ed. 
2010), or gender hierarchies, see, e.g., Meda Chesney-Lind, Girls’ Crime and a Woman’s 
Place: Toward a Feminist Model of Female Delinquency, 35 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 5, 14-
19, 25-26 (1989). See generally RANDALL G. SHELDEN, CONTROLLING THE DANGEROUS 
CLASSES (2d ed. 2007). 
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political or economic power,339 this social control function of criminal law 
suggests that criminal power should be limited to prevent governments 
from using their criminal laws as tools of hierarchy to oppress powerless 
groups. 
This is an important critique that tribes should consider, but it is better 
addressed at the substantive level. This article addresses a very limited 
question about tribal criminal justice systems: who must tribes have 
jurisdiction over in order to accomplish the aims of their criminal justice 
systems? Fortunately, the community recognition model presented here 
provides a simple answer. It balances the tribes’ needs with the concerns 
expressed by the Supreme Court. It is a modest proposal that would not 
even put tribes on par with other governments when it comes to the scope 
of criminal jurisdiction (as that would require full territorial jurisdiction and 
a rejection of the Court’s concerns about differentness and fairness). It is 
important to distinguish between expanding jurisdictional scope (e.g., 
which lawbreakers the tribe can reach) and expanding the substantive scope 
of tribal criminal powers (empowering tribes to mete out harsher 
punishments or define more activities as criminal). Critiques of criminal 
justice as social control are primarily concerned with substantive 
expansions because they are critiques of systems where jurisdictional scope 
and the existence of criminal power are rarely questioned.340 Tribes are 
alone in having their jurisdiction so severely curtailed, and one premise of 
this article is that jurisdiction must exist and be clearly defended before an 
effective critique of the content of tribal criminal power can be made. 
The community recognition model could also set the stage for tribes to 
build criminal justice systems that do not create or maintain racial, gender, 
or class-based hierarchies. In contrast to other recent efforts to fortify or 
expand tribal criminal jurisdiction, this model does not rely on the punitive 
nature of tribal courts to justify existing or expanded tribal jurisdiction.341 
Indeed, this model views the Supreme Court’s fairness concern as reflecting 
                                                                                                                 
 339. SHELDEN, supra note 338, at 61-62. 
 340. E.g., Ahmed A. White, The Juridical Structure of Habitual Offender Laws and the 
Jurisprudence of Authoritarian Social Control, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 705, 737-44 (2005-2006) 
(describing how habitual offender laws substantively expand the state’s criminal power). 
 341. By contrast, the two recent legislative restorations of tribal jurisdiction, the Tribal 
Law and Order Act and the Violence Against Women Act of 2013, primarily address the 
question of who a tribe may punish and for how long they may incarcerate those people, and 
both require that tribal courts go further toward a United States model of individual rights in 
order to expand their power to imprison. See generally 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1304 (2012). 
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in part the right of tribes to build criminal justice systems that are different 
from the punitive Western model. 
Short of pure territorial jurisdiction, the community recognition 
framework for determining proper subjects for criminal jurisdiction makes 
the most sense: even if a tribe cannot enforce criminal laws against all who 
enter their territory because of fairness concerns, it is still fair for the tribe 
to enforce its criminal laws against all people who have integrated into the 
tribe to the extent that they are familiar with the community, enjoy some 
benefits (even informal benefits) of tribal affiliation, and have some 
obligations toward the community. The community recognition model 
emphasizes an individual’s obligation to community, which provides an 
important philosophical basis for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, and 
in so doing it addresses the concerns about fairness and differentness 
outlined in Oliphant.  
Any imposition of federal limitations on tribal criminal jurisdiction 
infringes on tribal sovereignty and strips tribes of self-determination, 
because it fails to allow each tribe to determine for itself who should be 
covered by tribal criminal laws. Specifically, these limitations prevent 
tribes from exercising full territorial criminal jurisdiction, which is a power 
rarely questioned for other sovereigns. The community recognition standard 
acknowledges federal fairness-based limitations without sacrificing self-
determination any more than is required. While there is a compelling 
argument that Congress should amend the law to restore full territorial 
jurisdiction,342 the community recognition standard offers a way to interpret 
existing law in a manner that maximizes tribal jurisdiction, without 
requiring any legislative change.  
The Oliphant Court used the Indian/non-Indian distinction to 
differentiate individuals whose relationship to Indian tribal nations make 
them members of a special legal class,343 but the Court’s concerns about 
“foreignness” are less about a person’s Indian ancestry than they are about 
whether a person has an adequate connection to a tribal community so that 
                                                                                                                 
 342. See INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 3-4, 23 (citing a 
“public safety crisis” and “[i]nstitutional illegitimacy” as costs of the current system and 
recommending restoration of territorial jurisdiction). See generally Samuel E. Ennis, 
Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction Over Non-Indians: An Argument for 
a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 553 (2008). 
 343. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210-12 (1978); accord Garnett, 
supra note 16, at 440 n.50 (noting that both the Oliphant and Duro opinions “recognize the 
tie between the moral authority and legal reach of the criminal law and membership in the 
community for which that criminal law speaks”). 
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the tribe’s law would not be unfamiliar to them, and that the different due 
process protections applicable to tribal court prosecutions would not result 
in an unfair surprise.344 The community recognition approach best 
addresses these concerns. This test asks whether the community considers 
the person to be an Indian—whether the individual is sufficiently integrated 
within the tribal community that others recognize him or her as a member. 
It does not require that the individual be a citizen, or even a lifelong 
member of the community. It does not require any specific form of 
membership, such as formal enrollment or political participation. Instead, it 
addresses the Court’s concerns about familiarity by ensuring that a 
connection exists between individual and community, but retains flexibility 
as to the precise form of that connection. 
While the community recognition standard speaks to the Supreme 
Court’s concerns about fairness and familiarity, it also defers to tribes to 
determine the appropriate limits of their own powers. It is faithful to the 
federal approach to the Indian category, in which Indianness is shorthand 
for having a sufficient connection to an indigenous entity that is politically 
recognized by the United States.345 It is also consistent with Congress’s 
approach in the VAWA, which distinguishes between non-Indian domestic 
violence offenders according to whether they have sufficient ties to the 
community and have victimized a member of it. 
This standard provides an alternative basis for upholding tribal court 
jurisdiction in Means and Lara. Although the federal courts in those cases 
focused on the defendants’ status as enrolled citizens of other tribes, both 
defendants were also members of their local tribal communities.346 They 
                                                                                                                 
 344. This is not to suggest that, even in the view of the Supreme Court, a criminal 
defendant must be familiar with the specific provisions of tribal law in order for jurisdiction 
to be fair. Many tribal citizens are unfamiliar with their own government’s criminal laws, 
just as many state citizens are unfamiliar with each state’s particular laws. I thank Paul 
Spruhan for this insight. 
 345. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977). The Ninth Circuit makes this 
explicit by requiring that the defendant be affiliated with a federally acknowledged Indian 
tribe. LaPier v. McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1993) (“It is . . . the existence of a 
special relationship between the federal government and the tribe in question that determines 
whether to subject the individual Indian affiliated with that tribe to exclusive federal 
jurisdiction for crimes committed in Indian country.”) Because tribal jurisdiction serves 
different purposes than federal jurisdiction, see supra text accompanying notes 246-254, and 
in light of the kinship relationships between some recognized tribes and tribes that are either 
unrecognized or located across an international border, it is notable that some tribal codes 
define Indian to include members of unrecognized tribes. See supra note 255. 
 346. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing Lara and Means). 
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were married to tribal members, had family within the tribe, and lived and 
worked in the community.347 Their crimes arose out of their relationships 
with other tribal community members.348 Had the federal courts focused on 
the defendants’ connection to the tribal community in which they were 
being prosecuted, as the tribal court did in Means, they could have provided 
a well-reasoned explanation for jurisdiction, rooted in the work of criminal 
law. Instead, the federal courts’ focus on enrolled citizenship left 
unanswered questions about why citizenship in one tribe should matter in 
determining the jurisdiction of another. 
E. Community Recognition and Non-Indians 
The community recognition standard need not necessarily be limited to 
people of Indian descent. While many tribal criminal codes, including some 
that employ a community recognition standard, also incorporate a 
requirement of Indian ancestry,349 this may be a nod to the Oliphant and 
Rogers rules instead of an expression of tribal ideas about community 
membership. However, some tribes define community recognition without 
requiring Indian ancestry.350A focus on community membership and 
reciprocal obligations calls the logic of Oliphant into question as it applies 
to non-Indians who are integrated into tribal communities. With VAWA’s 
restoration of tribal jurisdiction over certain non-Indian community 
members,351 federal law has moved closer to the community recognition 
model expressed by these tribes. 
The VAWA includes a carefully crafted standard for determining which 
non-Indian offenders may properly be the subject of tribal jurisdiction, 
which relies on the offender’s “ties to the Indian tribe.”352 This suggests that 
Congress wanted to fix the problem of federal courts not prosecuting 
enough domestic violence offenders, but also wanted to retain an element of 
community connection. If under-prosecution was the only issue, Congress 
                                                                                                                 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. 
 349. E.g., GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA CODE tit. 9, § 102 (2012), 
available at http://www.narf.org/nill/codes/grand_traverse/index.html; HOPI CODE tit. III, ch. 
1, § 3.1.10 (2012), available at http://www.hopi-nsn.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Hopi-
Code.pdf. 
 350. E.g., SANTA CLARA LAW & ORDER CODE tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1.1 (2006); LEECH LAKE 
BAND OF OJIBWE TRIBAL CODE tit. I, pt. 2, § 1(B)(1) (n.d.), available at http://www.llojibwe. 
org/court/tcCodes/tc_coTitle1-Judicial.pdf; supra notes 270 and 283 and accompanying text 
(describing Navajo law). 
 351. See supra Part I.D (describing VAWA). 
 352. Id. 
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could have restored jurisdiction over all non-Indians who commit domestic 
violence or sex crimes against Native women on reservations—but it 
instead only restored jurisdiction over those with sufficient “ties to the 
tribe.” 
Breaking for a moment from the confines of Rogers,353 the community 
recognition standard presents an alternative way to define the Indian legal 
category. At its most basic level, the “Indian” legal category refers to 
indigenous groups recognized as having a government-to-government 
relationship with the United States, and the people with sufficiently strong 
connections to those recognized groups to be fairly within the reach of laws 
arising out of that relationship.354 A person who is not Indian by descent, 
                                                                                                                 
 353. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (arguing that Rogers—although 
incorporated by reference—is a poor standard for tribal criminal jurisdiction because that 
case concerned the wholly different question of whether an intermarried white Cherokee 
citizen should be considered an Indian for the purposes of escaping federal criminal 
jurisdiction). 
 354. Skibine, supra note 106, at 768 n.6 (“[T]he constitutionality of the Duro legislation 
hinges on the plenary power of Congress over Indian affairs. Because this power is derived 
from Congress' power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes, it follows that this plenary 
authority is limited to Indian tribes and their members. The term “Indian,” therefore, must be 
understood as being limited to members of Indian tribes.”). Professor Skibine notes, 
however, that “membership” may be understood in different ways and concludes that a 
person should be considered a member “so long as that tribe considers such person a 
member.” Id. One way the federal government drew this line was to differentiate between 
those people who “maintained tribal relations” and those who did not. See, e.g., LUCY 
MADDOX, CITIZENS INDIANS: NATIVE AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS, RACE, AND REFORM 109 
(2006) (discussing the Court’s holding in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock that Indians who 
maintained tribal relations were wards subject to congressional plenary power); Sharon 
O’Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States Maintain a Relationship?, 
66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1464 n.8 (1991) (describing census categories that 
differentiated between “civilized” Indians and those who “retain[ed] their tribal character,” 
as well as between “out of tribal relations” and “sustaining tribal relations”). This standard 
had a clearly assimilationist purpose: federal policy encouraged Indian people to leave their 
tribes and adopt non-Indian customs. Rolnick, supra note 13, at 979-81 (describing the 
relationship between allotment policy, citizenship, and assimilation); Bethany Berger, Red: 
Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591, 634-35 (2009) [hereinafter Berger, 
Red]. The people who left were then excluded from the Indian legal category in an era when 
the federal government’s goal was to reduce or eliminate the presence of Indian people. 
Rolnick, supra note 13, at 981. In this regard, modern enrollment rules help to counter 
assimilationist pressure, as Indian people who move away may still remain tied to their 
tribes—and thus legal Indians—as formal citizens. Enrollment, then, is one method of 
“maintaining tribal relations” despite distance. William Wood, Indians, Tribes, and (Federal) 
Jurisdiction (August 28, 2015), at *31 n.117, *40 n.161, *45 (unpublished draft, on file with 
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while unlikely to be an enrolled citizen today,355 may nevertheless be 
considered a member of the community. If “Indian” is defined to include all 
people who are members of a tribal community under the community 
recognition standard, eliminating the reference to descent in the Rogers 
definition, then a tribal court could redefine Oliphant’s bright line rule 
(even if the case remains good law) to permit tribal jurisdiction over all 
people who are recognized members of a tribal community, regardless of 
their ancestry. 
Eliminating the requirement of Indian descent entirely, while a 
significant departure from modern interpretations, is a more accurate 
reflection of historical practice.356 A recent concurring opinion authored by 
                                                                                                                 
author). It is not, however, the only indicator of tribal relations, and the community 
recognition standard acknowledges this. 
 355. Most tribes today have descent requirements for tribal citizenship. Kirsty Gover, 
Genealogy as Continuity: Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for Descent Rules in 
Membership Governance in the United States, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 243, 271-72 (2008-
2009) (citing increased proportion of documented tribal constitutions using lineal descent 
rules (forty-four percent) and blood-quantum rules (seventy-one percent)). But see Berger, 
Red, supra note 354, at 652 (noting that Cherokee citizenship requires documented descent 
from base rolls, which included inter-married whites and Black former slaves known as 
freedmen, but describing present-day efforts to limit citizenship to those descended from 
Cherokee-by-blood rolls). For a nuanced account of the history of, and current controversies 
related to, the citizenship status of the Cherokee freedmen, see CIRCE STURM, BLOOD 
POLITICS: RACE, CULTURE, AND IDENTITY IN THE CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA (2002). 
 356. As Robert Clinton observed in 1976, “Both intermarriage and the adoption of 
ethnologically non-Indian people into Indian tribes require that ‘Indian,’ when used in [the] 
context [of federal criminal jurisdiction], take on a social as well as a racial meaning.” 
Clinton, Jurisdictional Maze, supra note 16, at 514; see also Nofire v. United States, 164 
U.S. 657, 662 (1897) (“[The victim, a white man married to a Cherokee woman] sought to 
become a citizen, took all the steps he supposed necessary therefor, considered himself a 
citizen, and that the Cherokee Nation in his lifetime recognized him as a citizen, and still 
asserts his citizenship. Under those circumstances, we think it must be adjudged that he was 
a citizen by adoption, and, consequently, the jurisdiction over the offense charged herein is, 
by the laws of the United States and treaties with the Cherokee Nation, vested in the courts 
of that Nation.”); Lucas v. United States, 163 U.S. 612, 615 (1896) (federal criminal 
jurisdiction depends on whether the victim, a Black man living in Choctaw territory, is 
determined to be a “negro[] who ha[d] been adopted into the tribe . . . [and therefore] within 
the jurisdiction of its judicial tribunals”); Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 501 (1896) 
(federal court had jurisdiction over case about murder of a Black man who was not a 
Cherokee citizen by a Black man who became a Cherokee citizen when the Nation 
incorporated the freedmen). (Unlike Rogers, these cases did not require the Court to 
determine whether naturalization led to Indian status for federal jurisdiction purposes 
because they involved a specific treaty provision securing to exclusive tribal jurisdiction all 
cases “in which members of the Nation, by nativity or adoption, shall be the only parties.” 
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Judge Alex Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit advocates eliminating the descent requirement from the definition of 
Indian for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction. In its most recent 
opinion concerning the test for federal criminal jurisdiction, the majority of 
the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reaffirmed that Indianness requires “some 
quantum of Indian blood”357 in addition to political affiliation with a 
present-day tribe. Judge Kozinski disagreed in his concurrence, contending 
that the requirement of “Indian blood” standing alone rendered the statute 
an unconstitutional racial classification.358 He suggested instead “applying 
the [Major Crimes Act] to all members of federally recognized tribes 
irrespective of their race.”359 
Judge Kozinski’s critique assumes that tribes include both members of 
Indian descent and members not of Indian descent.360 He castigates the 
                                                                                                                 
Treaty with the Cherokees, U.S.-Cherokees, July 19, 1866, art. 13, 14 Stat. 799, quoted in 
Alberty, 162 U.S. at 502.) As Clinton explained, 
Since Nofire has never been overruled, it calls into question the prong of the 
traditionally accepted test for Indian status which requires an Indian to be in 
part genetically descended from person of Indian blood. At the very least, for 
purposes of ascertaining tribal court jurisdiction, tribal adoption of non-Indians 
might render such persons Indians. 
Clinton, Jurisdictional Maze, supra note 16, at 516 n.60; see United States v. Rogers, 45 
U.S. (4 How.) 567, 567-68 (1846) (federal criminal case involving inter-married white man 
who was prosecuted by the tribe); see also Berger, Power, supra note 67 (describing other 
cases of whites prosecuted by tribal courts); Spruhan, supra note 67, at 85-91; Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 197 n.8 (1978) (acknowledging that treaties also 
provided that whites who settled in Indian country could be punished by the tribe). 
 357. United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2015). The court overruled a 
prior case, United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2010), which had added a 
requirement that a person’s “Indian blood” be traceable to a federally recognized tribe. Id.  
 358. I disagree with Judge Kozinski on this point and instead share the majority’s view, 
Zepeda, 792 F.3d at 1110, that a federal statute that classifies Indians in whole or in part on 
the basis of ancestry is not necessarily an illegal racial classification. See supra Rolnick, 
supra note 13, at 995-96 (describing various constitutional arguments for upholding Indian 
classifications); id. at 1003-06 (critiquing the Court’s facile equation of ancestry-based laws 
concerning indigenous peoples with racial classifications). 
 359. Zepeda, 792 F.3d at 1116 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
 360. See id. at 1117 (“[The] political affiliation prong may provide a non-racial basis for 
limiting [federal jurisdiction] only to tribe members. But not all tribe members are subject to 
the [Major Crimes Act].”). It is not clear to whom Judge Kozinski is referring when using 
the term “tribe members.” With few exceptions, tribes’ formal membership rolls probably do 
not include people who lack any indigenous ancestry. While modern tribal communities do 
include some non-Indians who are recognized as informal members of the community, these 
people probably make up only a small fraction of informal community members on most 
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majority for continuing to rely on Rogers in determining who is subject to 
federal jurisdiction as an Indian: 
Rogers is a nearly 170-year-old case, authored by Chief Justice 
Taney, in which the Court held that an adopted, non-racially 
Indian tribe member wasn’t subject to an exemption from federal 
criminal jurisdiction for crimes committed by an “Indian” 
against another “Indian.” In defining “Indian” for purposes of 
the statute, the Court noted that the law “does not speak of 
members of a tribe, but of the race generally,--of the family of 
Indians,” and justified the federal government’s exercise of 
power over “this unfortunate race” in part based on the need “to 
enlighten their minds and increase their comforts, and to save 
them if possible from the consequences of their own vices.” 
Reliance on pre-civil war precedent laden with dubious racial 
undertones seems an odd course for our circuit law to have 
followed . . . . [Rogers is] obsolete [and] clearly distinguishable 
[because it] stands for the limited proposition that “a white man 
who at a mature age is adopted into an Indian tribe does not 
thereby become an Indian” when the adoption occurs for the 
purpose of evading prosecution. A case that does no more than 
prohibit a tribe from making membership exceptions designed to 
circumvent criminal punishment is a weak reed upon which to 
rest the federal government’s unfettered ability to racially 
discriminate between tribe members.361 
By advocating for elimination of the descent prong, which would leave 
only the Ninth Circuit’s political recognition prong (one that recognizes 
forms of tribal affiliation beyond citizenship),362 Judge Kozinski effectively 
advocates for replacing the federal jurisdiction standard with one that 
considers only governmental recognition (including tribal community 
recognition) to determine “Indian” status. If the federal courts were to 
follow Judge Kozinski’s suggestion, tribes would be free (but not required) 
to eliminate the descent requirement from their definitions of “Indian” for 
purposes of criminal jurisdiction, which would potentially permit them to 
                                                                                                                 
reservations. To the extent that Judge Kozinksi imagines a substantial population of Indians 
without indigenous ancestry, he is likely factually incorrect. 
 361. Id. at 1118 (citations omitted). 
 362. See id. at 1114. But see Prentiss, 273 F.3d at 1282 (declining to eliminate the 
descent prong). 
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prosecute people not of indigenous descent, in a way still consistent with 
Oliphant, by legally categorizing them as Indians. To be sure, categorizing 
these people as “Indians” departs significantly from modern jurisprudence, 
and is therefore properly the subject of an entirely separate analysis. In 
addition, there are sound reasons to incorporate a descent requirement in 
other contexts, especially given the centrality of ancestral tracing to 
determining whether a group is indigenous to a particular area. Criminal 
jurisdiction is unique because, to the extent that Congress and the Court 
have determined that it must be limited, the factors that seem to matter most 
are community connection, obligation, and familiarity, none if which 
strictly require that a person be of Indian descent. Nevertheless, it is 
important to recognize that, in addition to presenting an alternative to 
citizenship based classifications, a community recognition standard 
potentially offers an alternative to descent-based Indian classifications. 
III. Community Recognition Versus Citizenship 
As a legal term, Indianness designates an individual who is sufficiently 
affiliated with a tribal community such that he or she is properly subjected 
to the special federal laws governing the relationship between the United 
States government and Indian nations. Most federal laws passed since the 
1970s simply equate Indianness with tribal citizenship eligibility: a person 
is an Indian for federal purposes if he or she is an enrolled member of, or 
eligible for enrollment in, a federally recognized Indian tribe.363 It is 
tempting to assume, as the Duro Court did, that formal citizenship is the 
best (or only) way to determine the proper limits on tribal criminal 
jurisdiction. The citizenship standard is consistent with a larger trend in 
federal law to define the boundaries of legal Indianness through reference 
to formal citizenship in a federally recognized tribe. The community 
recognition standard employed by some tribal courts, however, presents an 
alternative way to understand membership in and affiliation with a tribal 
community, and it invites a comparison between the two. A close 
examination of the most common rationales for preferring the citizenship 
standard shows why community recognition is a better standard for criminal 
jurisdiction and suggests that it could work in other contexts as well. 
                                                                                                                 
 363. Margo Brownell, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer at the Core of 
Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 281 (2001); see, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 
450b(d)-(e) (2012); 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (limiting eagle take permits under the Bald and 
Golden Eagle Protection Act to members of federally recognized tribes and requiring a 
permit application to be accompanied by an enrollment certificate). 
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A. A Critique of the Citizenship Standard 
There are at least three advantages to an approach that equates tribal 
citizenship with legal Indianness. First, because citizenship criteria are 
governed by tribal law, this approach defers directly to tribal governments 
to say who is a member of the tribal community, and therefore a proper 
subject of the federal rules that apply to tribal nations. Second, affirmative 
enrollment is clearly a “political” classification, rather than a potentially 
“racial” one, and therefore is a safer basis for classifying a person as an 
Indian in an era when equal protection concerns haunt federal Indian law. 
This easily meshes with the idea that Indianness is a purely political 
designation because it emphasizes a form of voluntary citizenship in a tribal 
nation, a status that can be viewed as completely unrelated to race. Using 
tribal enrollment as the basis for Indianness thus helps insulate Indian rights 
against accusations that Indian laws provide illegal special rights to a racial 
minority group. Third, emphasizing formal enrollment as the proper test for 
legal Indianness reflects the view, expressed by the Duro Court, that 
consent-based citizenship is the only plausible justification for tribes’ 
exercise of governmental powers.364 The common desire to equate legal 
Indianness with tribal citizenship is likely a product of all these forces: 
respect for tribal self-governance, a desire to distance Indian classifications 
from racial ones, and a consent-based view of tribal power. Perhaps 
because of these coalescing interests, reliance on tribal citizenship is rarely 
questioned. However, comparing citizenship with a community recognition 
standard reveals several problems with relying on formal citizenship as the 
sole litmus test for Indianness under federal law. 
1. A Complicated and Contested Category 
The Indian legal category, in all its varied iterations, is supposed to refer 
to those people sufficiently affiliated with a recognized tribal government 
that they are fair objects of federal Indian law. It is a “political 
classification” because it hinges on an individual’s relationship to an entity 
with which the United States has a political relationship. Deferring to tribal 
citizenship rules, rather than formulating an alternative definition, signals a 
powerful recognition of Indian tribal sovereignty in that it defers to tribes 
                                                                                                                 
 364. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990). As Alex Skibine has pointed out, “The use 
of a ‘consent of the governed’ theory confused Justice Brennan, who, in his dissent, 
remarked that no constitutional rule exists stating that one cannot be prosecuted unless one 
can vote, run for office, and sit on a jury.” Skibine, supra note 106, at 775 (citing Duro, 495 
U.S. at 707 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
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themselves to say how the “Indian” category should be constituted, and 
affirms exclusive tribal jurisdiction over questions of membership. On the 
surface, it gets the federal government out of the business of determining 
Indianness and instead permits tribes to make their own decisions about 
who their members are, with federal benefits and rules applying only to 
those people tribes choose to enroll. 
The Supreme Court affirmed tribes’ inherent power to determine 
membership rules free from federal interference the same year it decided 
Oliphant.365 In so holding, the Court affirmed tribes’ plenary authority over 
membership decisions as a core component of sovereignty and self-
governance, even if those decisions are alleged to violate fundamental 
guarantees of liberty. A federal law defining Indianness solely in terms of 
tribally defined citizenship criteria affirms tribal authority over such 
matters. Deferring to tribal citizenship decisions in this way also advances 
the policy of self-determination,366 a policy that rejects paternalism and 
supports tribal self-governance.  
Even though it seems as if federal law simply defers to tribes’ own 
determinations about community membership by incorporating enrollment 
as the definition of legal Indianness, characterizing enrollment rules this 
way actually obscures the pervasive influence federal law has on modern 
tribal enrollment rules, and fails to account for the shifting and contested 
nature of tribal enrollment rules today. Formal membership rolls are a 
relatively recent phenomenon; prior to their widespread usage, membership 
in a tribe was a matter of kinship, residence, community integration, and 
initiation in a religious or clan structure.367 The practice of keeping formal 
                                                                                                                 
 365. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
 366. See supra note 62. 
 367. See Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirements for 
Indian Nations, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 437, 459 (2001-2002) [hereinafter Goldberg, Members 
Only?]; Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Of Native Americans and Tribal Members: The Impact 
of Law on Indian Group Life, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1123, 1129-31 (1994); see also Jessica 
Bardill, Tribal Sovereignty and Enrollment Determinations, AM. INDIAN & ALASKA NATIVES 
GENETICS RES. CTR, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS (NCAI), http://genetics.ncai.org/tribal-
sovereignty-and-enrollment-determinations.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) (launched June 
2012); KENT CARTER, THE DAWES COMMISSION AND THE ALLOTMENT OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED 
TRIBES, 1983-1914, at 12 (1999) (“The accuracy of written rolls had never been a major 
issue [before allotment] because ‘in a community as small and informal as the Indian 
republics, the recognition of citizenship rested more upon family and neighborhood 
knowledge than upon official registration[.]’”); Gabriel S. Galanda & Ryan D. Dreveskracht, 
Curing the Tribal Disenrollment Epidemic: In Search of a Remedy, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 383, 
394 (2015) (discussing kinship-based rules of belonging during the post-contact, pre-
constitutional era as “permanent” and not subject to revocation through disenrollment). 
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lists of enrolled members has roots in the allotment era, when the federal 
government pursued a policy of breaking up tribal landholdings with 
individual parcels assigned to each tribal members and opening the 
“surplus” lands for white settlement.368 The first enrollment lists were 
compiled by federal agents tasked with counting and identifying tribal 
members for purposes of assigning allotments or paying annuities as the 
federal government sought to break up tribes and assimilate individual 
Indians.369 
Today, citizenship criteria vary across tribes, but nearly all incorporate a 
descent requirement, such as the requirement that a person demonstrate that 
at least one ancestor appeared on the original tribal roll.370 Many also 
incorporate a degree of ancestry (blood quantum) requirement, usually one-
quarter.371 For some tribes, any Indian ancestry is sufficient, but others 
require a minimum degree of ancestry from that tribe.372 Some tribes 
require patrilineal descent,373 whereas others require matrilineal descent.374 
A few tribes require something more than descent, such as parental 
residence on the reservation375 or maintenance of contact with the tribe.376 
Naturalization is infrequent today,377 and naturalization of people with no 
Indian heritage at all seems to be especially rare.378 
                                                                                                                 
 368. Goldberg, Members Only?, supra note 367, at 457-58. 
 369. See CARTER, supra note 367, at 12 (describing the connection between tribal 
citizenship rolls, federal control these rolls, and the policy of allotment). 
 370. Gover, supra note 355, at 271-72. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. 
 373. See supra note 169 (citing Santa Clara and Seneca ordinances). 
 374. See supra note 169. 
 375. Gover, supra note 355, at 272. 
 376. E.g., LUMBEE CONST. art. II, § 2, available at http://media.wix.com/ugd/756e16_ 
72e7de6efe2f40549c0c49fcc88c8ad3.pdf (“Notwithstanding eligibility otherwise, no 
person’s application for enrollment shall be accepted if the applicant has not historically or 
does not presently maintain contact with the Tribe. Enrolled members may not be 
disenrolled for failure to maintain contact with the Tribe, in accordance with a tribal 
ordinance adopted under this Constitution.”); see also Lumbee Tribe of N.C., An Act to 
Provide for Tribal Enrollment, No. CLLO-2010-0121-01 (Jan. 21, 2010), available at 
http://media.wix.com/ugd/269399_948d7896b8b248128c743a448d2365b8.pdf (enrollment 
ordinance providing that present-day contact may be demonstrated through frequent visits to 
tribal territory and “knowledge of Lumbee churches, schools, and communities, or [] 
knowledge of community-based and/or tribal leadership” and requiring that tribal members 
recertify their enrollment every seven years). 
 377. Constitutions adopted by tribes organized under the Indian Reorganization Act 
sometimes had naturalization provisions, which may have reflected historical practices of 
incorporating spouses and adopted children into the community as full members. Today, 
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It is difficult to tell whether tribes would have adopted these descent 
requirements if the federal government had not first refused to recognize 
anyone as Indian who did not have a sufficient degree of Indian blood.379 
To many scholars, tribal blood quantum rules cause particular concern 
because the federal government’s use of blood quantum was linked to a 
policy vision in which successive generations of intermarriage between 
Indians and whites would eventually result in the wholesale disappearance 
of Indians as a separate people.380 This history has likely influenced tribal 
law regarding citizenship.381 On the other hand, descent plays an important 
role as a way to determine who belongs in a kinship-based society,382 so it 
is incorrect to assume that descent is only a factor in tribal citizenship 
because of federal influences. Blood quantum, in this context, can also 
operate as a rough proxy for kinship obligations or degree of connection to 
the community.383 
In either case, the idea that citizenship rules are a pure reflection of tribal 
notions of belonging deflects attention from the complicated evolution of 
the Indian legal category—a history shaped by racial stereotypes and a 
heavy federal hand.384 Citizenship rules are undoubtedly influenced by 
federal criteria, which are in turn influenced by racist perceptions of 
Indians. When federal law refers to tribal citizenship rules to determine who 
                                                                                                                 
these provisions appear to be used infrequently, and naturalization is sometimes explicitly 
prohibited. This is not to say that non-Indians and Indians from other tribes do not 
commonly integrate themselves into tribal communities. Rather, their integration is not 
accomplished through formal naturalization. 
 378. Although the subject of tribal naturalization laws requires further study, I am not 
aware of modern day examples of tribes naturalizing people who are not of Indian descent. 
 379. But see John P. LaVelle, The General Allotment Act “Eligibility” Hoax: Distortions 
of Law, Policy, and History in Derogation of Indian Tribes, 14 WICAZO SA REV. 251, 260-62 
(1999) (refuting the argument that the federal government “imposed” blood quantum on 
tribes). 
 380. See, e.g., Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, 8 J. 
GENOCIDE RES. 387, 387-88 (2006); J. KEHAULANI KAUANUI, HAWAIIAN BLOOD: 
COLONIALISM AND THE POLITICS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIGENEITY 12-25 (2008).  
 381. See Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 367, at 397. 
 382. Goldberg, Descent into Race, supra note 295, at 1390; see also Bethany Berger, 
Race, Descent, and Tribal Citizenship, 4 Cal. L. Rev. Circuit 23, 34 (2013) (pointing out that 
descent-based citizenship comports with international norms and that jus sanguinis, or 
decent-based determination of citizenship, was long the dominant rule outside of the United 
Kingdom and the United State). 
 383. See KIM TALLBEAR, NATIVE AMERICAN DNA: TRIBAL BELONGING AND THE FALSE 
PROMISE OF GENETIC SCIENCE 64-65 (2013). 
 384. See id. at 66. 
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is Indian, it may appear as if the federal government has gotten out of the 
business of trying to decide who qualifies as an Indian, because any 
potentially objectionable limitation on membership—for example, a 
minimum blood quantum requirement—appear to be solely the 
responsibility of the tribal government. Unless and until tribes can refine 
their citizenship rules to weed out federal influences, however, the idea that 
citizenship-based definitions of Indianness are entirely reflective of tribal 
self-determination is little more than a fiction.385 
Relying on citizenship to determine Indianness means according a highly 
contested and constantly shifting category paramount importance in 
determining all things relating to Indian rights and tribal power—including 
access to federal benefits, applicability of federal laws, and tribal 
jurisdiction. Assuming there is only one legitimate way to define Indianness 
for all purposes also avoids important questions about what is at stake with 
any particular classification, and what kind of analysis should guide the 
classification scheme in light of its purposes. The foregoing analysis of 
criminal jurisdiction standards is just one example.386 The trend toward 
equating Indianness with tribal citizenship means that tribal enrollment 
rules have a far greater significance today than they ever have in the past. 
Modern tribal citizenship rules serve specific purposes, and therefore 
may not provide a good measure of legal Indianness in other contexts. For 
example, in many tribes, formal enrollment determines which community 
members can vote in tribal elections, run for political office, and sometimes 
who can own tribal land.387 Those rules may not say anything at all about 
who lives in the community, who has kinship obligations to the community, 
how religious leadership is determined, who can participate in certain 
events, or who can benefit from the protections and services provided by 
the tribal government. Criminal jurisdiction rules are another example of a 
classification with a specific purpose: criminal jurisdiction is usually 
                                                                                                                 
 385. See Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 367, at 390 (contrasting “federally 
imposed notions of tribal ‘membership’ and ‘enrollment’ with “norms of indigenous 
belonging and kinship”); see also United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 9, U.N. DOC. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) (“Indigenous 
peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous community or nation, in 
accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned.”) 
 386. See supra Part II.D. 
 387. See JOANNE BARKER, NATIVE ACTS: LAW, RECOGNITION, AND CULTURAL 
AUTHENTICITY 82 (2011) (“specific rights that issue from [enrolled] membership include 
voting in tribal elections; holding tribal office; sharing in tribal revenue; the use of tribal 
lands and natural resources . . .; and housing, health care, and education”) (citing Goldberg, 
Members Only?, supra note 367). 
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described in its own section of a tribal code, and it is unlikely that any 
tribe’s citizenship rules were crafted with the question of criminal 
jurisdiction in mind. For this reason alone, formal citizenship—even in its 
ideal form—is an ill-suited classification to determine who is the 
appropriate subject of criminal power, and this mismatch should raise 
questions about whether it should be relied on in other contexts. 
Over-reliance on formal citizenship rules also presents additional 
problems. For several reasons, tribal citizenship encompasses only a narrow 
subset of community members. First, some tribes prohibit dual citizenship, 
so a person with significant ties to more than one tribal community may not 
be enrolled in one because he or she has chosen to enroll in the other.388 For 
those eligible to enroll in more than one tribe, the decision about where to 
enroll may be influenced by the relative financial resources of each tribe. 
Second, tribal enrollment criteria are heavily contested, because they 
determine access to financial resources and political power.389 Enrollment 
lists grew out of the lists compiled by federal officials to determine who 
should be entitled to share in tribal money and property,390 and they still 
serve that purpose today. Any standard that limits who can access tribal 
financial resources is bound to be contested because of concerns about 
limited resources. The same is true for any standard that limits who can 
hold and exercise political power in the tribe. 
Superficially, tribal citizenship may seem like a clean categorical marker, 
especially because tribes keep and regularly update enrollment criteria and 
lists of enrolled members. Enrollment therefore presents an attractive option 
for defining legal Indianness in all contexts. But the reality of tribal 
community membership is much more complex than what is captured on 
membership rolls. If formal citizenship is to be the sole indicator of 
Indianness for all purposes, including eligibility for federal benefits, 
exercise of tribal jurisdiction, and enjoyment of tribal benefits, it has to 
become more than simply a list of Indian people compiled by federal 
officials for purposes of distributing land allotments or annuity payments 
(the historical basis of membership rolls), or a tightly guarded list of who 
can share in tribal money or inherit tribal land. The maintenance of 
                                                                                                                 
 388. No federal law expressly prohibits dual enrollment, but the standards for federal 
recognition require that a petitioning tribe demonstrate that its members are not enrolled 
elsewhere. See KIRSTY GOVER, TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 95-96 (2010). Federal funding 
formulas may also count tribal members in a way that discourages dual citizenship. 
 389. See generally Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 367; see also BARKER, supra 
note 387, at 146-85. 
 390. See BARKER, supra note 387, at 88-93. 
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membership rolls and the use of formal enrollment procedures is a 
relatively new phenomenon for tribes when it comes to determining 
belonging, community participation, and eligibility for services. The limited 
purposes served by enrollment and the disputes surrounding it suggest that 
it is not the most reliable way to define the boundaries of a tribal 
community for all purposes. 
2. Indianness and Equal Protection 
The term "Indian" has always been a legal term of art, but its meaning 
has been shifting and inexact. At first, "Indians" simply meant the 
"numerous and warlike tribes" of "fierce savages" that inhabited North 
America prior to European arrival.391 Indian was seen as the opposite of 
white,392 and there was no need to define the term further, because 
relatively clear distinctions of phenotype, culture, language, and geography 
separated most Indians from most non-Indians. Federal policy focused on 
keeping Indians separate from settlers, so it probably seemed unnecessary 
to precisely define the edges of such a clear category. For indigenous 
peoples, tribal affiliation was more important than Indian identity.393 
Although some tribes were closely related to neighboring tribes and some 
even governed through formal confederations or alliances, tribes across 
North America were far more culturally diverse and geographically 
scattered than they are today. 
Eventually, federal courts began to face questions about the boundaries 
of legal Indianness, and the Indian category was reshaped by perceptions 
about religion and culture.394 Indian policy at the end of the nineteenth 
century was characterized by an effort to disempower tribal governments, 
forcibly assimilate Indians into American culture, and break up tribal 
landholding with the goal of eliminating the "Indian problem" by turning 
Indians into whites.395 As Congress and the courts considered which groups 
and individuals would be the subject of the federal plenary power over 
Indian affairs, the answers tended to focus on whether the people in 
                                                                                                                 
 391. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 586, 589 (1823). 
 392. LAURA GOMEZ, MANIFEST DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN 
RACE 50 (2007) (describing the white/Indian duality). 
 393. See Goldberg, Descent into Race, supra note 295, at 1374, 1389; Rolnick, supra 
note 13, at 1007. 
 394. See Rolnick, supra note 13, at 1010-13. 
 395. See id. at 979-81 (describing assimilation policy); see also Charles F. Wilkinson & 
Eric R. Briggs, The Evolution of Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 143 (1977) 
(describing how assimilation was proposed as a “solution to the ‘Indian problem’”). 
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question practiced European or traditional religions, whether they were 
sedentary farmers or nomadic hunters or herders, and whether they had 
been educated in American school systems.396 
When Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, which 
aimed to reestablish and support Indian tribal governments, after several 
decades of forced assimilation, and increase Indian control over Indian 
affairs, it had to define who would qualify as an "Indian." It did so by 
relying on three possible indicators: enrollment in a recognized tribe 
coupled with Indian descent, descent from a member of a recognized tribe 
coupled with residence on the reservation in 1934, or possession of "one-
half or more Indian blood."397 Federal law thus recognized that the Indian 
legal category is comprised of people who maintain ties with tribal 
communities, whether through enrollment or residence, as well as people 
who are descended from those communities. The blood quantum 
definition—uncoupled as it was from any requirement of tribal enrollment 
or reservation residence—may have been a way to account for the 
decimation of tribal governments and co-mingling of tribes that occurred as 
a result of federal removal and assimilation policies. It also enabled the 
federal government to extend its supervisory authority over communities of 
Indians not affiliated with any tribe by acquiring land for them and 
organizing them into sedentary communities.398 The blood quantum 
definition reflected federal use of blood quantum to define Indian status in 
prior eras399 and blood quantum and descent are still used in some federal 
laws to determine Indianness.400 It is this aspect of the federal Indian 
category, which focuses on descent and percentage of ancestry, that creates 
                                                                                                                 
 396. See generally United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 616-18 (1877) (holding that 
Pueblo people are not Indian for federal purposes because they are civilized, pastoral, 
intelligent, Spanish-speaking and Catholic); see also United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 
39-47 (1913) (holding that Pueblos are Indians under federal law because they are primitive, 
simple, and governed only by crude customs). 
 397. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2012).  
 398. Gover, supra note 355, at 281. 
 399. Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935, 
51 S.D. L. REV. 1, 9-45 (2006) (describing pre-IRA uses of blood quantum). 
 400. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1359 (2012) (specifying that immigration exceptions only apply 
to American Indians “who possess at least 50 per centum of blood of the American Indian 
race”); see also Rolnick, supra note 13, at 1016-17 (describing descent-based laws and 
judicial resistance to them). 
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the most consternation among those who consider Indianness to be an 
illegal racial classification.401 
Most of the time, people who qualify as legal Indians are the same 
people who make up the Indian racial category.402 The racial dimension of 
the term “Indian” did not present a problem for courts until the late 
twentieth century, when courts began to interpret the Equal Protection 
Clause as barring race-based legal classifications in almost any 
circumstance.403 If racial classifications were illegal, then how could 
Congress pass and the courts enforce special laws relating to Indians—a 
category that at least partly refers to race? 
The Supreme Court first addressed this conundrum in Morton v. 
Mancari, a 1974 case that upheld a Bureau of Indian Affairs Indian 
employment preference against an equal protection challenge.404 In the 
shadow of increasing debate over the constitutionality of race-based 
affirmative action programs, the policy was challenged as an illegal racial 
classification.405 The Court had not yet determined the level of 
constitutional scrutiny that would be applied to benign racial classifications 
(those intended to benefit a minority group).406 
Consequently, there were several options available to the Court to 
uphold the Indian preference law. First, the Court could have labeled the 
classification as at least partially racial and applied intermediate scrutiny 
because it was a program designed to benefit, rather than harm, a minority 
group. Alternatively, the Court could have applied strict scrutiny, but held 
that the government's interest in carrying out its unique trust responsibility 
was a sufficiently compelling interest, or that the Bureau's particular history 
of discrimination against Indians justified the modern preference in hiring 
and promotion. Finally, it could have recognized that the federal 
government's unique relationship with indigenous nations, which is 
                                                                                                                 
 401. See Rolnick, supra note 13, at 997, 1016-17 (describing criticism of descent-based 
Indian classifications). 
 402. See id. at 1007-14 (explaining how the Indian racial and legal categories evolved 
together and influenced each other). 
 403. See id. at 989-90, 997. 
 404. 471 U.S. 535 (1974). 
 405. See Carole Goldberg, What’s Race Got to Do with It?: The Story of Morton v. 
Mancari, in RACE LAW STORIES 237 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008) 
(describing how the case arose in the context of unanswered questions about the 
constitutionality of university affirmative action programs and how the plaintiffs and at least 
one amicus brief on the side of the BIA explicitly framed the dispute as one about race-
conscious remedies). 
 406. Id.; Rolnick, supra note 13, at 989-90. 
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affirmed in treaties and in the text of the Constitution itself, means that 
Indian classifications are not subject to standard equal protection analysis, 
even if the classification is in part race-based.407 Instead, the Court chose to 
avoid questions of race and equal protection entirely; it characterized the 
Indian classification as “political, rather than racial” and held that it was 
“rationally related” to the government's unique obligations towards Indian 
tribes.408 
In the decades since Mancari was decided, the constitutional limits on 
race-based programs have hardened. Racial classifications are always 
subject to strict scrutiny, even if intended to benefit, rather than 
disadvantage, minorities. Moreover, the goal of rectifying generalized 
historical discrimination against a group is not a sufficiently compelling 
governmental interest to permit a race-based program to withstand strict 
scrutiny.409 And even where a compelling interest is identified, the Court 
has carefully scrutinized the manner in which race is considered, striking 
down uses of race that it views as unnecessary to achieve the stated goal.410 
It has therefore become increasingly important to characterize laws singling 
out Indian people as involving political classifications as opposed to racial 
ones. 
Formal citizenship in a federally recognized tribe provides an easy 
political demarcation. The Mancari Court referred to citizenship when 
describing Indian classifications as political.411 Many federal statutes use 
citizenship to define Indianness.412 Those that do not continue to be dogged 
by concerns that they may draw illegal race-based distinctions.413 Several 
Supreme Court opinions preceding Duro also focused on citizenship as the 
                                                                                                                 
 407. See Rolnick, supra note 13, at 1015-25 (describing these options and explaining 
how the Court’s choice to characterize the rule as “political, rather than racial” had 
important ramifications for how Indian status has been conceptualized by courts ever since). 
 408. Mancari, 471 U.S. at 553-54 n.24. 
 409. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); id. at 239 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (plurality 
opinion); id. at 505-06 (opinion of the Court); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 289-90, 307-10 (1978). 
 410. E.g., Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013) (remanding 
challenge to race-based university admissions policy and holding that strict scrutiny requires 
that such policies must be necessary to achieve the university’s goal of diversity, which 
includes an inquiry into whether other measures might achieve the same goal, in order to be 
legal). 
 411. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974). 
 412. See supra note 363 (same point). 
 413. See supra note 401 (describing criticism of various laws singling out Indians but not 
defining Indianness in terms of enrollment). 
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basis for tribal power.414 While the move towards citizenship-based 
definitions of Indianness in federal law has been gradual, it closely tracks 
the increasing judicial distaste for racial distinctions of any kind, and is 
undoubtedly driven in part by a desire to square the field of Indian law with 
the Mancari political classification framework. In other words, the Duro 
Court was following a trend in federal law of avoiding equal protection 
problems by attempting to define Indian status as correlated to citizenship 
in a federally recognized tribe. Yet, as Parts I and II of this article 
demonstrate, formal citizenship is not the only way to measure whether a 
person has a sufficient connection to an Indian tribe, and it is therefore not 
the sole constitutional option for defining the boundaries of the Indian legal 
category. 
3. Consent and Shrinking Tribal Power 
Although the Duro rule was superseded by statute, its reasoning that 
consent and political participation is the only permissible basis for 
subjecting someone to tribal jurisdiction remains influential. In cases 
concerning tribal power over non-Indians in Indian country decided in the 
years between Oliphant and Duro, the Court slowly moved from 
distinguishing between Indians and non-Indians to distinguishing between 
members and nonmembers. The Court’s focus on consent as a basis for 
jurisdiction developed in tandem with this shift. 
The Court first employed the member/nonmember language in Wheeler, 
a case that confirmed tribal criminal jurisdiction over an enrolled citzen of 
the tribe, and Montana v. United States, a case that prohibited tribes from 
regulating hunting and fishing by non-Indians living on private property 
within reservation boundaries.415 In each case, the Court suggested a broad 
rule that tribes presumptively lacked jurisdiction over “nonmembers” 
within their territory.416 In Wheeler, this rule limiting tribal jurisdiction was 
dicta because the case did not involve nonmembers;417 Oliphant, decided 
the same year, limited tribal criminal jurisdiction over some people and 
explained the distinction as one between Indians and non-Indians.418 
                                                                                                                 
 414. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 415. 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1984). 
 416. See id. This broadly stated rule was inconsistent with past decisions recognizing 
broad tribal power over all within the borders of a tribe’s territory. It was also unnecessary to 
Montana’s holding that the tribe could not regulate hunting and fishing by a non-Indian on 
land he lived on and owned in fee simple within the boundaries of the reservation. 
 417. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 314 (1978). 
 418. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). 
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Montana concerned a white person who was neither an Indian nor a tribal 
member, but the Court used the phrase “nonmember” instead of “non-
Indian” and highlighted his lack of connection to the community, rather 
than his race, as the reason the tribe could not regulate his actions.419 
In subsequent cases concerning the limits of tribal civil jurisdiction, the 
Court embraced and expanded upon this newly announced presumption, 
which turned prior assumptions about tribal governmental power inside out 
by moving from a territory-based vision of tribal sovereignty to a consent-
based one.420 Tribes are sovereigns with power over their members and 
their territory,421 yet the increasing emphasis on tribal citizenship in federal 
law has fed the idea that tribes should only be able to exercise 
governmental power over those who consent to be governed, even within 
their territory. Over the past thirty years, the Court’s jurisprudence on both 
civil and criminal jurisdiction has carved massive holes in tribes’ control 
over their territory. In the criminal context, this has come in the form of 
categorical prohibitions against the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over 
certain groups of people. In the civil context, what began as a rule that 
exempted certain types of land within a reservation from certain forms of 
tribal jurisdiction422 has evolved into a blanket presumption that tribes lack 
power over anyone who has not consented to be governed by them.423 
The importance of consent shows up in the basic rule that tribes are 
presumed to lack power over the activities of nonmembers within their 
territory, as well as in one of the two exceptions to that rule, which 
recognizes tribal power over nonmembers who have consented (usually via 
                                                                                                                 
 419. Montana, 450 U.S. at 550. 
 420. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997); Atkinson Trading Co. v. 
Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647 (2001); Nevada v. Hicks, 553 U.S. 353, 359 (2001); Plains 
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328 (2008). 
 421. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) 
(describing territory sovereignty of Indian nations). 
 422. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566-67 (holding that tribe cannot regulate hunting and fishing 
by nonmembers on nonmember-owned fee land, but approving of lower court’s holding that 
tribe can regulate same on tribal trust land); Strate, 520 U.S. at 454-55 (applying Montana to 
state highway right-of-way crossing tribal trust land); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & 
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 441-45 (1989) (holding that tribe can 
apply zoning regulations to nonmembers who live in “closed” portion of the reservation, 
where the vast majority of land was held in trust for the tribe and devoted to restricted tribal 
uses, but not to those who live in “open” portion, where tribal and member land was broken 
up by many tracts owned in fee by non-members). 
 423. Hicks, 553 U.S. at 359; Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 328. 
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contractual agreement) to be governed by tribal law.424 In Plains Commerce 
Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co. (the Court’s most recent case 
concerning tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers425) Chief Justice 
Roberts explicitly stated the Court’s concerns about tribal jurisdiction over 
anyone but consenting members: “[N]onmembers have no part in tribal 
government—they have no say in the laws and regulations that govern 
tribal territory. Consequently, those laws and regulations may be fairly 
imposed on nonmembers only if the nonmember has consented . . .”426 The 
Court employs a very narrow understanding of consent in these cases to 
foreclose tribal power over everyone except those who affirmatively 
volunteer to be governed by tribal law: tribal members consent by enrolling, 
and non-members must consent to a specific exercise of jurisdiction in 
order for it to be valid. Formal citizenship, for example, measures a 
voluntary, active, and discardable form of community affiliation. Likewise, 
Montana’s consensual relations exception has been interpreted to cover 
mainly contractual agreements—another express, voluntary, and waivable 
form of consent. Implicit in the Court’s formulation is the idea that if a 
tribal government acts unfairly, this consent can be withheld or withdrawn: 
a nonmember can avoid unfairness by not consenting to tribal jurisdiction, 
and a member can avoid it by disenrolling.427 For a Court suspicious of the 
legitimacy and stability of tribes as governments, formal citizenship is a 
way to measure active, ongoing consent of certain people to be governed by 
tribes, thus easing concerns that tribes may be exercising governmental 
power over anyone except those who have voluntarily subjected themselves 
to tribal laws. 
This view of consent-based governance made its way back into the 
Court’s jurisprudence on tribal criminal jurisdiction in Duro. The Duro 
Court’s view that consent provides the only defensible basis for tribal 
jurisdiction reflects the focus on consent in the civil jurisdiction cases.428 
                                                                                                                 
 424. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565 (establishing consent exception and collecting prior cases 
that exemplified its application). 
 425. As of the writing of this article, a lawsuit seeking to further restrict tribes’ civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers, even those who have arguably consented to jurisdiction, is 
pending before the Court. See Opening Brief for the Petitioners, Dollar General Corp. v. 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, No. 13-1496 (Aug. 31, 2015).  
 426. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 337. 
 427. In Plains Commerce Bank, the Court expressed particular concern about non-
Indians because, even if they wanted to consent to governance, they could not enroll and 
thus could never participate in the local tribal government. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. 
at 337. 
 428. Skibine, supra note 106, at 776-777. 
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After Duro was overturned, the consent theme became less prevalent in 
criminal jurisdiction cases. However, the Court has continued to refine and 
explain the consent theme in its civil jurisdiction cases,429 suggesting that 
the idea of consent still holds significant weight as a theoretical basis for 
modern tribal jurisdiction. 
By invoking a special theory of consent-based jurisdiction for tribal 
courts, the Court has re-imagined tribal governments as membership 
associations held together by nothing more than the voluntary assemblage 
and active participation of their members.430 According to this vision, tribes 
may exercise power over their members because those members are free to 
renounce their tribal citizenship and abandon their tribal ties at any time. 
This vision belies the reality of tribal cultures built on kinship and clan-
based obligations, on fundamental ties among community members, and on 
the relationship between the people and the particular territory they inhabit. 
The community recognition standard that some tribes employ in the 
criminal jurisdiction context, on the other hand, better reflects these 
complex ties. 
B. Subjects Without Rights 
If formal citizenship carries with it certain rights, such as the right to 
vote and the right to run for political office, the use of different standards 
for citizenship and for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction may raise 
concerns because it effectively creates a category of people who are subject 
to tribal power but prohibited from participating in civic life via voting or 
running for political office. Citizens are subject to tribal jurisdiction and can 
exercise political rights. A larger class of secondary members are subject to 
tribal jurisdiction, but are not eligible to enroll and so may lack those 
political rights. This arrangement may seem to raise serious fairness 
questions because the secondary members are subject to sovereign power of 
a government in which they have no political voice. In such a structure, a 
core group of enrolled individuals have the power to govern, while an 
additional group of individuals remain subject to the government’s power 
but are prohibited from participating. When the power at issue is criminal 
jurisdiction, including the power to deprive a person of liberty, the concerns 
raised by a two-tiered structure may be especially acute. 
Resistance to the possibility of criminal jurisdiction without political 
participation was an important part of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Duro, 
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 430. See Rolnick, supra note 13, at 1023-24. 
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but jurisdictional rules that encompass non-citizens are not unique to Indian 
law. The United States has historically exercised criminal jurisdiction over 
many classes of people who could not exercise full citizenship rights, or 
who were not citizens at all, including African Americans until 1868 and 
women until 1920. Today nationals, permanent residents, disenfranchised 
felons, undocumented immigrants, and children under the age of eighteen 
all comprise part of the national community, and are certainly subject to the 
criminal jurisdiction of the federal and state governments431 even though 
these classes of people lack a formal voice in the country’s political 
process. But no one would suggest that the federal and state governments 
lack criminal jurisdiction over them. This is partly because sovereigns 
typically enjoy full territorial jurisdiction. Even when criminal jurisdiction 
is tied to the relationship between individual and nation, as in the 
extraterritorial context, however, it is not limited to citizens. At minimum, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction extends to all “nationals.”432 
Two-tiered membership structures already exist informally in most 
tribes.433 Many people who live on reservations and participate in tribal 
communities are ineligible for enrollment.434 Those community members 
may live on tribal land or in tribal housing. They may attend tribal schools, 
receive services at tribal clinics, enjoy the protection of tribal emergency 
response personnel, and receive a range of other services from the tribe. 
They may also have familial, community, and religious obligations. Many 
participate actively in ceremonial life (which in some tribes is closely 
connected to formal political life). They are members of the tribal 
community in all senses except for the right of direct political participation. 
Before formal enrollment rules, membership in a tribal community was 
based on kinship, residence, and sometimes choice of affiliation. Kinship 
sometimes included non-blood ties such as those gained via marriage, 
adoption, or naturalization.435 For example, an outsider who was adopted or 
married into the tribe may have become a tribal member for social 
purposes, but may not have been permitted to participate in a clan-based 
religious system.436 Because of the close link in many tribal communities 
                                                                                                                 
 431. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 707 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 432. See supra note 3 (describing extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction). 
 433. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 271-282 (describing EBCI law). 
 434. See supra text accompanying notes 168-170 (describing people who may live in 
community without being enrolled). 
 435. Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 367, at 394. 
 436. Spruhan, supra note 67, at 82-85; see also COLIN CALLOWAY, NEW WORLDS FOR 
ALL: INDIANS, EUROPEANS, AND THE REMAKING OF EARLY AMERICA 152-164 (1998). 
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between religious leadership and political governance, outsiders without 
clan status may have been excluded from political participation as well. 
Some tribes today have formalized the two-tiered structure in their 
constitutions or enrollment ordinances. These laws describe a category of 
people who are subject to tribal power and may access certain tribal 
services, but are expressly excluded from full membership. For example, 
the Blackfeet Tribal Code recognizes a category of descendant members 
who are eligible for certain tribal services and subject to criminal 
jurisdiction, but who do not have the full political rights of enrolled 
citizens.437 The Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation 
have created a class of “associate members” with a similar status.438 Some 
may view this status as a form of second-class citizenship.439 A better 
analogue, however, might be nationality or permanent resident status. 
Nearly all nations have some form of recognized affiliation short of 
citizenship. Like nationality laws, the two-tiered membership structure 
employed by Blackfeet, Fort Peck, and others has the advantage of 
providing clear notice to community members about their status, the rights 
they do and do not enjoy, and whether they are subject to tribal jurisdiction. 
There is certainly a strong argument that a society is better off if all 
people who are subject to governmental power have an equal voice in that 
government, but the appropriate place for that discussion is on the context 
of debates about citizenship criteria, not in the context of rules that narrow 
                                                                                                                 
(describing varying levels of community integration experienced by captives and others 
adopted into Indian tribes). 
 437. BLACKFEET CONST. amend. III; see supra note 210 (describing federal 
determinations of Indian status in cases where defendants qualified as descendants under 
Blackfeet tribal law). 
 438. FORT PECK TRIBES COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE tit. 4, ch. 1, § 101(e) (1988), 
available at http://www.fptc.org/ccoj/title_4/chapters/chapter1.pdf; see also Bailey, supra 
note 215. 
 439. Because the key difference between a full member and a descendant is often one of 
blood quantum (descendants are people whose blood quantum is not sufficient for 
enrollment), this category may appear even more troubling. While I advocate here for a more 
flexible conception of community membership for criminal jurisdiction purposes, I am 
mindful of the potential problems created by such a two-tiered citizenship structure. 
Criticism of such systems is one of the reasons tribal membership criteria are sites of 
contestation as many Indian people (formally enrolled members and nonmembers) lobby 
tribal governments to jettison restrictive membership rules. See, e.g., BLACKFEET 
ENROLLMENT AMENDMENT REFORM (B.E.A.R.), http://blackfeetenrollmentamendment 
reform.blogspot.com/ (last updated Jan. 8, 2015) (blog authored by Robert Juneau) 
(dedicated to changing the Blackfeet enrollment ordinance by eliminating the blood quantum 
requirement). 
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tribal governmental power. When this contestation takes place in the 
context of tribal enrollment rules, it is an example of tribal communities 
exercising healthy self-governance, which often entails a process of dissent 
and political change.440  
A mismatch between the standards for citizenship and jurisdiction may 
also be a reason for tribal courts to restrict a particular exercise of 
governmental power. This article is primarily concerned with countering 
the common assumption that federal law requires tribes to limit their 
jurisdiction to people enrolled in a tribe, but a tribe could also choose to 
limit its criminal jurisdiction to enrolled citizens for reasons related to how 
it conceives of its own social and political community and how it chooses 
to allocate rights among members. This is a legitimate approach and should 
not be confused with a tribe assuming that federal law requires it to limit 
jurisdiction to enrolled citizens. 
The Phebus case illustrates the difference between these two approaches. 
When the tribal appellate court ruled that the tribe could not prosecute a 
former citizen who had been involuntarily disenrolled, it (incorrectly) cited 
federal law as the reason for this limitation. However, the court may well 
have had its own concerns about whether the tribe could fairly prosecute a 
person in tribal court after revoking that person’s tribal citizenship. The 
court could have reasoned that, as a matter of Las Vegas Paiute tribal law, 
such a prosecution was inconsistent with principles of fairness, due process, 
or inclusive citizenship rules. On the other hand, the court could have 
determined, as the Navajo and EBCI tribal courts have done, that a person 
who remains in the community and maintains certain ties to the community 
can fairly be prosecuted for any crimes committed in that community, 
regardless of the person’s formal citizenship status. In either case, the 
question of what constitutes a sufficient connection to the tribal community 
to make prosecution fair is a question of tribal law. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 440. Addie C. Rolnick, Rewriting the End of a Sovereignty Story, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 
18, 2012, 5:58 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/06/rewriting-the-end-
of-a-sovereignty-story-santa-clara-pueblo-members-vote-to-change-patrilineal-membe.html 
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EARTH NATION: RATIFICATION OF A NATIVE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 81, 83-86 (2013) 
(describing successful effort to eliminate blood quantum floor from enrollment rules). 
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C. Strangers Enrolled in Other Tribes: Respecting Sovereignty by 
Narrowing Jurisdiction? 
The community recognition standard could in some cases narrow tribal 
jurisdiction. The Duro fix has been interpreted as confirming tribal power 
to prosecute and punish citizens of other tribes, regardless of their 
relationship to the prosecuting tribe.441 Indeed, there is evidence that 
Congress, recognizing that Indian people frequently live and work in other 
tribal communities, was primarily concerned with closing a jurisdictional 
gap over those people created by the Duro decision.442 The community 
recognition standards articulated by tribes incorporate this idea: most of 
those laws authorize prosecution of a person who is recognized as a 
community member by any tribe, not just the prosecuting one.443 
The standard outlined here, however, does not provide a justification for 
prosecuting strangers to one community on the basis of their connection to 
another. Under a principled approach to community recognition, it is 
difficult to explain why a tribe should be able to extend criminal 
jurisdiction over a complete stranger to its community just because that 
stranger is affiliated with another tribe. Under the enrollment-based 
interpretation of the Duro fix, any tribe could prosecute that person upon 
proof of citizenship in another tribe. Under the community recognition 
standard as expressed in most of the tribal codes described in Part II, a tribe 
could also prosecute someone based on evidence (not necessarily 
enrollment) of his affiliation with any other tribe. Under a strict 
interpretation of community recognition, by contrast, a tribe could not 
prosecute a nonmember Indian in the absence of a sufficient connection to 
the prosecuting tribe. For strangers to the community who are members of 
other tribes, the community recognition standard would result in narrower 
tribal jurisdiction. 
This may not be a significant contraction of tribal jurisdiction in practice 
because most Indians from one tribe who come within the territory of 
another tribe have some affiliation that likely would be sufficient under a 
community recognition standard.444 Jurisdiction over these people would be 
based on their connection to that community, rather than their status as 
enrolled members of another tribe, but no net change in tribal jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                 
 441. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 442. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 443. See supra note 289. 
 444. See supra text accompanying notes 346-348 (analyzing Means and Lara under 
community recognition standard). 
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would result. In the case of a stranger to the community who happens to be 
enrolled in another tribe, the result could change.445 
Federal courts have upheld Congress’ plenary power to restore 
jurisdiction over Indians enrolled in other tribes, but have done so under the 
mantle of rational basis scrutiny, assuming that any government 
classification based on Indianness is reasonable as long as it is related to 
Indian affairs—an explanation that is unsatisfying to some critics.446 The 
courts are correct that Congress has the power to restore inter-tribal 
jurisdiction, and this was likely an important goal of the Duro fix. 
Extension of tribal criminal jurisdiction over Indians from other tribes 
(enrolled or not) who are strangers to the prosecuting tribal community may 
be independently justifiable for reasons not explored here, and merits a 
separate inquiry.447 The community recognition standard, however, would 
address the practical concerns regarding the large number of nonmember 
Indians living and working in tribal communities described in the 
legislative history of the Duro fix.448 To the extent that Congress intends 
that tribes be able to exercise jurisdiction over strangers from other tribes, 
the best approach would be to clarify the need for such jurisdiction and, if 
jurisdiction is not also restored over all outsiders, explain why Indians and 
non-Indians are treated differently. This jurisdiction would be based on a 
separate theory, and would supplement the community recognition theory. 
This is the approach embraced by most tribes who include a community 
recognition standard in their codes. 
Even in the absence of an independent justification for inter-tribal 
jurisdiction over strangers, there are ways for tribes to ensure that inter-
tribal jurisdiction continues. For example, tribes could easily enter into 
cooperative agreements allowing for reciprocal criminal jurisdiction. Such 
agreements are already used by many tribes to facilitate inter-jurisdictional 
policing, prosecution, and detention between tribes and state and local 
                                                                                                                 
 445. Morris v. Tanner, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Mont. 2003), is a case in which a 
community recognition standard could potentially result in no tribal jurisdiction. The court 
discussed the thousands of nonmember Indians living on the Fort Berthold Reservation, but 
the opinion does not clarify Morris’s connection, or lack of connection, to the tribe. Id. at 
1135. If he were just passing through, a community recognition standard would not permit 
him to be prosecuted just because other nonmember Indians lived in the community. 
 446. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing Lara, Means, and Morris). But see Skibine, supra 
note 106 (arguing that federal plenary power permits Congress to restore tribal jurisdiction 
over Indians enrolled in other tribes even under a strict scrutiny framework). 
 447. See, e.g.., GOVER, supra note 388, at 11 (describing “inter-indigenous recognition”). 
 448. See Newton, supra note 112, at 109 n.7. 
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governments.449 While it may require more effort than a simple federal rule 
permitting inter-tribal jurisdiction, this approach would be more respectful 
of tribal sovereign authority. 
Conclusion 
The Supreme Court has twice attempted to draw a line defining the scope 
of tribal criminal jurisdiction, and has twice been partially rejected by 
Congress. In Oliphant, the Court drew a racial line,450 preserving tribal 
jurisdiction over “Indians” but not over “non-Indians.”451 The Court’s 
reasoning, however, focused on fairness and failed to provide much of an 
explanation for why the Indian/non-Indian line answered those concerns. 
Excluding all non-Indians from tribal jurisdiction while including all 
Indians is both overly broad (it permits jurisdiction over complete strangers 
who have Indian ancestry) and unduly narrow (it prohibits jurisdiction over 
anyone lacking Indian ancestry, regardless of that person’s relationship to 
the tribal community). The Oliphant Court’s racial line is better understood 
as an imperfect proxy for cultural and social integration into a community. 
This interpretation is bolstered by the 2013 VAWA amendments, which 
provide that tribes may appropriately exercise jurisdiction over some non-
Indians provided they have sufficient ties to the community.452 This partial 
repeal of Oliphant suggests that Congress disagrees with the Court’s 
overbroad assumption that all non-Indians will categorically lack sufficient 
community ties. 
Perhaps recognizing the inexactness of the racial line, the Court tried a 
second time to draw this line in Duro by adopting a member/nonmember 
                                                                                                                 
 449. See INDIAN LAW & ORDER COMM’N, A ROADMAP, supra note 16, at 104-05; David 
H. Getches, Negotiated Sovereignty: Intergovernmental Agreements with American Indian 
Tribes, 1 REV. OF CONST. STUD. 120, 152 (1993). Testifying in support of the Duro fix, 
Representative George Miller invoked the rationale of inter-tribal consent, interpreting 
widespread tribal support of the bill to mean that tribes “support letting other tribes have 
jurisdiction over their people.” See supra note 110.  
 450. I use the term “racial” here to mean “based solely on ancestry,” which is the way the 
Court most often defines the term in the context of Indian law. I have previously written 
about how both “Indian” and “race” have many different meanings (both social and legal) 
and the confusion that can result from overlapping meanings. See generally Rolnick, supra 
note 13. While the Oliphant Court did not further define what it meant by “Indian” and 
“non-Indian,” the decision is usually interpreted to at least bar tribal jurisdiction over people 
without Indian ancestry. 
 451. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211-12 (1978). 
 452. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B) (2012). 
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distinction.453 Membership in this context correlates to formal citizenship in 
the prosecuting tribe.454 Because almost all tribes have clear enrollment 
criteria, maintain lists of enrolled citizens, and issue certificates or 
identification cards to verify a person’s enrollment, it is relatively easy to 
determine whether a person is a citizen or not, so the Duro line is easy to 
implement. But citizenship is also a poor proxy for community ties and 
fairness. It is too narrow, as it excludes many different groups of people 
who may be part of that tribe’s community: non-Indian people, Indians 
from other tribes, Indians from that tribe who do not meet the tribe’s 
enrollment criteria, people eligible to enroll who have not done so, people 
who have chosen to disenroll but remain in the community, and people who 
have been involuntarily disenrolled but remain in the community. 
Moreover, Congress has clearly indicated its disagreement with the Court’s 
attempt to draw the line at enrolled citizenship by legislatively reversing the 
Court’s holding almost immediately. 
This article has presented a third option for determining the scope of tribal 
criminal jurisdiction by defining who is sufficiently affiliated with a tribal 
community such that he or she is a fair subject of criminal prosecution. This 
standard, which asks whether a defendant is recognized by the tribal 
community as a member, is already employed by some tribes seeking to 
balance acknowledgement of federal law limitations on tribal jurisdiction 
with careful analysis of the proper scope of tribal criminal powers. This 
standard also tracks the one used by Congress in VAWA. Compared to other 
possible standards, the community recognition standard protects sovereignty 
better, is more closely aligned with the functions of criminal jurisdiction, and 
better reflects the current rules governing tribal jurisdiction. It is also a way to 
make sense of the Oliphant prohibition on jurisdiction over non-Indian 
outsiders, Congress’ confirmation of jurisdiction over the many nonmember 
Indians living on reservations, and Congress’ recent restoration of jurisdiction 
over non-Indian domestic violence offenders with ties to the tribe. 
Because the community recognition standard avoids the citizenship-
versus-blood dichotomy, it provides a new potential answer to the equal 
                                                                                                                 
 453. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990). 
 454. The term “member” also has no static definition, but the Duro court described 
membership in terms of consent and political participation, suggesting that membership in 
this context means enrollment. Since the decision, tribal membership has often been equated 
with formal enrollment in a tribe. While I argue here for a broader understanding of what 
constitutes membership in a tribal community, I assume that others who use the term 
“membership” mean to refer to formal citizenship (also called enrollment) unless they 
specifically note otherwise. 
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protection questions haunting Indian law. It does so by demonstrating that 
legal Indianness is a political classification in the sense that it denotes 
individuals who are affiliated with modern tribal governments, but that the 
contours of individual affiliation with a political community are varied, 
context-dependent, and not reducible to either ancestry or to a rigid 
consent-based view of tribal citizenship. While this article has examined the 
particular context of criminal jurisdiction, its critique of the over-reliance 
on citizenship and its suggestion of an alternative way to define the 
boundaries of tribes as political communities should encourage a 
reevaluation of citizenship-based standards in all contexts. 
Using community recognition as the federal standard for tribal 
jurisdiction will not solve all the problems faced by tribes seeking to build 
strong justice systems, protect their communities, and ensure law and order 
within their territory. There is no doubt that when the Supreme Court 
carved a gaping hole in tribes’ territorial jurisdiction, and Congress failed to 
fully restore that jurisdiction, tribal sovereignty, tribal justice systems, and 
tribal people were deeply affected. For this reason, a federal commission 
appointed to study criminal justice in Indian country has rightly 
recommended that tribes be given the option of reassuming exclusive 
criminal jurisdiction over all offenders in their territory—a legislative 
Oliphant fix.455 
The standard proposed here is not a fix, but a reexamination and 
reinterpretation of the existing limits. Like much of Indian law, modern 
criminal jurisdiction rules may seem to be the result of policy shifts and 
inconsistent decisions. The community recognition standard is an attempt to 
identify the organizing principles that underlie what is commonly perceived 
as a set of disconnected rules, and to do so by centering tribal law and tribal 
courts.  
This article is a call for tribal courts to examine their own jurisdiction via 
tribal law, and for federal courts to follow their lead when reviewing their 
jurisdiction—to recognize that the scope of tribal criminal jurisdiction may 
be different than the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction. It is also a plea 
to tribal courts not to cede any more of their inherent jurisdiction than is 
absolutely required by federal law, and for federal courts to recognize this 
as the correct approach. It is a long overdue attempt to examine tribal 
criminal justice systems on their own terms, rather than treating them as 
half-formed institutions necessary only to fill in the gaps left by other 
governments. 
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